ANCIENT IMPERIALISM: CONTEMPORARY JUSTIFICATIONS [1] *

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I

IMPERIALISM is a word of relatively recent coinage.[2] Down to the middle of the nineteenth century, its cognate "imperialist" meant in English a supporter of the Holy Roman Empire and then of the first and second Napoleonic Empires. The term "imperialism" appeared about 1860 to signify: "an imperial system of government; the rule of an emperor, especially when despotic or arbitrary." The expansionist policy of the British government during the second half of the nineteenth century gave the word a slightly different twist. "Imperialism" became in the 1890's a political catchword which denoted either "the principle or spirit of empire" or more specifically, "the principle or policy of seeking an extension of empire." [3] The present discussion will use the word only in the last of these meanings, that is, an urge on the part of one people to extend its political rule over others. Though the word "imperialism" itself is modern, this drive has characterized certain peoples as far back as history reaches. In particular, it characterized the Persians, the Athenians, the Macedonians, and the Romans.[4] Moreover, reflective persons among these ancient peoples were not blind to its existence, whatever the term, ἀρχή, δυναστεία, or *imperium*, which they applied to it. Their attempts to rationalize and justify the imperialism of their respective peoples form a suitable introduction to a consideration of imperialism in general.

The imperialistic urge begins as an attempt by a given people forcefully to establish its racial, political, cultural, or economic domination over other peoples. If the attempt succeeds, there results a state of

* Because of the length of the notes to this article, they have been printed after the text.

vast size composed of more or less distinct cultural units. These lead their own diverse cultural lives subject to a single centralized will, which gives them equal recognition socially, politically, economically, and culturally.[5] While every imperialistic people attempts to some extent to impose its political and cultural patterns upon its conquests, empires as just defined are characterized by a wide tolerance on the part of the ruling people for local political and cultural systems. Generally any uniformity results rather from imitation of the dominant system by the subjects than from the forceful imposition thereof. If there is a successful imposition of the dominant system, the resultant elimination of differences produces a unified "national" state rather than an empire. The empires with which this discussion is concerned displayed to a marked degree tolerance of local differences.

The causes and methods of imperialism have been much discussed since the publication in 1902 of a critique of British imperialism by an anti-imperialist, J. A. Hobson.[6] His argument "was to the effect that whereas various real and powerful motives of pride, prestige, and pugnacity, together with the more altruistic professions of a civilizing mission, figured as causes of imperial expansion, the dominant directive motive was the demand for markets and for profitable investment by the exporting and financial classes within each imperialistic regime."[7] This economic interpretation of imperialism became very fashionable and has been applied both to Athens and to Rome.[8] However, W. L. Langer pointed out in a critique of Hobson's book, published in 1935, that the thesis is not in itself tenable and that other factors, recognized by Hobson as subsidiary, have as much importance as the economic.[9] For instance, imperialism, by satisfying the superiority complex of the general public, affords demagogues the opportunity to enlarge on the theme of conquest.[10] Or a people who thinks itself better than its neighbors may invoke "sociological Darwinism," the presumed "right" of the fittest to dominate over the less fit and to carve up the decadent.[11] Many peoples sincerely feel that they have a better religion or higher culture than others and should extend the benefits thereof by a sort of missionary imperialism.[12] In the end, the strongest element in the imperialistic urge is probably the atavistic, irrational "disposition of a state to forceful

expansion without any special object and without a definable limit." [13] Although the present discussion is not concerned primarily with the causes and methods of imperialism, it will appear that all the above motives were invoked by ancient thinkers to account for contemporary empire-building.

As a last prefatory qualification, the definition of imperialism here adopted has no reference to the form of government of a people which evidences the imperialistic urge.[14] The earlier significance of imperialism was indeed, "the rule of an emperor, especially when despotic or arbitrary." Because British imperialism at the end of the nineteenth century was connected with Disraeli's elevation of Queen Victoria to be Empress of India in 1877, even the derivative meaning with which this discussion is concerned carries an overtone not only of a wide-flung empire including many peoples but also of a single ruler to whose will they are all equally subject. Yet Athens in the fifth century B.C. was ruled by its popular assemblies, and republican Rome during its Mediterranean expansion by an oligarchic senate. It may be that, in antiquity, Cyrus and Alexander found their counterparts in Pericles and Pompey and in modern times that a Disraeli or a Teddy Roosevelt were imperialist successors to Napoleon; that, in short, imperialism, whether as applied to a form of government or to the expansion of national domination, generally reflects the guidance of a single will, whereas an aristocracy or oligarchy is opposed to expansion.[15] Even so, the constitution, under which the imperialistic urge of a people is aroused and directed by a single forceful individual, need not be monarchical.

II

It is likely that the Egyptian Pharaohs who sought to extend their rule outside of the Nile Valley and the successive kingdoms which attempted to dominate the Mesopotamian Valley and adjacent areas responded simply to the atavistic urge towards conquest whether felt by the whole people or by the ruler.[16] For the purpose of the present discussion, only the last of these, the Persian, need be considered. For the Persian Empire most completely of them all transcended the concept of mere conquest and developed a "heterogeneous empire,

subdivided not into nations but into administrative districts." [17] The Persians did not, on the whole, force their religion and language upon conquered peoples. They established a loose administrative unity, which depended largely on the loyalty of the governors to the ruler and on such common services as roads, coinage, and defense. The different peoples incorporated in the Persian Empire received equal treatment and continued to enjoy their native cultures.[18] Thus the Persians set the pattern of an imperial, rather than a nationalistic, state for Alexander and the Romans to follow.[19]

Morevoer, the Persian kings seem to have rationalized their atavistic urge to conquer by explicitly justifying their rule on the basis of their Zoroastrian religion.[20] Zoroaster had taught that throughout the universe the forces of good are aligned against the forces of evil. The Persian king claimed to represent on earth the divine Lord of All Good. It was therefore the duty of all men of good will to unite under him in the truceless conflict against evil. He in turn was presumed to rule according to justice and equity in the straight way of the law of the Lord of Good.[21] This is the missionary or moral justification of imperialism, namely, that rulers are entitled to rule because they are good and rule justly.

III

The particularism which characterized Greek politics was even from the time of Homer counterbalanced by a sense of common race. When in the early days one community sought to expand at the expense of its neighbors, it did so either by conquest, as Sparta annexed Messene, by absorption, as Athens incorporated Attica, or by simple federation, as Thebes organized Boeotia. In these cases, the small area affected and the kinship of the peoples concerned prevent us from calling the domination imperialistic.[22] When in the sixth century B.C. Sparta aspired to the leadership of Greece, she exercised only a loose leadership or hegemony and not direct rule. When Athens, by her courage during the Persian Wars, won the preëminence from Sparta after 479 B.C., she too attempted at first only a hegemony of communities, particularly of those in the Aegean area, who had formed a common league with its headquarters at the island

shrine of Delos. But the Athenian populace began to throw off the restraints of the old-fashioned conservative control which had previously been exercised by the well-to-do landed families. They soon realized what the empire might mean to them in jobs and revenue and their appetites were whetted by the new demagogic leaders, Ephialtes and Pericles.[23] In 454 B.C. the treasury of the League was shifted from Delos to Athens.[24] Thereafter the Athenians treated the allied states as subjects, subjects to be sure of the same language and race, but subjects who enjoyed under Athenian domination their local political and cultural life. Hence the Athenian control may justly be called imperialistic.

Little contemporary justification of the Athenian Empire survives from the period before the Peloponnesian War.[25] The tragedians and Herodotus are silent. However a writer of the succeeding generation, who had witnessed the downfall of the empire, purports to give Pericles' own justification of his imperialistic policy. Thucydides placed in the mouth of Pericles the famous Funeral Oration, delivered in 430 B.C. over those who had fallen during the first year of the war.[26] In the course of this exaltation of Athens, Thucydides makes Pericles claim that the city was the school of Hellas, the champion of freedom, and the cultural leader whose rule conveyed benefits which far outweighed the revenues which she derived from her subjects.[27] According to Thucydides, therefore, Pericles propounded the missionary justification for imperialism, on a cultural rather than, as had the Persians, on a religious basis.

In the spring of 430 B.C. a terrible plague devastated Athens. It produced not only a severe loss of man power but also, as Thucydides remarks, a terrible decline in public and private morality.[28] The populace turned against Pericles as the cause of their woes and Thucydides attributes to him a speech in his own defense in which there is a marked change of tone from the high idealism of the Funeral Oration.[29] In defense of his policy of imperialism based on control of the sea, he no longer appealed to Athenian culture but to the self-interest of the Athenians in maintaining both the power and the reputation which they had attained, an interest which, he felt, far outweighed their losses in Attica because of the invasion of the

Spartans or the afflictions resulting from the plague. In particular, he pointed out to the populace that they were not fighting merely to preserve their freedom and avert slavery, but to preserve their empire and avoid revenge for their unpopular rule. It was too late for them to abandon the empire, for the rule which they held was like a tyranny — ὡς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἤδη ἔχετε αὐτήν — which, unjust though it may have been to assume, was certainly dangerous to let go. Only a subject state, not an imperial one, could afford the luxury of submission.[30]

Pericles won back popular support, but in the following year, 429 B.C., he died and the leadership passed to less worthy, more self-centered men.[31] These new demagogues developed the selfish motives of profit and of survival which were adumbrated in Pericles' defense of his imperial program.[32] These justifications appear frequently in Thucydides' account of the speeches and dealings of Athens during the course of the Peloponnesian War. The classic expression of the justification in terms of power politics is attributed to Cleon, in the speech in which he urged that the people of Mytilene be severely punished for their abortive attempt to revolt from the empire in 427 B.C.[33] He remarks to the Athenians in an almost verbatim quotation from Pericles: "you should remember that your empire is a despotism — ὅτι τυραννίδα ἔχετε τὴν ἀρχήν — exercised over unwilling subjects."[34] Similarly, the Athenian emissaries who were sent in 416 B.C. to urge the people of Melos to join the empire voluntarily rather than to await conquest disclaimed that the Athenian rule was justified because of the Athenian defeat of Persia two generations previously, and based their argument purely on expediency, τὸ ξυμφέρον.[35] A year later, in the great debate on the wisdom of attempting to occupy Sicily, Alcibiades, according to Thucydides, supported the expedition in opposition to Nicias on slightly different grounds. He appealed to national pride and argued that unless the empire continued to expand it would begin to decay.[36]

The shift from the ideals of Pericles to the motives of self-interest and national pride does not, naturally, reflect a shift in Thucydides' own feelings. He was sufficient of a dramatist so that it is hard to discover what he himself felt about the empire. Despite his admiration

for Pericles, he may have thought that some sort of federal arrangement under Athenian hegemony would have been more successful.[37] Certainly he held that the selfish and ruthless imperialism of the populace under its demagogic leaders, whether these were the self-made Cleon or the brilliant and ambitious aristocrat Alcibiades, had been the ruin of Athens. The arguments of the demagogues undoubtedly reflect the thesis advanced by the more wordly and practical of the contemporary modernists, the Sophists.[38] One of these, Thrasymachus, is introduced into Plato's *Republic*, whose dramatic date is about 420 B.C., to support the thesis that justice is whatever the stronger party can get away with.[39] The same argument is brought out, whether sarcastically or not critics fail to agree, in a little essay on the Athenian government preserved among the works of Xenophon. This essay apparently presents the viewpoint of a conservative oligarch in the mid years of the Peloponnesian War.[40] The author points out to what a degree the empire benefited the Athenian populace in terms of revenues and jobs. Finally, the conservative comic poet Aristophanes, who looked back longingly to the heroic days of the "Marathonomachoi," the victors over Persia, constantly criticized the selfish imperialism that was ruining Athens by involving it in the long-drawn-out war with Sparta.[41]

And, in fact, Athens was ruined and her ruin left a lasting conviction among Greek and Roman political thinkers that popular democratic rule was as dangerous, if not more so, as the much hated tyranny.[42] Surviving classical literature in general represents the conservative view of the vested, propertied interests. Plato and Aristotle, spokesmen for these interests, point to the downfall of Athens as a justification for aristocratic control of a city-state and for avoidance of imperialistic expansion beyond the narrow geographic limits in which the city-state could function.[43] During the fourth century B.C., the dominance of Sparta and then of Thebes in Greece reverted to a hegemony over allies as against direct rule.[44] Athens, when she tried to revive her Aegean hegemony, expressly agreed to avoid those imperialistic abuses which had made her previous dominance so unpopular.[45]

IV

Yet the urge towards imperialism did not die out in Greece. The distinguished political pamphleteer of the fourth century B.C., Isocrates, sought a cure for the constant dissensions between the particularist city-states in the advocacy of Pan-Hellenism.[46] For an emotional ground on which to unite all Greeks, he appealed to the heroic period of the Persian Wars when all differences had been sunk in a common effort against an alien barbarian foe. He advocated a crusade against the Persian empire to free the cities of Asia Minor, which had definitely been surrendered to the Great King in 387 B.C. by the so-called King's Peace or Peace of Antalcidas.[47] Hence the Pan-Hellenism of Isocrates required as a corollary an imperialistic war which would unite all Greeks against a common foe and which would depend on a common feeling of Greek superiority to other, non-Greek peoples. This is not the place to trace the history in Greek literature of the concept of the barbarian, the non-Greek, and of the conflicting attitudes, often found in the same author, both of admiration for non-Greek peoples and of superiority to them.[48] Isocrates, however, paved the way for a new definition of the contrast between Greek and barbarian. Thereafter this contrast was less and less racial and more and more one between civilized and uncivilized. Isocrates himself, in his *Panegyric* on Athens, said: "so far has our city left the rest of mankind behind her in thought and speech that her students have become the teachers of others, and she has made the name of the Hellenes to seem to be no longer one of race but of intellect, and those rather to be called Hellenes who share in our culture than in our descent."[49] Though he may have had in mind the civilizing effect of Athens on other Greeks to which Pericles had appealed, his idea was developed practically by Alexander's successors and philosophically by the Stoics to divide mankind into those on the one hand who were Hellenized, that is civilized, and were therefore fit to rule both themselves and others, and those on the contrary who were not civilized, who were barbarians, by nature slaves, and who needed the rule of their betters.[50]

