Is the Gaza Resistance diminishing? Data from February and October 2024

Tim Anderson

Part 1: February 2024, original post 2 March 2024, here https://english.almayadeen.net/articles/analysis/is-the-gaza-resistance-diminishing

Given the inability of the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority (PA) to even slow down the pace of land theft and ethnic cleansing on the West Bank, or break the siege on Gaza, Palestinian public opinion has turned against the PA and has become more favourable to the Resistance.

The resistance is here to stay – graphic from Al Mayadeen

A number of theories are circulating about the capacity of the Palestinian and allied armed resistance, as the Israeli reprisal slaughter of civilians in Gaza proceeds. Information gathered by Iran’s Press TV for the month of February 2024 allows us a better perspective. Overall, despite the widely denounced genocidal bombing and siege, there is little sign that Gaza Resistance activity is diminishing.

Press TV lists items of Resistance activity on a daily basis, with brief descriptions of each. The list includes regional resistance actions by Hezbollah (Lebanon), the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, and the Yemeni armed forces (called ‘the Houthis’ by Western governments and media, which do not want to recognise Yemen’s revolutionary government).

Most of the Palestine resistance activity listed is in Gaza, the Hezbollah activity is in the northern parts of occupied Palestine as well as parts of occupied Lebanon and Syria. 

Details in the listings afford us a rough idea of which activities involved heavy weapons, such as artillery of 100mm or above, or heavy rockets (e.g. heavy Katyushas, Falaq and Burkan rockets) and long-range drones. However, this information is insufficient.

Put into numerical form, the raw data (1-27 February 2024) appears in the graphic below. It is mostly for the militia of six Palestinian Resistance factions: Al-Qassam (Hamas), Al-Quds (Palestinian Islamic Jihad), Al-Aqsa and Al-Asifah (both Fatah), Mujahideen, Abu Ali Mustafa (PFLP) and Omar al-Qasim (DFLP). Data also appears for Hezbollah, Iraq’s Islamic Resistance and the Yemeni armed forces.

Key points which can be drawn from this data are as follows: 

1.     Rumours that Hamas’s armed wing(al-Qassam) has been decimated are false. Al Qassam carried out multiple operations on most days in February and 88 in total, many of them with heavy weapons such as 105 and 107 shells. One-third of their operations were in the last week of February.

2.    Hamas is far from alone. There were almost the same number of operations each by the Al-Quds (PIJ) and the Al-Aqsa and Al Asifah Brigades (Fatah) – 90 and 81 respectively. However, it seems that Al-Qassam may have used more heavy weapons. Overall Al-Qassam accounted for about one-quarter of the combined Palestinian Resistance operations. All this makes even more illusory the supposed Israeli aim of eliminating “Hamas”. 

3.   It is notable that the militia of Fatah (the dominant party of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority: PA) is very active in armed resistance, given that the Fatah-led PLO ‘recognises’ “Israel” and the Fatah-dominated PA’s prestige is at an all-time low, given its collaborationist role in recent decades. The Fatah Resistance groups (mainly the Al-Aqsa Brigades but also Al-Asifah) may be vindicating the party to some extent, in the eyes of Palestinian people. 

4.  Hezbollah is the most active force imposing itself on the Israeli military, with 202 operations in February. Hezbollah does not operate in the Gaza theatre but is certainly drawing a substantial part of the Israeli military away from Gaza. The descriptions at Press TV do not allow too much analysis of the weapons used, but many have included heavy weapons. It is well known that Hezbollah has heavy weapons and that much of its missile arsenal remains in reserve. 

5.  There is no real sign of the armed resistance flagging. The Al-Qassam, Al-Quds, Al-Aqsa and Hezbollah militia all carried out more operations in the second half of February than in the first half. Of course, this has come at a cost. Hezbollah reported on 27 February that it has lost 209 fighters in the current round. Yet, as the data shows, its operations also are not slowing down.

6.   Smaller resistance groups linked to the PFLP (Abu Ali Mustafa) and the DFLP (Omar al-Qasim) carried out another 21 operations in February. Two operations were also recorded for the Nasser Salah al-Din Brigades (on 21 Feb and 22 Feb).

Given the inability of the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority (PA) to even slow down the pace of land theft and ethnic cleansing on the West Bank, or break the siege on Gaza, Palestinian public opinion has turned against the PA and has become more favourable to the Resistance. In November-December 2023, most of those polled (72%; 82% in the West Bank and 57% in the Gaza Strip) supported the offensive of October 7. 95% believe the Israelis committed war crimes in their attacks on Gaza; while only 10% believed Hamas committed war crimes. 

