by Bassam Abu Abdallah, 1 December 2025
The rise of Islamic fundamentalism cannot be understood without returning to the seed planted by Hasan al-Banna in 1928. The man who began with simple sermons in Ismailia ended up founding an organization built on “al-bay‘a” (the pledge), and “hearing and obedience”—concepts drawn from the model of a closed sectarian group, not from the modern state. In his Epistle of Teachings, al-Banna articulated the notion of “al-ustādhiyya,” which transforms the organization into a project above the state and turns politics into worship and criticism into betrayal. This foundation later produced a culture of political takfīr, for whoever sees himself as “bearer of the divine mission” must see society as deficient, corrupt, ignorant, and in need of reshaping.
Second — Sayyid Qutb transformed this insularity into a total existential battle. In his infamous work Milestones, he wrote his most dangerous line: “Time has turned back to the state it was in when Islam came.” Meaning that everything humanity built over 13 centuries had reverted to jāhiliyya. This concept is the cornerstone of modern takfīr ideology. If society, the state, and institutions are considered jāhiliyya, then salvation can only come through rupture, confrontation, and the establishment of “the Muslim society.” Thus extremism became systematic: da‘wa, then organization, then confrontation. For this reason the thinker Muhammad Imara said that Qutb “was not writing politics; he was writing revolutionary theology.”
Third — Abul A‘la al-Mawdudi, whom Qutb later drew from, offered the most influential doctrinal foundation for the concept of “ḥākimiyya.” In The Four Key Terms and Islamic Law and Constitution, he laid down the rule: “Sovereignty belongs to God alone; whoever legislates besides Him is an unbeliever.” Though theoretical, this means in practice that any parliament, constitution, or civil law is an assault on God. Here lies the root rejection of the modern state. Citizenship, law, and institutions lose meaning; politics becomes an extension of creed. And for this reason no political experiment built on the ideas of al-Mawdudi, Qutb, or al-Banna has ever succeeded in building a state—because by nature their project undermines the state.
Fourth — With Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden, the idea moved from text to blood. Azzam, in Defense of the Muslim Lands, declared: “Jihad continues until the Day of Judgment,” meaning war is not circumstantial but eternal destiny. Bin Laden transformed this doctrine into a global armed network based on “fighting the far enemy” to topple regimes. Takfīr became not just a theological judgment but a violent practice. Meanwhile Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi—the author of Millat Ibrahim—provided the most rigid doctrinal foundation with his declaration: “Disavowal of the polytheists is an essential pillar of religion.” This text became the core doctrine for all takfīrī groups, from al-Qaeda to ISIS. They see the world through a severe binary: belief vs. disbelief, loyalty vs. disavowal, abode of Islam vs. abode of infidelity. In such a worldview, the modern state becomes treason, the constitution polytheism, opposition apostasy, and citizens mere categories of “tyrants” and “their helpers.”
Fifth — Field experience has proven that the problem is not in the individuals but in the ideological structure itself. In Afghanistan in the 1980s, Azzam proposed the model of an “armed nation” instead of a state. In Sudan under al-Turabi, the experiment failed because the state turned into a battlefield of organizational loyalties. In Gaza, the project became a perpetual struggle with both internal and external enemies. ISIS offered the starkest model: an emirate without institutions, a rule built on blood, a system sustainable only through war. None of this is an aberration—it is the natural outcome of an ideology based on ḥākimiyya, loyalty-and-disavowal, and perpetual jihad. A society built on takfīr can only produce more takfīr.
Sixth — In the recent Syrian experiment—under Ahmad al-Shar‘a since 8 December 2024—all of this ideology appeared naked, without masks. In just one year, the promises the movement marketed—good governance, justice, integrity, security, economic reform—collapsed. What emerged instead was unprecedented sectarian incitement, hatred against Alawites, Druze, and Christians, leading to genocidal massacres in the coast and Suwayda, ongoing killings and daily assaults, rampant crime, service collapse, and the dismantling of state institutions. Not because the authorities were merely corrupt, but because the ideological model itself rejects the state, cannot tolerate diversity, and sees people not as citizens but as categories of believers and apostates. Al-Shar‘a and his regime demonstrated conclusively: when this ideology reaches power, it does not produce a state—it produces a closed emirate that destroys society in the name of purifying it. This is why they never utter the words democracy or “rule of the people,” because their doctrine rejects them. What they offer are theatrical cosmetic gestures to appease external audiences—software, not hardware.
Seventh — Collaboration with Western geopolitical projects is not incidental; it is a continuous pattern since the birth of this ideology. The British encouraged the Brotherhood early on to contain the Egyptian nationalist movement. The Americans supported the mujahideen under Azzam and bin Laden in Afghanistan. France and the United States supported political Islam against national governments from Algeria to Syria. Even today, some in the West still view these groups as tools to fragment states and societies. As Zbigniew Brzezinski admitted years after supporting Islamist fighters: “We created a monster, but it was a useful monster.” Today, when the Syrian experiment presents itself as “liberation,” reality exposes it as a project that fractures society along sectarian lines, serving external interests far more than Syrian ones.
Eighth — The doctrine of “loyalty and disavowal” is the single biggest structural reason for the failure of the fundamentalist project. It means an individual’s loyalty is not to the state or law, but to the group; his disavowal is not of injustice or corruption, but of those who differ religiously or sectarianly. Thus these movements collapse whenever they govern, because a state requires an inclusive social contract, while they require ideological alignment. The state is built on law; they are built on obedience. The state is built on citizenship; they are built on faith-based sorting. All their experiments end in internal splits: the Brotherhood fractured; al-Qaeda splintered; ISIS split into three formations; even the Shar‘a regime imploded within months.
Ninth — Economically and administratively, these movements have no conception of the modern state. No economic vision, no stable institutions, no professional administration—only the replacement of competence with loyalty, expertise with the pledge, citizenship with organizational belonging. In the recent Syrian experience, service and economic structures collapsed because the new authorities do not see these sectors as institutions of knowledge but as “spoils.” State resources turn into distributed spheres of influence; every security apparatus becomes a tool for settling scores. Thus the state is dismantled in the name of religion, society destroyed in the name of creed, and dissent criminalized in the name of “applying sharī‘a.”
Tenth — French philosopher Roger Garaudy once said a sentence that explains everything: “Ideas incapable of creating life can only create death.” This is the essence of the fundamentalist project for a century: a doctrine unable to build a state, so it builds an emirate; unable to produce law, so it collapses into takfīr; unable to deliver development, so it substitutes jihad; unable to tolerate diversity, so it turns it into war; unable to protect society, so it transforms it into a jungle. Every time it is applied, the contradiction between rhetoric and reality becomes clear. They speak of an “Ummah,” while they tear societies apart. They speak of “justice,” while drowning in corruption. They speak of “sharī‘a,” while justifying every violation in its name. These are not the mistakes of individuals—they are the inevitable result of an ideological structure that does not belong to this era, does not understand the state, and cannot comprehend the world.
Finally — The scientific and objective conclusion is clear: the fundamentalist project collapsed from within before it collapsed from without. It fell because it lacks the conditions for survival, the ability to build a viable human model—offering instead a model of death, killing, and destruction. It fell morally because its discourse contradicts its practice, and hypocrisy became the rule, not the exception. From Hasan al-Banna to Sayyid Qutb to al-Mawdudi to bin Laden to al-Maqdisi to Ahmad al-Shar‘a, the chain is one and the outcome the same: the destruction of state and society, the failure of the emirate model, and the downfall of a project that has not succeeded once in an entire century.
Jolani / al Sharaa