Isocrates' Pan-Hellenic crusade had a second corollary, the need

of a leader who would transcend the individual city-states. As Barker says, "it was not that he sought a monarchy or believed in a monarchy. He sought only a new Agamemnon, commander-in-chief of the forces of a new Greek symmachy . . . the symmachy of his dream would thus have been a military *entente* of autonomous cities under a generalissimo who might be king in his own country, but among his allies was simply a chosen commander." [51] Isocrates looked in various quarters for such a leader. Sentimentally he hoped that Athens might assume the role, but she preferred her particularism and independence.[52] He therefore turned to such contemporary rulers as Nicocles of Cyprus, Dionysius of Syracuse, and Archidamus of Sparta.[53] But in the end he settled on Philip of Macedon, in whom he hoped to find the character of soul, the human sympathy, and the good will towards the Greeks which should characterize his ideal leader.[54] Hence this second corollary of the Isocratean program popularized the concept of the ideal ruler, a concept also presented by Xenophon in his *Cyropaedeia* in a more practical form than in the philosopher-king of Plato's *Republic*.[55] In Goodenough's words: "it is notable that Isocrates, the pupil of Gorgias, does not once approach the problem of royalty or tyranny from the point of view of the Sophists. The right of the strong to assert himself is never hinted. The sanction of monarchy is the legal, moral, and philosophical character of the ruler and his actions." [56]

V

Isocrates, born in the heyday of the Periclean Age, in 436 B.C., died a few days after the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 B.C.[57] It is doubtful whether Milton's words, based on an ancient tradition, really represent his feelings:

> as that dishonest victory
> At *Chaeronea*, fatal to liberty
> Kill'd with report that Old man eloquent . . .[58]

He might well have regarded Philip's triumph as the final defeat of the Greek particularism which Demosthenes had personified and the first step towards the realization of his own Pan-Hellenic ideal.

Certainly Alexander, who succeeded as a youth of twenty to his father's throne in 336 B.C., began by following very closely the program of Isocrates.[59] It appears probable that initially Alexander, pupil of Aristotle and ardent admirer of Homer, conceived himself to be the leader of a Pan-Hellenic crusade of Greeks for the liberation of Asia Minor, a crusade the way for which had been prepared by nearly a century of Greek operations across the Aegean.[60] But his easy penetration beyond Asia Minor, a penetration which again had been foreshadowed by the march of Cyrus the Younger to Babylon and, after his defeat, the retreat thence of Xenophon's Ten Thousand, broadened Alexander's horizons.[61] In the end he found himself conqueror of the whole Persian Empire. He must have come to realize that so vast a territory and such a conglomerate of peoples required some other form of government than the tribal monarchy which he exercised over his Macedonians or the leadership of a Greek league. The natural form of government to which to turn was that with which the area was already familiar, an empire. This is not the place to attempt to analyze what Alexander finally purposed; that has recently been done ably by Professor Robinson. In setting himself up as a super-racial, semi-divine emperor, Alexander changed the character of his rule from the imperialistic domination by himself as leader of the Macedonians and Greeks over the barbarian Persians to the union of many different peoples, each of whom preserved their local political and cultural integrity, in equal subservience to his single will.[62] He may have conceived at the end that he could join the west to his eastern conquests and thus unite the whole inhabited world, what the Greeks called the οἰκουμένη, in one world-wide, or ecumenical, state.[63]

The successor states of the Hellenistic period were no longer, therefore, imperialistic in the sense of this discussion.[64] They did, indeed, compete with one another for the possession of certain border areas. But their rivalries and international politics resemble those of continental Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries rather than the imperialistic scramble of the nineteenth. Nevertheless the Hellenistic monarchies based their rule to some extent on imperialistic principles. To a greater or less degree, they recognized that the Mace-

donians and Greeks constituted a ruling class in virtue of their superior culture and excellence. By thus excluding in varying degrees the subject natives from their administrations and armies, they fell short of Alexander's ideal that good men should be promoted no matter what their race.[65] Secondly, they attempted, again in varying degrees, to Hellenize their subjects and thus carried out a civilizing mission with which Alexander would probably have agreed.[66] Finally, the ruler, save in the Macedonian kingdom, was exalted as divine and as an "animate law" whose spoken word, proceeding ultimately from eternal truth and wisdom, took the place of the written law which had been the basis of the Greek city-state.[67] The Hellenistic world generally accepted the traditional political theory that an aristocratic, sovereign city-state represented the finest framework for man. But this theory had less and less relation to the pragmatic political fact that the prevailing form of sovereign state was a monarchy, based on concepts which may justly be called imperialistic. This contrast between theory and fact was seriously to hamper the Romans when it came their turn to face the problem of empire.[68]

VI

Rome's slow rise to the dominance of the Italian peninsula south of the Po Valley preceded the beginnings of her cultural self-consciousness as expressed in literature. The later historians who have preserved the record of early Rome interpreted her rise in the light of her final conquest of the Mediterranean world.[69] What they say in explanation or justification of her first successes does not preserve contemporary evidence but is only hindsight. However, the beginnings of Roman literary self-expression are contemporary with her expansion into the Mediterranean world outside of Italy during the century from the outbreak of the First Punic War in 264 B.C. to the defeat of Perseus, King of Macedon, at Pydna in 168 B.C. The writers of this heroic century might well be expected not merely to account for but also to justify Rome's annexations of alien lands. It is true that, except for the plays of Plautus, only fragments survive of these authors, who wrote in both prose and verse, in Greek and in Latin.[70] These fragments, preserved in most cases to illustrate archaic

language and grammar, do not perhaps afford a fair basis for judging the tone of the whole literature.[71] Yet the plays of Plautus and the fragments of the two great early epics on Rome's history, that of Naevius on the First Punic War and that of Ennius on Rome's annals since the legendary era, do breathe an almost Homeric pride in Rome and attribute her extraordinary achievements to the virtue and bravery of her citizens.[72] But they give no justification in abstract terms for her expansion. It may well be that Tenney Frank was right to argue that Rome was not initially imperialistic and that her expansion was due mainly to her desire to secure peace by preventing the rise of any strong rival power.[73] Or her conquests may simply have been the result of the atavistic, unreflective urge of a military people to go on fighting.

A Greek, not a Roman, first attempted to philosophize on Rome's expansion. Polybius was brought to Rome as a hostage from the Achaean League in 167 B.C. after the Battle of Pydna.[74] Fortunately he was received into the leading liberal families at Rome, those of Aemilius Paullus and the Scipios. In particular, he early became a sort of tutor-counselor to Scipio Aemilianus. This young man was a son of Aemilius Paullus who had been adopted by the son of Scipio Africanus. He became the leading figure at Rome during the second half of the century, the conqueror of Carthage and of Numantia in Spain. Polybius was himself the son of a statesman and had been active in the affairs of the Achaean League. He was fascinated by the interplay in history between chance on the one hand and individual or collective intelligence and worth on the other; he had, for his time, advanced ethical standards of political and military behavior; and he possessed, after Thucydides, the deepest insight of any classical historian into the historical process and the correlation of events on a universal basis.[75] He set out to explain to contemporary Greeks why the Romans, whom they regarded as uncivilized barbarians, had become the dominant Mediterranean power.[76] He attributed the success of the Romans to their individual uprightness and to the excellence of their aristocratic constitution. This constitution was not the work of one lawgiver, like the famous constitutions of Greece, but the result of racial genius working itself out in a slow

historical development.[77] Towards the end of his *History* there are suggestions that he thought that these characteristics were breaking down and that Roman foreign policy was becoming more corrupt and selfish.[78] But at no point, at least in the surviving portions of his *History*, does he do more than explain. He does not try to justify Roman imperialism either on the ethical grounds of their superiority to other peoples or on the practical grounds that empire was necessary or advantageous to them.[79]

It is perhaps no accident that during Polybius' formative years at Rome there was apparently a clear policy of avoidance of annexation.[80] From 197 B.C., when, after the Second Punic War, Rome took over southern and eastern Spain, until 148 and 146 B.C., when she took direct charge of Macedon and Africa, no new provinces were acquired. Defeated countries were left, under what seemed adequate controls, to their own governments.[81] During this period, the thoughtful Romans with whom Polybius associated may not have sought justification for Roman imperialism because they did not conceive of her position as imperialistic.[82] In Italy, she had the hegemony of a loose organization of peoples largely of cognate race; abroad she ruled only where rule had been forced upon her and intervened elsewhere only to maintain a balance of power favorable to herself.

VII

Between the death of Polybius about 120 B.C. and the emergence of Cicero as a political figure in 70 B.C., Rome's position changed fundamentally.[83] The aristocratic city-state government so admired by Polybius was subject to severe attack on the one hand because of the insurgence of the popular assemblies, led first by the idealistic Gracchi and later by their demagogic successors, and on the other because ambitious generals tried to free themselves from senatorial control.[84] Both groups sought in particular to wrest the direction of foreign policy from the senate; the demagogues wanted to use provincial revenues for the benefit of the populace, the generals desired to achieve for themselves the glory and profit of conquest.[85] The result was that Rome's role in Mediterranean politics became selfishly and nakedly imperialistic.

Precisely at the opening of this period, in the middle of the second century B.C., Greek philosophers established themselves in Rome in the face of the opposition of old-fashioned people like Cato to the new-fangled learning.[86] Unlike Polybius, these philosophers apparently advanced abstract justifications for Rome's imperialism. The scanty fragments of the contemporary literature show no trace of such speculation.[87] There is good reason, however, for believing that the debate between Philus and Laelius preserved in the fragments of the third book of Cicero's treatise *On the Commonwealth*, though written in the fifties of the first century B.C., represents views advanced respectively by Carneades the Sceptic, who came to Rome as one of three ambassadors from Athens in 156 B.C., and of Panaetius the Stoic, who joined the household of Scipio Aemilianus a decade thereafter.[88] Philus, presumably reproducing Carneades, argued along the lines of Thrasymachus in Plato's *Republic* that government could not be conducted without injustice.[89] Laelius countered with a defense of justice in the ruler which must go back to Panaetius and to Poseidonius, his successor as head of the Stoic School under whom Cicero himself studied in Rhodes.[90] The later Stoic argument was based on the assumption that men differ in native ability; an assumption which derived from Aristotle's defense of the "natural slave" and from the view, already mentioned, that civilized, namely, Hellenized, men, should rule over uncivilized or barbarian men.[91] These Stoics claimed, as had Plato, that the ruler should possess wisdom and virtue, that he should rule justly, that is, in accordance with the law and reason inherent in all nature, and that he should rule for the benefit of the ruled.[92] Thus the justification of imperialism by natural superiority, explicitly of culture but also implicity of race, is joined to the missionary concept that the ruler should improve the lot of the ruled.

Cicero's political activity lasted from 70 to his death in 43 B.C. He devoted much attention before the courts, the assemblies, and the senate to problems connected with Rome's provinces.[93] In these speeches, he naturally emphasized the concrete advantages of the empire to Rome, which might be endangered, for example, by the misdeeds of a Verres, or promoted by the appointment of Pompey to

recover the provinces lost to Mithridates, or undermined by the ambitious intrigues of Caesar to get control of Egypt.[94] But Cicero had little to say about the fundamental issues at stake; the relation of the provinces to the central government, the theoretical justification for Rome's rule, and the like.