The two most popular options for future governance of Gaza were Hamas (60%) or a Palestinian Unity government excluding PA ‘President’ Mahmoud Abbas (16%). Another recent poll showed that 79% of Palestinians think unelected ‘President’ Mahmoud Abbas should resign. The Fatah-led PA has not faced an election since 2006, when it lost to Hamas. Nevertheless, propped up by funding from Washington, the EU, and some Arab monarchies, Abbas and the PA still present themselves as the municipal rulers of the occupied Palestinian territories. Polls say that 80% in the West Bank and 61% in the Gaza Strip believe Hamas will succeed in returning to rule over the Gaza Strip despite the Israeli operations.

On the other side, Washington has been trying to reshape the PA and use it as a tool to control Gaza, after the US-enabled bombing ends. Hence the resignation of the entire PA Cabinet, under US pressure, but not that of the most unpopular figure, Mahmoud Abbas. Demanding even greater compliance with the Israelis will hardly add legitimacy to Abbas or the PA, in the eyes of the Palestinian population. 

The Resistance is here to stay, and with even greater popular support.

Update, October 2024

Photo: rally for Palestine in Sanaa, capital of Yemen. Through 2024 Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Yemen’s Ansarallah-led revolutionary government and the Iraqi resistance (Hashid al Shaabi) have played an increasingly important role in defending the Palestinian people

In February this year I asked the question “Is the Resistance in Gaza diminishing?” under the pulverising blows of genocidal Israeli operations.  Thanks to data collected by Press TV on resistance operations against the Israeli regime, cited according to each resistance group, it was possible to give some tentative answers, both in February 2024 and again in Sept-October 2024.

More recently the attacks by al Qassam (Hamas) have decreased and have been overtaken by those of the al Quds (PIJ) and al Aqsa (Fatah) brigades, while the role of Hezbollah and the regional resistance has increased. Overall resistance activity remains about the same, when we combine the activity of both Gaza groups and Hezbollah.

Notwithstanding the fact that individual operations vary in scale and character, including the extent to which they used heavy weapons, these were the answers in February 2024.

1.     Rumours that Hamas’s armed wing (al-Qassam) has been decimated were false. Al Qassam carried out multiple operations on most days in February and 88 in total, many of them with heavy weapons such as 105 and 107 shells. One-third of their February operations were in the last week of February.

2.    Hamas was far from alone. There were almost the same number of operations each by the Al-Quds (PIJ) and the Al-Aqsa and Al Asifah Brigades (Fatah) – 90 and 81 respectively.

3.   It was notable that the militia of Fatah (the dominant party of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority: PA) remained very active in armed resistance operations in Gaza.

4.  Nevertheless, Hezbollah was the most active force imposing itself on the Israeli military, with 202 operations in February.  

5.  There was no real sign of the armed resistance flagging. The Al-Qassam, Al-Quds, Al-Aqsa and Hezbollah militia all carried out more operations in the second half of February than in the first half.

6.   Smaller resistance groups linked to the PFLP (Abu Ali Mustafa), the DFLP (Omar al-Qasim) and others carried out another 21 operations in February.

In September-October (10 September -7 October 2024), one year after 7 October 2023, an updated assessment was made, with details shown in Table 1. The main conclusions were:

1. September saw consistent but fewer attacks by al Qassam (an average of 1.25 per day compared to 3.6 in February), though this was supplemented by steady activity from PIJ’s al Quds Brigade (1.6 per day compared to 3.4 in February) and Fatah’s al Aqsa (2.25/day compared to 3.6 in February).

2. The big change was a large increase in Hezbollah activity, from the northern border of occupied Palestine, with 13 attacks per day in Sept-Oct compared to 7 in February.

3. Combining the activity of all Gaza groups and Hezbollah there were 20.5 attacks per day in February and 20 in Sept-October. Hezbollah thus played a more important role, contributing almost 2/3 of resistance attacks on the Israeli regime.

4. Added to this was increased activity from the Iraqi resistance and Yemen, about double the number of attacks were made in Sept-October compared to February. On top of this is the increasing role of Iran, with its missile attacks of October 1-2 on Israeli military bases having a more direct impact compared to its volley of drone and missiles in April, which were mainly probing the air defences of the regime and its allies.

5. In other words, Hamas (al Qassam) activity did fall off later in 2024, even forming a smaller minority of overall Gaza resistance activity, but the increased regional resistance activity, particularly that of Hezbollah, played a much larger role, such that overall resistance activity remained at about the same level.

6. There was no decrease in Hezbollah attacks after the 27 September assassination of the group’s Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah and there was an increase in Hezbollah activity after the 1 October attempt by the Israelis to invade south Lebanon.

With the catastrophic damage done to the entire Gaza population, the role of the regional resistance – Hezbollah, the Iraqi resistance, the revolutionary government in Yemen and the Islamic Republic of Iran – seems likely to continue and perhaps increase its importance in weakening the Israeli regime.