Even in his philosophical and rhetorical treatises, Cicero was primarily concerned with the traditional politics, ethics, and education suited to the orthodox theory of the self-contained and sovereign city-state.[95] Only in his treatise *On the Commonwealth*, as already indicated, does he show some consciousness of Rome's imperial obligations.[96] He there supports the Stoic view that Rome's right to rule depended on the moral character of her constitution and of its leaders, which mutually tended to produce each other.[97] Rome, he says, had gained her empire by defending the interests of her allies.[98] She retained it because her citizens were best fitted to rule and it was advantageous for others, the weaker, to be ruled.[99] For this reason it would not become her to be at once a governor and a taker of profits.[100] And Romans should be conscious that however great their achievements seemed to themselves, yet in comparison with the wide-flung universe or even the inhabited earth, their empire was relatively slight and transitory.[101] Cicero's belief in Rome, to borrow the title of a study by the German scholar Vogt, was tempered in his profounder moments by a consciousness that man and his works are mortal and that only the divine spirit which sustains the universe is eternal.[102]

Caesar, with his intensely practical approach to the problems of empire, did not worry in his *Commentaries* on the Gallic and Civil Wars about justifying Rome's rule; it sufficed if he could justify his extension of that rule, which was really undertaken more in his own than in Rome's interest.[103] Yet the ecumenical concept of the empire which, as sole arbiter of Rome, he prematurely attempted to realize came in the end to be its justification. The personality and aims of Caesar have been as much disputed as have those of Alexander. He does appear, like Alexander, to have conceived of an empire in which all races would be treated alike, in which ability would be the only test of superiority, and in which everybody would be equally

subject to a single will.[104] The Ides of March, 44 B.C., proved that he was ahead of his time and that the ingrained prejudices in favor of the traditional aristocratic constitution controlled by the senate and of the right of the Romano-Italic people who had conquered the empire to govern it could not easily be set aside.[105]

VIII

Augustus learned well the lesson of the Ides of March. His final settlement of the century of internal conflict which Rome's external expansion had caused was a compromise. Whether sincerely or not, he "restored the Republic"; that is, he perpetuated the traditional constitution dominated by the senate. He likewise preserved the favored status of the Romano-Italic people, the Roman citizens.[106] But he secured for himself powers which gave him effective control of Rome's armies and of her foreign policy. From the point of view of this discussion, moreover, he put an end to the imperialistic expansion of Rome.[107] It is true that the tradition that a veritable Roman leader should constantly endeavor to extend the sway of Rome remained vivid at least until the time of Trajan and was not forgotten thereafter.[108] In fact, however, the frontiers established by Augustus remained in their major lines those of the empire until its collapse.[109] Thus with Augustus ends the consideration of ancient imperialism in the sense of this discussion. Thereafter "empire," the Latin *imperium*, began to take on the sense of "an imperial system of government" which it was to retain until modern times.[110]

Yet Augustus himself did not assume the title of king or emperor; he remained "first citizen," *princeps*, the moderator of the affairs of state in the sense advocated by Cicero in the fifth book of his treatise *On the Commonwealth*.[111] His control depended not on specific overweening powers but on his influence over others, his *auctoritas*, a concept in Latin more informal and psychological than the modern legalistic word "authority."[112] To heighten this *auctoritas*, he resorted to various devices, such as surrounding himself with an aura of divine sanction.[113] He also presented himself as the fulfiller and restorer of Rome's victorious destiny.[114] Hence Augustan literature is full of the

mighty achievements of Rome's conquering past and of Augustus' even greater extensions of Roman sway.[115] Coupled with these themes, emphasis is placed on the pre-destined and just character of Rome's rule, in consequence of the favor of the gods and the virtues of the Romans, and more particularly of Augustus.[116]

In the surviving books of Livy's *History of Rome since the Foundation*, stress is laid on the historical inevitability of Rome's expansion under divine guidance and thanks to the character of her citizens, rather than on any philosophical justification for her rule.[117] Only once, in connection with Hannibal's failure when he invaded Campania to detach Rome's allies, does Livy echo the Stoic justification. He then says that the cities did not desert Rome "because they were ruled justly and moderately and did not refuse to obey their betters, which is the best bond of loyalty." [118]

The Augustan poets provide rich material for justification of the empire, which has been fully and topically analyzed in a treatise by the German scholar F. Christ.[119] For the present discussion, it must suffice to cite Virgil. The *Aeneid* is the poetic parallel to Livy's prose *History*. It symbolizes Rome's achievement of her destiny under divine favor in the allegorical myth of how the pious Aeneas triumphed over the many obstacles put in his way and fulfilled his destiny to found Rome.[120] The familiar lines in which Anchises described for his son Aeneas the mission of Rome express both a sense of the superiority of Romans to others and a realization that their function was not, as was that of the Greeks, to civilize but to provide the framework of just and peaceful government in which civilization would be possible. "Others" says Anchises, meaning the Greeks, "will, I believe, carve bronze more gracefully into breathing forms or draw living features from marble. They will be better pleaders and will mark out the course of the heavens with their pointer and name the rising stars. Do thou, O Roman, remember to rule the peoples under thy power — these will be thy arts — and to impose the habit of peace; to spare the conquered and fight down the proud." [121] These lines nobly express an imperial mission, but the imperialism is the new Augustan imperialism of governing, not the traditional Roman imperialism of conquest and expansion.

The two centuries which followed Augustus witnessed a gradual extension of Roman citizenship and of membership in the senate to non-Roman provincials.[122] In consequence, the preferred position of the Romano-Italic people was lost and the senate became an upper class, still primarily based on heredity but also open to merit wherever found, and increasingly representative of the empire as a whole rather than simply of Italy.[123] Hence even that element of the traditional justification for Roman imperialism which survived Augustus, the superiority of the Roman people over others, lost its validity; or, rather, Rome gathered unto herself all peoples within the empire so that the city, the *Urbs*, became coterminous with the civilized world, the *Orbis*.[124] Outside this charmed circle were only uncivilized barbarians.[125]

Midway in this development, around 100 A.D., stand Tacitus and Pliny. Both recognized that the old Republic and its conquests were no longer possible and accepted the monarchical empire. But Tacitus looked back nostalgically to the past and regarded his contemporaries as degenerate in vigor and virtue.[126] Pliny, though still proud of the Roman traditions, was far more a herald of the future. He recognized the ecumenical character of the empire and admitted the merits of monarchical government. He felt that a good emperor like Trajan fulfilled the Stoic ideal of the just ruler who governs for the sake of the governed in accordance with universal reason and law.[127]

IX

It lies outside the scope of the present discussion to trace further in Roman literature this ecumenical concept which the Roman empire inherited from Alexander and the Persians, or to review its effect on later political and ecclesiastical thought.[128] Nor is there time to examine what slight evidence survives of contemporary scepticism concerning the merits of Roman imperialism, whether in the form of territorial expansion or of ecumenical government.[129] Nor, finally, is this the place to speculate on the parallel between the shift in the concept of Roman imperialism which occurred as between the great expansionist, Pompey, and the founder of the ecumenical empire, Augustus, and the similar shift between Disraeli and the present

British Commonwealth of Nations, which now includes even the Dominions of Pakistan and India.[130]

A survey of contemporary justifications for ancient imperialism has shown the triumph of moral over material considerations. The imposition of the rule of one people over others in antiquity originated from the same motives as it has in recent history, namely the atavistic urge towards conquest, greed, a sense of superiority, or missionary zeal. Then, as now, justifications for imperialism ranged the full gamut from "might makes right" to Lord Rosebery's description of the British Empire as "the greatest secular agency for good the world has ever seen."[131] But in the end that justification prevailed in Persia, in Greece, and in Rome which assigned rule to merit, that is, to wisdom and virtue, and which required that it be just, that is, in accordance with the fundamental principles of equity and for the benefit of the governed. Not without reason did the last pagan poet of Rome, Rutilius Namatianus, who had seen Alaric's Goths sack the Eternal City in 410 A.D., still proclaim his continued faith in her by exclaiming: "that thou dost rule is less significant than that thou dost deserve to rule": *Quod regnas minus est quam quod regnare mereris.*[132]

It is tempting to conclude on this note and to draw therefrom a moral for the present. But the moral will not hold. To be sure, the Athenian empire went down in ruin because it was blatantly selfish and oppressive. Yet once Alexander died, his high ideals did not perpetuate the ecumenical state for which he strove.[133] Persia, on the contrary, controlled her conquests for more than two centuries. But when her initial expansion ceased, her strength slowly failed and Alexander had but to push her imposing façade to have it crumble.[134] The Romans extended their sway over the Mediterranean world during two centuries and Augustus laid the foundations of an ecumenical state which endured, however much its character changed, for five centuries longer in the west and for nearly fifteen in the east.[135] But the western Roman empire, like the Persian, decayed from within and required only concerted pressure from without for its final dissolution. In the eastern empire, changes, though gradual, were so much more significant than continuity that the Byzantine

state may be regarded as a new political phenomenon.[136] The triumph of the moral over other justifications for rule is, indeed, of great significance both for political theory and for political practice. But it cannot be maintained that the moral character of the empires of the Persians, of Alexander, or of the Romans constituted a major factor in determining their permanence or impermanence.

It was remarked above that Greek and Roman political theorists failed to escape from the domination of the orthodox theory of the city-state, with its doctrine that all citizens must be able to participate directly in public affairs both as members of the assemblies and by holding office in turn.[137] During the Hellenistic period, federation and representation were tried but failed to hold their own.[138] Practically, therefore, the solution to the problem of integrating areas larger than the city-state was confined to monarchy, the rule of the single will, whether as king of a national state or emperor of an ecumenical union of peoples. Monarchy was, to be sure, acceptable only when it shunned absolutism, or tyranny, and at least ostensibly justified itself on the moral grounds which have already been indicated. Even so, sooner or later ecumenical monarchy failed because it sacrificed an essential characteristic of the city-state. However much the rule of an Alexander or an Augustus or their successors expressed the will and desires of their subjects, it was not responsible to that will; their sovereignty did not derive from the people, despite the quibbles of the Roman lawyers.[139] It was basically self-created and self-perpetuating, though at times this fact might be concealed by invoking divine authority.[140] Ultimately, therefore, the ruler, however well-meaning, came to be set over against the subjects and to regard the perpetuation of rule as the prime end to which all other considerations, including the benefit of the governed, must be sacrificed.[141] Ancient imperialism, whether in the form of the dominance of one people over another or in the form of an ecumenical monarchy, teaches a far more profound lesson than that an empire to endure must conform itself to standards set by some moral justification. This lesson is that government must never cease to be not only for the people but, even more than this, of and by the people. And the problem which ancient imperialism poses to the modern world is not that

of creating a world state; the Persians and Alexander showed that this could be done, while Augustus founded one whose endurance still challenges the imagination of mankind. Rather, the problem is to combine the surrender of sovereignty to a world state with the preservation of responsibility to the will not merely of the people, but of many peoples, each eager to protect its own economic, social, political, and cultural integrity.[142]

NOTES

[1] This paper was given as the first of six Marshall Woods Lectures at Brown University on "Imperialism." It is printed here substantially as it was delivered on October 1, 1947, under the auspices of Professor C. A. Robinson. The criticisms and suggestions of Professor Robinson, of Professor W. S. Ferguson, and of the Editors of these *Studies* have been of great assistance in the revision for publication. The brevity necessary for a lecture has relegated many points to rather lengthy notes. The full title of works referred to in the notes will be given when they are first cited. Thereafter the author's name only will appear, with a cross reference to the note in which the work was initially cited. In a few instances the full title will be given later than the first citation, at a point where the work in question is particularly apposite.

[2] The definitions of "imperialist" and "imperialism" are taken from the *New English Dictionary* V (I–K, 1901) 86. "Imperialist" is cited first in 1603 for a supporter of the Holy Roman Empire and in 1800 for one of Napoleon. "Imperialism" for an imperial system of government is first cited in 1858 and dubiously for the extension of empire in 1881. But the clear instances for this second meaning given by the *NED* run from 1895 to 1899 and "imperialist" as a supporter of expansionist "imperialism" is first cited in 1899. The *NED* confines the expansionist meaning to the British Empire and adds "and of . . . uniting the different parts of empire." It connects this meaning with Disraeli (Lord Beaconsfield).

[3] The best general discussion of the various meanings of "Imperialismus" is the article by Othmar Spann in the *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaft* V (ed. 4, Jena, Fisher, 1923) 383–385. He points out that the term has no clearly defined meaning and has become a political catchword rather than a "scientific" term. See also M. J. Bonn's article on "Imperialism" in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* III (New York, Macmillan, 1932) 605–613, who deals chiefly with modern imperialism, and H. Kohn's article on "Imperialism" in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* XII (ed. 14, Chicago, New York, Toronto, 1946) 122–122B, who gives a brief historical résumé before treating modern imperialism.

[4] Capelle, (n. 88) 111 n. 1, cites F. Salomon's preface to his *Der Britische Imperialismus* (ed. 2, Leipzig, 1927) for the difference between ancient and modern imperialism; see also Hasebroek (n. 8) 1–6. Capelle points out that there are, nevertheless, fundamental parallels between the historical phenomena of national life in Athens during the fifth century B.C., Rome during the second century B.C., and Europe during the nineteenth century which justify applying the modern term to the political or economic expansion of an ancient people beyond its natural limits and to the imposition of the rule of one ancient people upon others. Throughout this discussion the term "people" will be used for a politically united and racially relatively homogeneous state, to avoid the question whether the concept of "nation" may properly be applied to classical states or races. Naturally several distinct states or peoples may be racially relatively homogeneous, as in Greece (see above p. 112 for Pan-Hellenism), or in Italy before the extension of Roman citizenship in 88 B.C. in consequence of the Social War. The Earl of Cromer's (Evelyn Baring) *Ancient and Modern Imperialisms* (New York, Longmans, 1910) is still stimulating, particularly in his remarks, pp. 124–127, on the problem of reconciling imperialism with the introduction to subject peoples of democratic institutions (see below, n. 130 on India).

[5] W. S. Ferguson, *Greek Imperialism* (Boston, New York, Houghton Mifflin, 1913) 2–6. He holds that the relation of superior to inferior is essential to any empire but may be either that of one people to others or of ruler to subjects.

[6] J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study*. The third edition (London, Allen & Unwin, 1938) has been consulted for this paper.

[7] Hobson's (n. 6) preface of 1938, pp. v–vi. Though admitting such other motives as power, pride, prestige, and prevailing sentiments, Hobson in this preface reaffirms his belief that "trade follows the flag." On p. 6, he conceives that "the novelty of recent Imperialism regarded as a policy consists chiefly in its adoption by several nations" and says that in contrast "the root idea of empire in the ancient and mediaeval world was that of a federation of states under a hegemony, covering in general terms the entire known recognized world, such as was held by Rome under the so-called *pax Romana*." He devotes a page to the concept of universal (ecumenical, below n. 63) empire as realized by Rome and inherited by the Middle Ages but otherwise devotes no further attention to imperialism in any meaning before the French Revolution until his last chapter. Then, pp. 365–367, he compares British imperialism to the Roman Empire in respect to the rise of a capitalist class and the loss of a healthy peasantry (see below, n. 85, on the Gracchi), and the decay of the ability of the aristocracy to govern the empire (see below, n. 15). For the conflict of motives in British imperialism, see also Cromer (n. 4) 118–119. Such an arch imperialist as Cecil Rhodes exhibited a blend of idealism, patriotism, and selfishness which has led to the most diverse interpretations of his character, his relation to his times, and his ultimate objectives.

[8] An extreme, if not false, economic interpretation of Athenian imperialism at the time of the Peloponnesian War is F. M. Cornford's *Thucydides Mythistoricus* (London, Arnold, 1907). Tenney Frank, *Roman Imperialism* (New York, Macmillan, 1914), denies that Rome was basically imperialistic until the provinces began to provide great opportunities for private investment after 133 B.C. through the taking of tax contracts and the lending of money. J. Hasebroek, in a speech on *Der Imperialistische Gedanke im Altertum* (Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1926), argues that ancient imperialism was not economic in the modern sense of the endeavor to capture wider markets and fields for investment. He holds that throughout there were two motives: the feeling that the strong should rule, and the feeling that the state should provide for the support of its citizens. These motives may be equated with the atavistic urge to conquer and the selfishness of the populace. On page 6, he identifies the atavistic urge to conquer with the justification that rule is the right of the stronger (above p. 111, and nn. 39, 131) and denies any moral principle of ideal justice; contrast Capelle's (n. 88) argument on behalf of the moral justification of rule.

[9] W. L. Langer, "A Critique of Imperialism," *Foreign Affairs* XIV (1935) 102–119, especially p. 108. Langer shows that the economic advantages supposed by Hobson to arise from imperialism do not in fact do so. Investments in the subject areas do not necessarily increase and frequently prove unprofitable. Nor do monopolies, trusts, and cartels develop more readily in imperialistic than in nonimperialistic countries. New colonies often provide new markets for world production rather than for the home country and in time such colonies develop their own industries to challenge those at home. Hobson might reply that even though the desired economic advantages do not arise, the expectation that they will suffices to justify his motivation for imperialism. A critique similar to Langer's might be applied to the predecessor of imperialism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, "mercantilism," a policy which sought to develop national power by control of economic resources, particularly of trade. E. F. Hecker concludes his article on "Mercantilism" in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* X (New York, Macmillan, 1933) 333–339 thus: "Generally it may be said that mercantilism is of greater interest for what it attempted than for what it achieved."

[10] Hobson (n. 6) 101: "The government of the propertied classes . . . are no longer seriously frightened by the power of the people as implied by a popular franchise . . . 'Panem et circenses' interpreted into English means cheap booze and Mafficking. Popular education, instead of serving as a defense, is an incitement towards Imperialism; it has opened up a panorama of vulgar pride and crude sensationalism to a great inert mass who see current history and the tangled mass of world events with dim, bewildered eyes and are the inevitable dupes of the able and organized interests who can lure, or scare, or drive them into any convenient course." Anyone familiar with Thucydides' account of Cleon (see above, p. 110) or Cicero's attacks on Clodius and

Caesar will realize the applicability of this passage to Greek and Roman history. *Panem et circenses* is part of Juvenal's criticism of the Roman mob under the empire for its lack of public spirit, *Sat.* X, esp. line 81. See Hasebroek (n. 8) 11–21.

[11] Hobson (n. 6) 153–160; Langer (n. 9) 109.

[12] See the quotation from Lord Rosebery above, p. 123, and n. 131 from Hobson (n. 6) 160. Moslem imperialism was largely religious in inspiration; British imperialism has often been begun by missionaries and carried on by persons who sincerely accepted their rule over other races as Kipling's "white man's burden."

[13] Langer, (n. 9) 109, cites Josef Schumpeter, *Zur Sociologie der Imperialismen* (Tübingen, Mohr, 1919), and continues: "Conquests are desired not so much because of their advantages, which are often questionable, but merely for the sake of conquest, success and activity."

[14] Ferguson (n. 5) 1.

[15] Hobson, (n. 6) 365–367 (see above n. 7 at end), is perhaps wrong in comparing the Roman and British aristocracies as imperialistic phenomena. Aristocracies in the ancient world were primarily composed of landowners, and tended to be anti-imperialistic. In Athens, though the aristocratic leader Cimon in the mid-fifth century pursued an expansionist policy, the conservatives later opposed the Periclean empire. Sparta was anti-imperialistic except when some king or general took matters into his own hands and he generally was recalled for discipline by the home authorities. The Roman senate of the republic was consistently opposed to the extension of her sway by such commanders as the Scipios, Sulla, Pompey, and Caesar. The British Tories and the Prussian Junkers apparently took the same line. The agricultural Middle West of the United States has been generally "isolationist" in the past. In Rome of the first century B.C. there was an aristocracy of financiers, the equestrians, who, like the British merchant class, opposed the conservative senate and supported Pompey and Caesar, Frank (n. 8) 227–328, 357–358. Augustus saw to it that the equestrians were brought into line by seriously curtailing and controlling the practice of having provincial taxes gathered by private bankers under government contract and by working the equestrians into his administration and making the class a feeder for the senatorial order; see A. Stein, *Der Römische Ritterstand* (Munich, C. H. Beck'sche VBH., 1927) ch. IV, pp. 195–363: "Aufstieg in den Senatorenstand." It may be doubted whether in Periclean Athens there was any large group of wealthy merchants or bankers whose interest was imperialistic; his support came directly from the populace, the small traders, artisans, sailors, and others who got jobs as a result of the empire, above p. 109; Hasebroek (n. 8) 7–8.

[16] The growth of the world empires of the Near East is briefly described by M. Rostovtzeff, *A History of the Ancient World* I: "The Orient and Greece" (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1926) 151–156.

[17] Rostovtzeff (n. 16) 151, who continues, "this reform was never completed by Persia."

[18] Rostovtzeff (n. 16) 153. Xerxes' host in 480 B.C. as described by Herodotus, VII 61–99, illustrates how diversity was allowed even in the army; see the summary in J. A. K. Thomson, *Greeks and Barbarians* (Unwin, London, and New York, Macmillan, 1921) 33–37. The army with which Darius opposed Alexander a century and a half later was equally diverse, Robinson (n. 49) 125–126.

[19] Rostovtzeff (n. 16) 156; A. Moret, *Histoire de l'Orient* II: "Les Empires" (*Histoire Générale, Histoire Ancienne*, première partie, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1936) 722, 764–765; G. B. Gray in *The Cambridge Ancient History* (Cambridge, University Press) IV (1926) 2, who contrasts the fact that the Persian Empire lasted for two centuries under one dynasty, the Achaemenid (he regards Darius as a true Achaemenid, pp. 5, 174), whereas that of Alexander fell apart at his death. The general articles on imperialism cited above in n. 3 begin the concept of an ecumenical or universal empire with Alexander.

[20] E. Meyer, in his *Geschichte des Alterthums* III "Das Perserreich und die Griechen usw." (ed. 2, Stuttgart, Berlin, Cotta'sche BH., 1912), 93–95, emphasizes the religious tolerance shown by the Achaemenids despite their convinced Mazdaism. The "missionary" interpretation of the expansion of Persia was advanced by Professor J. L. Myres in lectures at Oxford about 1927. The statements in the text are adapted from his Frazer Lecture on *Mediterranean Culture* (Cambridge, University Press, 1943) 45–46; see also his George Slocum Bennett Lectures at Wesleyan University on *The Political Ideas of the Greeks* (New York, Cincinnati, Abington Press, 1927) 336. Herodotus regarded the Persian "imperialistic urge" as a ruinous passion, *ὕβρις*, Cochrane (n. 110) 466–467. The date of Zoroaster is much disputed; Moret, (n. 19) 711, places him in the seventh century B.C., while Gray, (n. 19) 205, puts him as early as 1000 B.C.

[21] Moret (n. 19) 765–769; Gray (n. 19) 205–211. For the concept of the Persian King as "animate law," see E. R. Goodenough, "The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship," *Yale Classical Studies* I (1928) 78–79. Goodenough points out that the Egyptian Pharaohs were similarly thought to be a source of law because they partook of divine inspiration. Near-eastern concepts of divine kingship have recently been discussed in a volume of essays edited by H. and H. A. Frankfort, entitled *The Intellectual Achievement of Ancient Man* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948) and in H. Frankfort's *Kingship and the Gods, etc.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948); see also the review article by T. H. Gaster on "Divine Kingship in the Ancient Near East" in *A Review of Religions* IX (1944–1945) 267–281.

[22] Ferguson, (n. 5) 6–19, in his first chapter describes the rise of the city-states and the incompatibility of imperialism with the concept thereof; see

below (n. 63). For federation in Greece generally, see the brief but stimulating remarks of E. Barker in *Cambridge Ancient History* VI (1927) 506–509; see also C. A. Robinson's chapter on "Federal Unions" in *The Greek Political Experience etc.* by A. C. Johnson and others (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1948) 93–108. Besides the works cited in his bibliography on pp. 228–229, the article by J. A. O. Larsen on "Representative Government in the Panhellenic Leagues," in *Classical Philology* XX (1925) 313–329, XXI (1926) 52–71, draws interesting conclusions on pp. 69–71 concerning the beginning in these leagues during the fourth century B.C. of a representative federal organization and suggests possible reasons why Alexander did not perpetuate this; namely, because a Panhellenic league would leave no room for the inclusion of other peoples, see below, n. 62, and because, with the difficulty of communications, a federal league would be limited to the Aegean area and could not effectively include the new foundations in Asia. Compare also the references below in n. 138. For Sparta's hegemony of Greece in the sixth century B.C., see H. T. Wade-Gery in *Camb. Anc. Hist.* III (1925) 537–538, 557–569, and Adcock's remarks in vol. IV (1926) 71–75. Wade-Gery, p. 538, says of Tyrtaeus' (*c.* 600 B.C.) poem on the first conquest of Messene that he "does not disguise the motive, it was the acres of arable orchard and vineyard, that Sparta desired." For the relevant fragment, see E. Diehl, *Anthologia Lyrica Graeca* I (ed. 2, Leipzig, Berlin, Teubner, 1936) 13. For Athens' "synoecismus" of Attica, see E. A. Gardner and M. Cary in *Camb. Anc. Hist.* III (1925) 577–580; for Athenian expansion under the Peisistratid tyrants during the second half of the sixth century B.C., see F. E. Adcock in vol. IV (1926) 61, 69–70, who maintains that the motive was not economic (commercial), as often argued, but protective. For Thebes' hegemony of the Boeotian League, see M. Cary in vol. III 608–609. Sir Alfred Zimmern, on pp. 6–7 of an article entitled "Athens and America" in the *Classical Journal* XLIII (1947) 3–11, calls attention to the Amphictyonic League as an embryo Panhellenic confederacy in sixth-century Greece; one which, however, failed.

[23] For the development of the Delian League and its conversion into an Athenian empire, see the brief remarks of A. J. Toynbee in *A Study of History* (abridgment by D. C. Somervell, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1947) 297. Zimmern, (n. 22) 7–9, summarizes briefly the rise and failure of the Athenian empire, and, among the many historical treatments thereof, his *The Greek Commonwealth* (ed. 5 rev., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1931) 180–197 gives an account which is lively if perhaps over optimistic in his interpretation of Athenian motives. On p. 433, he contrasts Pericles in his great years as "the champion of the Free Sea and Free Intercourse, who had been warning Athens for a generation against the dangers of aggrandizement" and Pericles of the last speech reported by Thucydides, I 60–64, where he "was the first to preach to her the fatal doctrine of Universal Sea-power," a doctrine taken up by Cleon and others, who "set their course by expediency and interest alone."

This rosy view of the early Pericles does not accord with his attempt between 454 and 446 B.C. to build up a land empire, an attempt ended by the so-called Thirty Years' Peace with Sparta, *Camb. Anc. Hist.* V (1927) 90–91. Ferguson, (n. 5) 39–41, thinks that Themistocles laid the foundations of the Athenian Empire but that the real impulse to expansion came from the new self-confidence of the victorious Athenian populace themselves, not from their statesmen. On pp. 65–78, he sees Pericles as an imperialist from the beginning in that he made the subject allies pay for the Athenian "nation of noblemen." B. D. Meritt, in his chapter on "Athens and the Delian League" in *The Greek Political Experience* (n. 22) 52–54, traces the conversion of the League into an empire to the period of the transfer of the treasury to Athens and hence directly to Pericles; his whole discussion, by one who has made the authoritative study of the inscriptions which preserve the quota of the tribute dedicated to Athena, is excellent. This is not the place to debate whether an outstanding statesman creates his popular support or is a product of a basic popular urge, which he formulates and attempts to realize. It is at least arguable that the first-class statesman, whether good or evil, leads by sowing his concepts in the popular mind, and that only second-raters (the politicians ?) run with the herd, wherever its vagaries direct.

[24] *Cam. Anc. Hist.* V (1927) 84.

[25] The opinions of the Athenian Empire expressed by Greek authors of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. are collected by Hermann Rohde, *De Atheniensium Imperio quid quinto quartove a. Chr. n. saeculo sit iudicatum* (Diss. Gött., Göttingen, Dieterich, 1913). He devotes only twelve out of ninety-eight pages to the period before the Peloponnesian War, most of which are general. He cites none of the three tragedians or Aristophanes, but does (p. 12) argue from Herodotus VII 139 1 that this historian thought that Athens' worth in the Persian Wars justified her hegemony. However, Rohde admits that we cannot know what Herodotus thought of the Empire.

[26] Thuc. II 34–46, translated with comment by Zimmern, *Gr. Com.* (n. 23) 198–209. Cf. Zimmern's essay on "Thucydides the Imperialist" in his *Solon and Croesus and Other Greek Essays* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1928) 81–104. There has recently appeared a detailed discussion of Thucydides' views on Athenian imperalism, a copy of which was kindly loaned for consultation by Professor J. H. Finley: J. de Romilly, *Thucydide et l'Impérialisme Athénien: la pensée de l'historien et la genèse de l'oeuvre* (Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1947). Mlle. de Romilly regards Athenian imperialism as the central theme of the war for Thucydides (p. 52). While Thucydides presents practical arguments for and against the Athenian empire, his judgments are political, not moral (pp. 89–91). He admired the moderate imperialism of Pericles, guided as it was by outstanding political wisdom (p. 136), and he found its antecedents in Themistocles rather than in Cimon (pp. 154, 196–200; see above, n. 23, for Ferguson's view of Themistocles as founder of Athenian imperialism). He condemned the

overreaching imperialism of Cleon (pp. 166–167) and of Alcibiades (pp. 191–195). Mlle. de Romilly derives for Thucydides three "laws" which governed the rise and fall of Athenian imperialism (pp. 260–285, summarized pp. 284–285): politically, imperialism was imposed on Athens by the necessity of maintaining her position; psychologically, imperialism, unless controlled by wisdom, induced an appetite for more which became "hybris" (see also pp. 71–72, 200); and, philosophically, the rule of the stronger is a basic principle in human relations. The events of 404 B.C. did not alter Thucydides' fundamental position but only intensified his admiration for Pericles and his condemnation of his successors (pp. 286–293). Thucydides failed to offer any solution for the downfall of Athens; only in the fourth century were such solutions offered politically by Isocrates in the form of Panhellenism (see also pp. 266–268 and below, nn. 46, 49), perhaps on the basis of a knowledge of Thucydides' work, and philosophically by Plato in his ideal state, which appears to be independent of Thucydides (pp. 297–305). Thucydides apparently had no intellectual contact with Socrates and his moral approach to politics (pp. 304–305); the historian affords only a realistic interpretation of politics which is parallel to that of those Sophists like Callicles and Thrasymachus in Plato (below, n. 39) who were frankly pragmatic (pp. 251–256, 305). On pp. 116–124, 128–130, de Romilly analyzes the Funeral Oration, see below, n. 29. She gives on pp. 118–121 interesting parallels from Euripides for its thought; see also p. 98 for the political character of the plays of both Euripides and Aristophanes.

[27] Paraphrased from Zimmern, *Gr. Com.* (n. 23) 196–197. Cf. Thomson (n. 18) 82–104 for the contrast between Greek freedom and Persian absolutism; also Myres, *Political Ideas* (n. 20) 319–340.

[28] Thuc. II 51–53; compare his remarks on the bitter passions released by the Corcyrean Revolt, III 82–84.

[29] Thuc. II 60–64. Professor W. C. Greene called attention to the significance of this speech, and especially of c. 64. de Romilly, (n. 26) 136, concludes that there is no fundamental change throughout the speeches attributed to Pericles by Thucydides. His first speech, I 140–145, the short summary in II 13, and this final speech set forth the political and military measures necessary for the survival of Athens, while the Funeral Oration, II 34–46, gives the political and intellectual justification for Athenian imperialism, with particular reference to the criticisms of the pro-Spartan party. All the speeches, in her opinion, are consistent with the favorable judgment passed on Pericles in II 65 (pp. 99–100). See generally her discussion of Pericles, pp. 99–136; also pp. 27–30 for the first speech. She would not, therefore, recognize any hardening of Pericles' attitude in this last speech.

[30] de Romilly, (n. 26) 62–76, recognizes that Athenian imperialism rested on sea-power and the control of the islands and argues that its primary motive was the desire for more (see pp. 71–72, 200) and particularly the desire of the masses to be supported by the empire. She does not regard conscious economic motives,

particularly the need to assure the grain supply (see below n. 40), as important. She concludes (p. 76): "il ne reste que l'image précise d'une politique nationale, fondée sur la thalassocratie, et cherchant sa satisfaction dans le sentiment même de la domination; et celle-ci se dresse comme une force simple menaçant la Grèce"; this is almost Langer's atavistic, irrational disposition towards conquest (above n. 13). The quotation that the Athenian rule was a tyranny is from Thuc. II 63; the themes are taken up by Cleon and Alcibiades, below, nn. 34–36. de Romilly, (n. 26) 111–113, cites interesting parallels for this concept of the empire as a tyranny: the Corinthians in I 122 3; Cleon again in III 37 2 (see also pp. 143–146); Euphemus in VI 85 1; the "Old Oligarch" (below, n. 40) I 14; Aristophanes *Knights* 1114; Plutarch *Pericles* 12 2. See below, n. 42.

[31] Thuc. II 65; Ferguson (n. 5) 75–76. Pericles was fined but his policy was adopted and he was elected general again for the following year, 429 B.C., during which he died. Thucydides draws a strong contrast between the moderate, patriotic, and intelligent policy of Pericles and the self-seeking and overreaching projects of his successors, which culminated in the ruinous expedition to Sicily and the final downfall of Athens; see de Romilly (n. 26) part II pp. 97–200 throughout.

[32] See Hasebroek (n. 8) 6. W. Nestle, "Politik und Moral im Altertum," *Neue Jahrbücher für das klass. Altertum usw.* XLI/XLII (1918) 225–244, discusses the ways in which ancient thinkers sought to relate ethics to politics, a problem which arose for them not so much within the state as in the relationships between states, p. 243. He concludes, with Hasebroek (n. 8), that despite Plato, Aristotle, and the Middle Stoa, the effective view was that altruism had no part in international relations and that the natural rule of the prevalence of the stronger, the view of the Sophists, Cynics, and Sceptics, was the most effective. Nestle wrote under the impact of World War I, see pp. 243–244. Contrast Capelle (n. 88). Both refer to H. von Arnim's Frankfurter Universitätsrede (1916) entitled "Gerechtigkeit und Nutzen in der griechischen Aufklärungsphilosophie."

[33] Thuc. III 37–40; see de Romilly (n. 26) 137–149 for a discussion of the Mytilenean Debate. The Mytileneans were saved from wholesale execution by a change of heart at Athens and a reprieve which arrived dramatically just in the nick of time.

[34] Jowett's translation of Cleon's remark in Thuc. III 37 2; for Pericles' similar statement, see above, n. 30. It is worth noting that, as de Romilly points out, (n. 26) 91–92, Thucydides seems to have had no feeling that it was wrong for Greeks to rule Greeks (below, n. 42) or of any contrast in this respect between the rule of Greeks over Greeks and over barbarians (below, n. 48). He shows no Panhellenic sentiment, either in the moderate, Cimonean sense of a joint hegemony by Sparta and Athens (such as is argued for by the Spartans in the debate on the prisoners taken at Pylos, VI 19–20; de Romilly 153–155), or in the later, Isocratean sense (below, n. 46; de Romilly 298–300).

Nor did he regard ethnic or political rivalries as significant causes of the war, as compared to Athenian imperialism *per se* (above, n. 30; de Romilly 76–78).

[35] Thuc. V 85–113. de Romilly, (n. 26) 230–259, regards the Melian Dialogue not as an attack on Athenian imperialism *per se* but on its excess. Its lesson is still that the rule of the stronger is basic to politics (above, n. 26; de Romilly, pp. 250–257). She points out, pp. 257–258, that even Isocrates in his great *apologia* for Athens, the *Panathenaicus*, did not condemn the Athenian treatment of Melos but simply tried to minimize its significance. She also notes, pp. 207–211, that whereas in the debate at Sparta at the beginning of the war, the Athenians laid great emphasis on their right to the hegemony because of their defeat of the Persians, I 73–74, this argument is dismissed as irrelevant in the Melian Dialogue, V 89; see below, n. 42. The Melians summarize the Athenian position in §90 as follows: *παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ξυμφέρον λέγειν ὑπέθεσθε.* They determined to resist but were overcome and either executed or enslaved. Their island was settled by five hundred Athenians, §116, a fate that has a contemporary ring. Rohde, (n. 25) 93, states that Thucydides consistently makes the Athenians defend their empire on the basis of utility, *τὸ ξυμφέρον*, and never of justice, *τὸ δίκαιον*.

[36] Thuc. VI 18; for the whole debate, cc. 9–26. See the lists of justifications of Athenian imperialism in T. S. Brown, "Greek Influence on Tiberius Gracchus," *Classical Journal* XLII (1947) 472 first column.

[37] That Thucydides admired the imperialism of Pericles but condemned that of Cleon and Alcibiades is the contention of Zimmern in "Thucydides the Imperialist" (n. 26); see Haarhoff (n. 48) 33–34 for Gilbert Murray's view in *Euripides and his Age* (Home Univ. Lib., London, Williams & Norgate; New York, Holt, 1913) 127, that the space devoted to Melos represents Thucydides' condemnation of the pride, *ὕβρις*, of the Athenians; but contrast Hasebroek (n. 8) 6–7 and Nestle (n. 32) 228–229, both of whom think that Thucydides accepted the Athenian policy as a phenomenon inherent in the nature of politics. de Romilly (n. 26), generally takes a similar position, but admits that Thucydides felt that the Athenians failed to limit their desire for more by wisdom and so fell into the destructive error of "hybris"; see pp. 71–72, 200, 268–280; above, n. 30. J. H. Finley, Jr., *Thucydides* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, 1942) 31, says that Thucydides realized that the dynamic growth of Athens as a thriving metropolis necessitated her maritime power, imperial status, and democratic (that is, popular) control and that this realistic view of power was based on that of the Sophists, see also his p. 35 and below, n. 39. In conversation, Professor Finley suggested that Thucydides, to judge from his condemnation of early Greek particularism in the "Archaeologia," I 2–19, realized the value of at least economic unification and might have favored some sort of federal union under Athenian hegemony (the Delian League in its first form ?) to the empire. Thucydides, VIII 97 2, states that the conservative government of the "five thousand," established in Athens in 411 B.C., was the best constitu-

tion that he had known in Athens. Aristotle, about eighty years later, shared this opinion in his *Constitution of Athens* 33 2 (*c.* 325 B.C.) and, in fact, this constitution approximated what became the orthodox view of the best form of city-state constitution, above, pp. 115, 124.

[38] Finley (n. 37) 31; Capelle (n. 88) 86–93, gives the later descent of the "utilitarian" justification as Sophists > Epicureans > Carneades (Sceptic).

[39] *Rep.* I 338 A — 354 C, especially the opening definition by Thrasymachus, 338 C: "I say that justice is nothing else than the advantage of the stronger," *φημὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον.* de Romilly (n. 26) 251–253, cites the parallel argument of Callicles in the *Gorgias* 483 D and compares both to the Melian Dialogue, Thuc. III 89. She gives good parallels from Euripides, pp. 252–254, and adduces for Thucydides a "philosophical law" that the rule of the stronger is fundamental in human relations, pp. 280–285; see nn. 8, 26. See also *Laws* IV 714 C; below, n. 131; and the suggestive remarks on the whole doctrine by W. W. Jaeger in his chapter on "Praise of Law" in *Interpretations of Modern Legal Philosophies; Essays in honor of Roscoe Pound*, ed. P. L. Sayre (New York, Oxford University Press, 1947) 364–365. For the dramatic date of Plato's *Republic*, 420 B.C., see A. E. Taylor, *Plato, etc.* (New York, The Dial Press, 1929) 263–264.

[40] The "Old Oligarch" is discussed by A. W. Gomme in *Athenian Studies Presented to W. S. Ferguson* (*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, supplementary vol. I, 1940) 211–245. He argues for a shift in the traditional date of 424 B.C. to sometime between 420 and 415 B.C. A summary of earlier discussions will be found in W. Schmid und O. Stählin, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* (Müller und Otto, *Handbuch der klass. Alt-wiss.* VII) I 3 1 (Munich, Beck'sche VBH, 1940) 149–155. de Romilly (n. 26) 104–105, compares the view of the "Old Oligarch," II 14–16, that the Athenian empire had to be a thalassocracy with the similar view put by Thucydides, I 143 5, in the mouth of Pericles; see above, n. 30, for her denial of the importance of the grain trade in motivating the desire of Athens to dominate the Aegean. Hartvig Frisch has published a text, translation, discussion, and commentary entitled in Danish *Athenernes Statsforfatning* (Copenhagen, Nyt Nordisk Vorlag, 1941) and in English *The Constitution of the Athenians, etc.* (1942). He argues for a date previous to 432 B.C., in the full Periclean Age; see p. 62 of the English version. On pp. 218–221, he discusses the picture of Athenian selfishness which the author draws in I 14. On pp. 249–251, he discusses the connection which the author indicates between Athenian imperialism, sea power, and her need to control the sea-borne grain trade. On p. 109, he remarks on the relative ("Thrasymachean") meaning which the author attaches to "just," *δίκαιον*, notably in I 2. This last topic is more fully treated by H. Fränkel in a "Note on the closing section of Pseudo-Xenophon's Constitution of the Athenians" in the *American Journal of Philology* LXVIII (1947) 309–312. Fränkel finds that in III 12–13, the author uses *δίκαιον* "to describe a way of action as promoting the interests of those in

power." On p. 310 n. 2, Fränkel points to a certain inconsistency in I 13, where *τὸ δίκαιον* seems to mean "true justice" in contrast to the advantage of the populace, *τὸ αὐτοῖς συμφέρον*.

[41] Rohde (n. 25) 23–24.

[42] Rohde (n. 25) 93–95, concludes that the Athenian Empire found no real justification but only condemnation in writers from Thucydides through Aristotle, and he cites especially Aristotle's *Rhetoric* II 22 6–7, 1396 a 12–18, where Aristotle says that people praise the Athenians for Salamis and Marathon (see above, n. 35, for this argument in Thucydides) and other similar deeds but blame them because they enslaved the Greeks, their ally in the war against the barbarian (see below, n. 48 and see above, n. 34, for the absence of any such feeling in Thucydides). Rohde remarks that even Gorgias (see below, n. 47) and Isocrates (see below, nn. 46, 56), who urged concord among the Greeks, never thought that this should take the form of domination of one state over the rest. The Athenian Empire was often compared to a tyranny, a word hateful to the Greeks. See the remarks of Cochrane (n. 110) 84–86; also above, n. 30, for Thucydides.

[43] Ferguson (n. 5) 97–114.

[44] M. Cary in *Camb. Anc. Hist.* VI(1927) ch. II–IV, especially pp. 25–26 for the lessons of the fall of the Athenian Empire; pp. 36–37 for Sparta's failure to establish a permanent peace; and p. 102 for the weakness inherent in Epaminondas' plan for Theban supremacy.

[45] The inscription preserving the terms of the new Athenian league (377 B.C.) is discussed by E. L. Hicks and G. F. Hill, *A Manual of Greek Historical Inscriptions* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1901) no. 101, pp. 193–198; see also Haarhoff (n. 48) 37–38; S. Accame, *La Lega Ateniese del secolo IV A.C.* (*Studi pubblicati dal R. Ist. Ital. per la Storia Antica* fasc. II, Rome, Signorelli, 1941) 48–69.

[46] For Pan-Hellenism in the fourth century B.C., see J. Kaerst's chapter on "Die nationalhellenische Idee im vierten Jahrhundert" in his *Geschichte des Hellenismus* I (ed. 2, Leipzig & Berlin, Teubner, 1917) 138–153. For the ideals of Isocrates, see W. W. Jaeger, *Paideia* III (New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1944) 71–155, especially 71–83. G. M. A. Grube, reviewing *Paideia* in the *American Journal of Philology* LXVIII (1947) 200–215, criticizes Professor Jaeger on p. 213 for seeing too consistent and philosophical a point of view in Isocrates and regards the latter as full of contradictions and lacking a philosophic base. de Romilly, (n. 26) 266–268, 298–300, contrasts the political solution to the problem of Athenian imperialism offered by Isocrates and, to some degree, by Xenophon, with Thucydides' failure to answer the same problem; see above, n. 34.

[47] For the Peace of Antalcidas, see *Camb. Anc. Hist.* VI (1927) 54. The Peace was implemented by treaties between Athens and Sparta in 374 and 371 B.C., pp. 76–79. Isocrates attacked the Peace, especially later in his *Panegyricus*,

pp. 55–56. E. Barker, pp. 505–519, discusses the drive towards political unity in Greece during the fourth century and points out, p. 518, that Gorgias in 408 B.C. and Lysias in 388 B.C., both in public orations at Olympia, had exhorted the Greeks to unite to free Ionia; see Jaeger (n. 46) III 73 and 306 n. 3 for references; also Haarhoff (n. 48) 38. N. T. Pratt, in his chapter on "The People and the Value of their Experience" in *The Greek Political Experience* (n. 22) 10, attributes the failure of the Greeks to attain a Pan-Hellenic unity to their diversity of tribe and dialect.

[48] J. Jüthner, *Hellenen und Barbaren: Aus der Geschichte des Nationalbewusstseins* (*Das Erbe der Alten*, Neue Folge VIII, Leipzig, Dieterich'sche VBH, 1923), traces the concept of "barbarian" from Homer. He shows how the consciousness of a common Greek race developed among the particularist city-states through a common consciousness of their own similarity as against the otherness of non-Greek peoples; how the Sophists in the fifth century B.C. argued for the community of all men despite racial and cultural differences; how after Alexander Hellenism became increasingly a cultural rather than a racial differentiation and more and more associated specifically with Athenian culture (compare below, nn. 49, 62, 65); how the Romans perpetuated the distinction between civilized and barbarian but, despite their adoption of Greek culture, never identified themselves completely as Hellenes so that the world became tripartite: Romans, Greeks, and barbarians; and finally how the Christian Church identified Hellenism with paganism and the Byzantine Empire perpetuated the idea that its inhabitants were the true Romans so that only with the Renaissance was the union of Hellene and culture revived. T. J. Haarhoff, *The Stranger at the Gate* (London, New York, Toronto, Longmans Green, 1938), covers the same ground as Jüthner somewhat more fully for the Greeks. For Rome, he describes how the Romans accepted Hellenism and forged from the combination with their own genius an ecumenical but bilingual culture. He concludes by drawing parallels to the confrontation of the African and the English cultures in South Africa and by pleading for a "Holistic" (i.e., humanistic) program in education. At no period in Greek literature is there a consistent attitude towards the barbarians. Despite the growth of Greek self-consciousness after the Persian Wars, admiration for barbarians is evident in Aeschylus' *Persae*, in Herodotus (Haarhoff 20–26; Toynbee [n. 23] 373), and in Xenophon (Jaeger [n. 46] III 160), to mention only a few instances. On the other hand, so great a thinker as Plato felt that war against the barbarians should be ruthless whereas war between Greeks should be humane, *Rep.* V 469B–471C, cited with other passages by Jüthner, 23–25 and 130 nn. 70–71; see also Haarhoff 65–67 and n. on p. 71. Jaeger, p. 73, would add Plato's eighth *Epistle* (which he accepts as genuine), especially 353A and 357A, where Plato urges the Greeks in Sicily to unite against the common enemy, the Carthaginians, under Dion, if Dion will rule justly according to law and not tyranically; otherwise the Carthaginians will reduce Sicily to "barbarism"; see Haarhoff 164. A similar argu-

ment was advanced in 217 B.C. by Agelaus of Naupactus to Philip V of Macedon according to Polybius, V 104; namely, that Philip and his allies should make a general peace in Greece with the Aetolians and their allies since either the Romans or the Carthaginians, whichever won the Second Punic War, would surely take advantage of the dissensions in Greece to overcome everybody; see Haarhoff 110. J. B. Bury, in an essay entitled "The Hellenistic Age and the History of Civilization" in *The Hellenistic Age: Aspects of Hellenistic Civilization* by J. B. Bury and others (Cambridge, Eng., Camb. Univ. Press, 1923) 24–26, thinks that the sense of the inferiority of the "barbarians" originated in the late fifth century B.C., for instance, in the later as against the earlier books of Herodotus, but see the criticism of this view by Paul Shorey in a review in *Classical Philology* XX (1925) 350–351. Bury cites in support of his view Euripides' statement in the *Iphigenia in Aulis* 1401–1402 that Greeks as free men, should rule the barbarians, who are slaves, and not *vice versa*: *βαρβάρων δ' Ἕλληνας ἄρχειν εἰκός, ἀλλ' οὐ βαρβάρους,/μῆτερ, Ἑλλήνων· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλον, οἱ δ' ἐλεύθεροι.* Cromer, (n. 4) 9 n. 1, also cites these lines and adds that G. Grote, *History of Greece* II 162–163 (in ed. 4, London, Murray, 1872; the passage occurs at the opening of Part II chapter II), discusses the later, pejorative, meaning of "barbarian." E. B. England. *The Iphigenia at Aulis of Euripides* (London, New York, Macmillan, 1891) 140 n., gives parallels to the above lines from elsewhere in Euripides; see also Jüthner 20–21; Haarhoff 54–56. It is noteworthy in this connection that Thucydides, despite close connections of thought with Euripides in other respects (above, nn. 26, 38), apparently had no feeling against the rule of Greeks over Greeks (above, n. 34). For Alexander and the barbarians see below, n. 65. Plautus, in the *Miles Gloriosus* 211, speaks of the Roman Naevius as a *poetae barbaro*; for the identification see Festus-Paulus 36 2 (M). The speaker speaks, of course, as a Greek and Festus-Paulus remarks that in antiquity everybody not a Greek was a *barbarus*. Parallel passages from Plautus for this usage are collected by R. Y. Tyrrell in his edition of the *Miles* (London, Macmillan, 1894) 159, n. on line 212. For the concept of "barbarian" in Polybius see below, n. 70. W. F. J. Knight, in *Roman Vergil* (London, Faber and Faber, 1944) 268–269, remarks that Virgil hardly ever used *barbarus* but can give no good reason why. Moreover, his citations are not complete, see Merguet's *Lexicon* under *barbaricus* and *barbarus*. The question of Virgil's attitude on barbarians therefore needs further study, as does the whole attitude of the Roman empire towards barbarians. E. A. Thompson, *The Historical Works of Ammianus Marcellinus* (Cambridge, Eng., Camb. Univ. Press, 1947) 5 n. 2, cites W. Ensslin in *Klio* Beiheft XVI (1923) 33 for the statement that Ammianus, who wrote in the latter part of the fourth century A.D., uses the word *barbari* almost exclusively of the Germans, whom he hated as almost beasts, XXXI 8 9. Ammianus never uses it of the Persians, though he hated them almost equally, see p. 12, especially n. 3. The Greeks were curiously free from color prejudice, see Haarhoff 100 and n. on p. 103, also p. 299; Grace H.

Beardsley, *The Negro in Greek and Roman Civilization* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1929) 119–120. F. M. Snowden, Jr., in an article on "The Negro in Classical Italy" in the *American Journal of Philology* LXVIII (1947) 287–290, disputes Miss Beardsley's statement that the Romans developed a feeling of racial superiority to the Negro, see especially his n. 120 on pp. 288–289, also his discussion of race-mixture on pp. 290–292 and the Pompeian grafitto cited on p. 279. An article by Professor Snowden on "The Negro in Ancient Greece" has appeared in *The American Anthropologist* L (1948) 31–44, and is summarized in *Proceedings of the American Philological Association* LXXVII (1946) 322–323. His study supports the conclusions of Zimmern and Westermann that there was among the Greeks no "color line" or desire for racial purity. He quotes Menander frag 533 K (Loeb ed. p. 480), especially lines 12–13, for the view that it makes no difference whether one is an Ethiopian or a Scythian; natural talent, not race, determines nobility. Compare Professor Snowden's "A Classical Addendum to Tannenbaum's *Slave and Citizen*" in *Classical Outlook* XXV (1948) 71–72 for the similarity between the lack of color prejudice in the classical world and that in modern Latin America.

[49] Isocrates *Panegyricus* 50. E. Meyer, in an essay on "Alexander der Grosse und die absolute Monarchie," *Kleine Schriften* (Halle, Niemeyer, 1910) 285–332, argued on p. 300 that Isocrates meant to extend the possibility of becoming Hellenes by education to all peoples. This is the generally accepted view, for instance by C. A. Robinson in his *Alexander the Great* (New York, Dutton, 1947) 237–238. But Jüthner, (n. 48) 34–39, argues that Isocrates meant by "our culture," *τῆς παιδεύσεως τῆς ἡμετέρας*, specifically Athenian culture and that this was to be extended to other Greeks, not to barbarians. Haarhoff, (n. 48) 63, disputes Jüthner's interpretation and favors the traditional one. He admits, pp. 319–320, that Atticism became equivalent to culture; see also Toynbee (n. 23) 312 n. 1: "Atticistic would be a more accurate label than the customary term Hellenistic etc."

[50] Jüthner (n. 48) 44–59, especially p. 52. Capelle, (n. 88) 107–111, shows how the Stoics combined the distinction between Greeks and barbarians with Aristotle's distinction, *Politics* I 5, 1254 a 15–1255 a 2, between the "natural slave," who must be ruled, and the freeman, capable of ruling himself and others; see Nestle (n. 32) 223–224 and Haarhoff (n. 48) 67–68. For a much earlier manifestation of this idea, see the passage from Euripides *Iph. in Aul.* 1401–1402 cited above in n. 48.

[51] E. Barker in *Camb. Anc. Hist.* VI (1927) 518–519.

[52] For Isocrates' admiration for Athens see the pamphlets *Panegyricus, On the Peace, Areopogaticus,* and *Panathenaicus.*

[53] Jaeger (n. 46) III 85; Schmid und Stählin (n. 40) I ed. 6 (1912) 573–575; Münscher's article "Isocrates 2" in Pauly's *Realencyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft* ed. G. Wissowa and W. Kroll (Stuttgart, Metzlersche BH) vol. IX (half vol. 18, 1916) 2146–2227.

[54] Robinson (n. 49) 32; see references in last note. The text is paraphrased from a quotation which Goodenough, (n. 21) 56–57, gives to indicate Isocrates' justification for Philip's hegemony; namely from *Philip* 114, where Isocrates urges Philip to imitate Heracles: *κατά γε τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος καὶ τὴν φιλανθρωπίαν καὶ τὴν εὔνοιαν ἣν εἶχεν εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας*, and again from §116, where he exhorts Philip: *ἐπί τε τὰς εὐεργεσίας τὰς τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ πραότητα καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν*.

[55] For Isocrates, see Jaeger (n. 46) III 84–105; for Xenophon, pp. 156–181; for Plato, II (1944) 312–320, based on *Rep.* VII 535A–541B. de Romilly, (n. 26) 278–279, suggests that the admiration for Pericles' wisdom found in Thucydides adumbrates the concept of the wise ruler as expressed in Xenophon, Isocrates, and even in Plato. She would not, however, go so far as to argue for a direct influence; Xenophon and Isocrates knew Thucydides but Plato apparently did not (above, n. 26).

[56] Goodenough (n. 21); see above, n. 42.

[57] For the dates of Isocrates, see Münscher (n. 53) 2150; Schmid und Stählin (n. 53) 565–569.

[58] Milton, *Sonnet* X lines 6–8. For doubts as to the tradition, see Münscher (n. 53) 2219; Schmid und Stählin (n. 53) 569.

[59] Robinson (n. 49) 22. Prof. C. Edson remarked in conversation that one achievement of Philip and Alexander was to secure for the Macedonians, whom the Greeks had previously regarded as barbarians, recognition as fellow Hellenes, that is, a civilized people; see Jüthner (n. 48) 28–33; Haarhoff (n. 48) 73–74; Robinson, (n. 49) 223, who gives from Arrian VII 9–10 a speech of Alexander on this theme delivered to mutinous Macedonian troops.

[60] For Aristotle, see Robinson (n. 49) 37–38; 42–43; for Homer, pp. 38, 75, 77–78.

[61] Robinson (n. 49) 73.

[62] Ferguson (n. 5) 116–148. On pp. 133–135, he argues that Alexander never lost faith in the supremacy of Hellenic culture; see above, nn. 22, 48, and below, n. 65; Robinson (n. 49) 74–75; Haarhoff (n. 48) 74; and P. Jouguet, *Macedonian Imperialism and the Hellenization of the East* (Eng. trans. by M. R. Dobie in *The History of Civilization* ed. by C. K. Ogden, London, Kegan Paul Trench Trubner; New York, A. A. Knopf, 1928) 395. For a brief survey of Greek respect for the Persians, see Toynbee (n. 23) 373. For Alexander and universality, see O. W. Reinmuth's chapter on "Alexander and the World State" in *The Greek Political Experience* (n. 22) 109–124. On pp. 117–118, Reinmuth tends to minimize Alexander's belief in the superiority of Greek culture. He regards the cities founded by Alexander not so much as centers for the dissemination of Greek culture among the barbarians as mingling points for Greek and other cultures. C. A. Robinson, "Alexander the Great and the Barbarians" (n. 65) 302–303, thinks that Alexander's foundations were primarily for garrison and administrative purposes. Professor Robinson defends the broad ecumenical

scope of Alexander's plans in an article which he is contributing to the forthcoming volume of *Hesperia* (1947) entitled "Alexander the Great and the Oecumene." In this he gathers together the ancient sources and references to the relevant modern literature. W. W. Tarn takes a more restrained view of Alexander's plans in his Raleigh Lecture on "Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind," in the *Proceedings of the British Academy* XIX (published separately, London, Milford, 1933) and in his article on "Alexander, Cynics, and Stoics" in the *American Journal of Philology* LX (1939) 41–70. See also W. Kolbe's annual address to the Freiburger wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft (Heft 25) on *Die Weltreichsidee Alexanders des Grossen* (Freiburg im Breisgau, Speyer, 1936). For the deification of Alexander, see below, n. 67.

[63] For Alexander's plans of western conquest, see Robinson (n. 49) 74, 228. Robinson cites in his bibliography (pp. 241–242) U. Wilcken's article on "Die letzten Pläne Alexanders des Grossen" in *Sitzungsberichte der Preuss. Ak. der Wiss.* (Berlin) phil.-hist. Kl. for 1937, 192–207, who argues for such plans, and W. W. Tarn's refutation, "Alexander's Plans," in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies* LIX (1939) 124–135. Jouguet (n. 62) 1–7, remarks on how alien the concept of an ecumenical empire was to Greek political thought and how deeply Eastern were its roots; see also p. 394; Goodenough (n. 21) throughout; and above, n. 22. J. Kaerst, in an inaugural address entitled *Die antike Idee der Oekumene in ihrer politischen und kulturellen Bedeutung* (Leipzig, Teubner, 1903), touches on many of the points raised in this paper, notably on the contrast between the self-sufficient city state in which the individual is subordinated to the whole, and the ecumenical state, with its individualism and cosmopolitism. He alludes briefly on p. 11 to the transitional stage from the city-state to the empire of Alexander, namely the imperialistic domination of one people over others. The two themes of the equality of all peoples (the ecumenical idea) and subordination of all alike to the one ruler are constantly brought out by Robinson in his *Alexander* (n. 49); see for the former, pp. 16–17, 21, 36, 73–74, 136, 224–225, 230, 235; and for the development of the latter, pp. 84, 99–101, 109, 131, 137, 161–167, 216–222. Haarhoff (n. 48) 75–76, emphasizes the elasticity of Alexander's actual arrangements; see generally pp. 74–84. Polybius, V 102 1, remarks, with hindsight, that Philip V of Macedon "came of a house such as always especially aimed for the hope of universal rule," *ἐξ οἰκίας ὁρμώμενον τοιαύτης ἡ μάλιστά πως ἀεὶ τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἐλπίδος ἐφίεται*. Philip was, of course, an Antigonid and not directly descended from Alexander, but Polybius probably had in mind the Macedonian kings generally.

[64] For the "empires" of the Ptolemies, Seleucids, and Antigonids, see Ferguson (n. 5) 149–248; chs. IX–XI, pp. 125–172, in *The Greek Political Experience* (n. 22). It is perhaps significant that such a recent and profound study of the Hellenistic period as M. Rostovtzeff's *The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World* (3 vols., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1941) does not, in vol. III, index the word "imperialism."

[65] For Alexander's treatment of the barbarians on an equal footing with Greeks and Macedonians, see C. A. Robinson "Alexander the Great and the Barbarians" in *Classical Studies presented to Edward Capps* (Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1936) 298–305. The relation of Greeks and Macedonians to the subject peoples in the Hellenistic period is conveniently discussed by W. W. Tarn, *Hellenistic Civilization* (ed. 2, London, Arnold, 2nd imp. 1936) 58–64 (Antigonids), 130–131 (Seleucids), 155–156 (Ptolemies). The Antigonids, ruling Greeks, made the least distinction and in general approximated most closely to a hegemony. The Seleucids followed Alexander's preference for Greek culture but gave considerable recognition to subject leaders, particularly if Hellenized. The conflict induced by their policy appears most vividly in the resistance to it on the part of the orthodox Jews, led by the Maccabees, see Tarn, pp. 181–208. Finally, the Ptolemies made a sharp distinction and kept the Egyptians down, though the later Ptolemaic period witnessed a certain degree of Egyptian comeback, and Polybius, as quoted by Strabo XVII 1 12, C 797 (Polybius XXXIV 14 in vol. VI of the Loeb ed. [n. 70] 334–335), regarded the Egyptians as an acute and civilized race, *ὀξὺ καὶ πολιτικόν* (see Haarhoff's n. [n. 48] 101), superior both to the rough and uncultivated mercenaries, *βαρὺ καὶ . . . ἀνάγωγον*, and to the mongrel and not genuinely civilized Greek population, *οὐδ' αὐτὸ εὐκρινῶς πολιτικὸν . . . καὶ . . . μιγάδες*; see Haarhoff (n. 48) 86–87. The famous description of Alexander's attitude towards the barbarians is found in Plutarch's first essay (*Oratio I*) *De Alexandri Magni Fortuna aut Virtute* 329 B-D, to be found in the Teubner edition by Bernadakis, II (1889) 415–416, or in the Loeb edition by Babbitt, IV (1936) 396–399. Plutarch's two essays are a defense of the view that Alexander's success was due to his virtue, and not simply to Fortune. For the background of this debate, see the remarks by W. W. Tarn in *Camb. Anc. Hist.* VI (1927) 400, quoted by Robinson (n. 49) 11–12. Plutarch says that Zeno described an ecumenical state as a dream or pattern of good government and of a constitution, but Alexander produced fact to equal the theory. For he did not do as Aristotle advised him, namely, treat the Greeks as if he was their leader (*ἡγεμονικῶς*) and the barbarians like a master (*δεσποτικῶς*) and care for the former as friends and relatives but behave towards the latter as beasts or plants, since by such conduct he would have filled his realm with many exiles and subversive factions. Rather, he thought that he was sent by the gods as a general harmonizer and orderer of the whole world. Strabo, I 4 9, C 66–67, states that Eratosthenes later criticized Aristotle severely for his traditional point of view and said that "it would be better to make divisions not by race but according to virtue and vice (*ἀρετῇ καὶ κακίᾳ*) since not only were many Greeks bad (*κακούς*) but many of the barbarians were refined (*ἀστείους*), for instance Indians and Arians and also Romans and Carthaginians, who carried on their governments so admirably. Eratosthenes said that this was the reason why Alexander, disregarding Aristotle's advice, welcomed as many as he could of men of fair repute and did them favors"; see

Jüthner (n. 48) 49 and 134 n. 121; Haarhoff (n. 48) 69–70. Robinson (n. 49) 36, cites from Plutarch, *Or.* I 329 C at the end, the remark of Alexander that people should consider as akin to themselves all good men and as foreigners only the wicked; the distinguishing mark of the Greek should be seen in virtue and that of the foreigner in iniquity, etc. See above, n. 48, on the concept of "barbarian."

[66] For Hellenistic civilization, see generally Tarn (n. 65); Jouguet (n. 62), esp. H. Berr's remark in the preface, p. xiii; Rostovtzeff (n. 64); Jüthner (n. 48) 44–59; Haarhoff (n. 48) 86–103.

[67] For the king as animate law, see Goodenough (n. 21) throughout. On pp. 91–92, he cites a statement from the pseudo-Aristotelian (Anaximenes?) *Letter to Alexander* (prefaced to the *Rhetoric* of Anaximenes) that the λόγος (inadequately translatable as "reason") of Alexander as king was equivalent to νόμος ("law") in a democracy. Philippson, (n. 129) 436, cites from Plutarch *Alex.* 52 and Arrian *Anab.* IV 9 7 remarks of Alexander which imply that he regarded his words and acts as just because they were inspired by Zeus. Goodenough traces the concept of the king as animate law in Greek thought to the Pythagoreans and thinks that they assimilated it from the Near East, either in the pre-Platonic period or, as he thinks more probable, in the Hellenistic period, see particularly his concluding paragraph, pp. 101–102. Ferguson, (n. 5) 139–148 and in his article on "Legalized Absolutism en route from Greece to Rome" in the *American Historical Review* XVIII (1912) 29–47, argued that deification provided to Alexander and his successors, including the Roman emperors, a device for imposing their decisions as divine utterances on the Greek city-states, whose constitutions did not provide for any sovereignty beyond themselves. This view is debatable, Hammond (n. 106) 106–109. D. Magie emphasizes the sovereignty of free cities during the Hellenistic and Roman periods in his chapter on "The Political Status of the Independent Cities of Asia Minor in the Hellenistic Period" in *The Greek Political Experience* (n. 22) 173–186. C. A. Robinson, in his "Alexander's Deification" in the *American Journal of Philology* LXIV (1943) 286–301, argues that Alexander had recourse to deification to win back the loyalty of his mutinous Macedonian troops at Opis and, in general, to regularize his position politically vis-à-vis the Greeks. In part, the deification may have been the result of Alexander's instinct for "stage" in impressing on the Greeks his new oriental position; see Ferguson (n. 5) 123, cited by Haarhoff (n. 48) 77; Goodenough (n. 21) 86 n. 102; Robinson (n. 49) 114–116, 165, 220–221. Reinmuth, (n. 62) 120–121, connects the deification with Alexander's desire to be regarded as the harmonizer and stabilizer of the world, see Plutarch as quoted above in n. 65. For Alexander as the "hero-savior," see Cochrane (n. 110) 86–90. The Stoics, perhaps under the influence of the concept of the king as "animate law," developed Plato's theory of the philosopher-king who has true knowledge of the real world of eternal ideas into the view that the king, through his superior wisdom and virtue, makes effective in human relations the

divine reason that pervades the universe; see Goodenough 58, who cites J. Kaerst *Geschichte des Hellenismus* II (ed. 2, Leipzig, Teubner, 1926) 108–126, 304–325; see also Tarn (n. 65) 73–74; Bury (n. 48) 26–30; Haarhoff (n. 48) 82–83; Toynbee (n. 23) 540–541.

[68] Compare Zimmern, "Ath. and Am." (n. 22) 9; Cochrane (n. 110) 30–32.

[69] Tenney Frank, "Roman Historiography before Caesar," *American Historical Review* XXXII (1926/1927) 232–240; W. Soltau, *Die Anfänge der römischen Geschichtsschreibung* (Leipzig, Hässel, 1909); E. Ciaceri *Le Origini di Roma* (Milan, etc., Soc. Dante Alighieri, 1937) 1–120.

[70] The literary and epigraphic *Remains of Old Latin* down to Sulla are collected by E. H. Warmington in four volumes of the *Loeb Classical Library* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press; London, Heinemann, 1935–1940). The historians are collected by H. Peter in *Historicorum Romanorum Fragmenta* (Leipzig, Teubner, 1883) and, more fully, in *Historicorum Romanorum Reliquiae* I (ed. 2, Leipzig, Teubner, 1914).

[71] Warmington (n. 70) I viii–xiii.

[72] M. Schanz, *Geschichte der römischen Literatur* (Müller's *Handbuch der klass. Alt.-wiss.* VIII), I: "In der Zeit der Republic," ed. 4 by C. Hosius (Munich, Beck'sche VBH., 1927) 54–55 for Naevius, 76 for Plautus, 96–97 for Ennius; see also J. W. Duff, *A Literary History of Rome in the Golden Age* (ed. 2, London, Unwin, 1910 and later reprints) 118–201, especially 133–134 for Naevius, 146–148 for Ennius, and 172–176 for Plautus; Haarhoff (n. 48) 180–187. F. Christ, *Die römische Weltherrschaft in der antiken Dichtung* (Tübinger Beiträge zur Alt.-wiss. XXI, Stuttgart, Berlin, Kohlhammer, 1938) 182–183, discusses the concept of Rome's universality in the early poets. On pp. 179–182, he points to a possible Greek source for the concept of world rule in early Roman literature in a "Hymn to Rome" by a certain south Italian Greek poet, Melinno, cited by Stobaeus, III 7 12.

[73] Frank (n. 8) 56 nn. 2–3. On pp. 65–67, he traces the first period of Roman aggressiveness to the new democracy which at the beginning of the third century B.C. threw off conservative restraints and became involved in the war with Pyrrhus in 280 B.C.; compare his title for chapter VI: "Imperial Democracy." He argues that at the end of the First Punic War in 241 B.C. national exhaustion meant a resumption of conservative, senatorial, anti-imperialistic control, which lasted until the democratic revolt initiated by Tiberius Gracchus in 133 B.C. See generally his conclusion on pp. 356–357; Haarhoff (n. 48) 132–134. Frank's view of Rome as fundamentally nonaggressive is criticized briefly by Bury, (n. 48) 12–13, from a "Hellenistic" standpoint.

[74] See, briefly, H. J. Edwards' preface to W. H. Paton's translation in vol. I (1922) of the Loeb ed. (n. 70) of Polybius, pp. vii–xv.

[75] C. Wunderer, *Polybius: Lebens- und Weltanschauung aus dem zweiten vorchristlichen Jahrhundert* (*Das Erbe der Alten*, zweite Reihe XII, Leipzig, Dieterich'sche VBH, 1927), gives a more general discussion of his thought than

does R. Laqueur, who, in his *Polybius* (Leipzig, Berlin, Teubner, 1913), is more concerned with determining strata of composition. See also W. Siegfried, *Studien zur geschichtlichen Anschauung des Polybius* (Leipzig, Teubner, 1928) and, briefly, Haarhoff (n. 48) 222–227. For the catholic and pragmatic viewpoint of Polybius, see briefly Edwards' preface (n. 74) to the Loeb ed. (n. 70) vol. I p. xi, with reference to III 6–8. K. Jäntere, (n. 128) xiii, remarks that Polybius substituted for the idea of the autarchy of the city-state or of the Hellenistic kingdom that of the autarchy of the whole world, but this concept goes back politically to Alexander and philosophically to the Stoics; see Kaerst (n. 63) 12–17, especially p. 12 bottom.

[76] For the Greek view of the Romans as barbarians, see Wunderer (n. 75) 59 and 75 n. 94; Jüthner (n. 48) 61–62. Polybius quite frequently represents Greeks as calling the Romans barbarians, for instance: XI 5(6) 7, in a speech of an Achaean ambassador; XVIII 22(5) 8, in the speech of a Macedonian messenger. The Persians are barbarians in IX 34 3, where Alexander is said to have enslaved them, and in XXXVIII 2 (4 or 16) 4, where the Persians under Xerxes are so called. The term is freely used of the tribes north of Macedon, IX 35 4 and 37 6; of the Thracians, XXIII 10 (XXIV 8) 4; of the Gauls with Brennus, IX 30 3, or in Galatia, XXI 40 (43 or XXII 24) 2, XXXI 9(11); and of the Hyrcanians, X 29 4 ff. The Ligurians are barbarians, XXXIII 8 (7 or 4) 3, 10 (11 or 8) 6; as are the natives of south Italy, X 1 2. "Barbarian" is identified with an atrocious outrage by the Achaean ambassador mentioned above, XI 5(6) 7, with reference to the Romans; and in connection with the treatment of Philinus and his sons by the Achaean demagogue Diaeus, XXXVIII 18 (XXXIX 11 or XL 5). One of the most amusing uses of the term in Polybius is in Cato's rebuke of Aulus Postumus who chose to write in Greek and then apologized for his "barbarisms," XXXIX 1 (12 or XL 6) 7: *κἄπειτα παραιτεῖσθαι συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἐὰν βαρβαρίζῃ τῆς ἁπάσης ἀτοπίας εἶναι*; see below, n. 86. Polybius was ready to admire virtue or courage in barbarians, as in the Galatian chief Ortiagon, XXII 21, and his wife Chiomara, XXI 38; in the Galatian chief Cavarus, IV 52 1, VIII 22 (24) 1; or in the Odryssian ruler Cotys, XXVII 12(10). But he shows no idealization of the barbarian, such as apparently occurred in some Hellenistic writers, Jüthner (n. 48) 55–59; Haarhoff (n. 48) 88 and n. on p. 102. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, writing under Augustus, refers to the view that the Romans were barbarians and refutes it by arguing that they were actually an offshoot of the Greeks, I 4–5 (preface), 10–11, 89–90; see Cary's preface to vol. I (1937) of the Loeb ed. (n. 70) of his *Roman Antiquities* pp. xx–xxii. Jüthner, (n. 48) 64–78, shows how the theory of the Greek origin of the Romans arose once the Romans became "civilized," that is, Hellenized, and suggests, p. 67, that the Roman equivalent for the Greek *παιδεία*, which distinguished Greek from barbarian, was *humanitas*, which also included the Greek *φιλανθρωπία*.

[77] Polybius III 2 6, 118 9, VI throughout, VIII 2(4) 7; Cochrane (n. 110) 91,

474. Compare Cicero *De Rep.* II 1 2, where the view that Rome's constituiton was the product of the genius of the whole people, not of any individual, is attributed to Cato the Elder; see Cochrane (n. 110) 32. The relative weight in Polybius' thought of merit or Fortune in ensuring success has been much disputed; see XXIX 21 (6c) where Perseus, after his defeat, reflects that Demetrius of Phalerum attributed Alexander's overthrow of Persia to Fortune in a treatise on *Tyche*. Polybius compares the fall of Persia and the fall of Macedon as examples of the work of "Tyche, who never bargains with life, who always defeats our reckoning by some novel stroke." In XXXVI 17 (XXXVII 4 or 9), Polybius differentiates between natural accidents due to the gods or chance and events due to deliberate human action, like the decline of the birth rate in Greece, and he says that the Macedonian support of the pretender Andriscus in 149 B.C. was a human action but inspired by an infatuation from heaven, since the Romans had ruled well and the pretended "Philip" was a hateful man. Laqueur, (n. 75) 241–242, 275–277, thinks that Polybius replaced his view that Roman success was due to her excellent constitution by the view that it was due to "Tyche" in a late revision of his work, when he had fallen under the influence of Panaetius, who, in turn, was influenced by Demetrius; see especially Laqueur 242 n. 2, and, for the political slant of the view that Alexander's success was due to "Tyche," Tarn as cited above, n. 65.

[78] That Roman policy in the mid-second century was becoming increasingly selfish and power-conscious is the theme of various passages in Polybius (see below, n. 101); XXXI 10(18) 7 (see below, n. 98) on the Senate's decision of a dynastic dispute in Egypt; XXXI 11(19) 11 on a similar dispute in Syria; XXXI 21(32) 5–6 on the dispute between Massinissa and Carthage. L. Homo, in *Roman Political Institutions* (trans. M. R. Dobie in the series *History of Civilization* ed. by C. K. Ogden, London, Kegan Paul Trench Trubner; New York, Knopf, 1929) 85–90, gives examples of the abuse by the equestrians of contracts for tax-farming and for public works during the second century and describes how this brought them into conflict with the selfish interests of the senators. Sallust, writing a century later than Polybius, shared his view on senatorial selfishness as ruinous to the state, below, n. 105. Polybius, however, did not feel that Roman misgovernment was sufficient to justify opposition to her on the part of the Greeks. He quotes with disapproval the wild talk of an ambassador from Demetrius of Syria, a braggart grammarian, who justified the murder of a Roman envoy on the ground that it "would put a stop to the haughty orders of the Romans and to their unrestrained exercise of power"; see above, n. 77, for Polybius' condemnation in XXXVI 17 (XXXVII 4 or 9) of the Macedonians for supporting Andriscus against Rome.

[79] In III 2 6, Polybius says that the subject of his history was not simply how the Romans got their universal rule, since the acquisition of power is not an end in itself but, like all human actions, aimed at the resulting pleasure, good, or utility (§ 11). Rather he will study the effect of their domination on other

peoples, to see whether their rule was acceptable and praiseworthy or the reverse (§ 7). This suggests that in the lost portions of his work there may have been some consideration of the practical, if not the theoretical, justification for Rome's rule. The closest, however, that the surviving portions come to this is in XXXVI 9 (XXXVII 1 or 1a), where he gives the various opinions held in Greece with respect to Rome's conduct towards Carthage in the Third Punic War, a passage too long to quote here. In XXXVI 2 (1b), he notes with approval (based on Demetrius of Phalerum) the attention which Rome paid to basing her wars on justifiable pretexts, whatever the fundamental cause, since a good pretext justifies victory in the eyes of other nations and gains sympathy for defeat. Capelle, (n. 88) 89 n. 1, states: "Bei Polybius kann daher von einer Theorie (zugunsten oder zuungunsten des römischen Imperialismus) nicht wohl die Rede sein." He goes on to deny Nestle's contention, (n. 32) 238–239, that Polybius shows the influence of Panaetius (above, p. 118) in VI 3.

[80] Frank (n. 8) 138–242; M. Cary, *A History of Rome, etc.* (London, Macmillan, 1938) 178–212.

[81] Polybius closed his *History* in 144 B.C., see his epilogue, XXXIX 8 (19 or XL 12), but he presumably was composing it in the years between that date and his death about 120 B.C. (below, n. 83). Cary, (n. 80) 212 n. 12, refers to M. N. Tod, "The Macedonian Era," *Annual of the British School at Athens XXIII* (1918/1919) 206–217 for the annexation of Macedon in 148 B.C. instead of in the generally accepted year 146 B.C.

[82] The position of Scipio the Elder (Africanus) and Scipio the Younger (Aemilianus) in the development of Roman imperialism, as generally in the development of Roman culture, is much disputed. Scipio the Elder retired from Rome in 184 B.C. in dudgeon at the impeachment brought against his brother for their joint conduct of the war against Antiochus, and he died in the following year, Cary (n. 80) 252. Polybius could never, therefore, have known him personally. Cary, (n. 80) 592 n. 32, points out that Polybius presents him as a Machiavellian manager of men, whereas Livy regards him as a great Roman leader and hero. Similarly, W. Schur, in his *Scipio Africanus und die Begründung der römischen Weltherrschaft* (*Das Erbe der Alten*, zweite Reihe XIII, Leipzig, Dieterich'sche VBH., 1927), makes him out as the founder of one-man power, a *princeps*, and the father of Roman imperialism, who was heroized by his Hellenized admirers and regarded as a "tyrant" by aristocrats like Cato. R. M. Hayward, on the other hand, in his *Studies on Scipio Africanus (The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science* series LI no. 1, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), criticizes the "legend" that made him a mystic and *princeps* and portrays him simply as a Roman noble, leader of the liberal, philhellene party, who was heroized only in the East and only to the extent that other Romans had been. Scipio the Younger was considerably junior to Polybius and may well have been influenced more than was the historian by the thought of the Greek philosophers domiciled in his home (below,

n. 88). Even the degree to which Polybius felt this influence is disputed, above, n. 77 end. J. Kaerst, "Scipio Amelianus, die Stoa und der Prinzipat," *Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung* V (1929) 653–675, argues strongly for the influence on Scipio of the teaching of Panaetius. K. Bilz, *Die Politik des P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus* (*Würzburger Studien zur Alt.-wiss.* VII, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1936), regards Scipio as a great and typical Roman aristocrat, free from the selfishness and corruption which characterized many of his contemporaries but looking backward, seeking cures for the basic decay of the constitution by remedying superficial faults, and blind to the need for a revolutionary change of the outworn city-state form of government to adapt it to the needs of empire. O. Seel, *Römische Denker und römischer Staat* (*Neue Wege zur Antike* I. Reihe [*Darstellungen*] XIII, Leipzig, Berlin, Teubner, 1937) 6 n. 1, and 77, thinks that Scipio stood closer to Polybius and both to Carneades than to Paenetius, though Scipio softened the stark "power politics" of Carneades by his devotion to the Roman tradition of morality and duty. Frank, (n. 8) 186–187, thinks that Scipio the Elder attempted to make Rome simply another enlightened Hellenistic power and that even the defeat of Perseus, pp. 213–215, did not make Rome more eager for direct annexation, though it meant the substitution of a more practical policy towards Greece in place of the previously sentimental philhellenism. Only with the conquest of Carthage, p. 238, did Rome become frankly ambitious for power, as indicated by Polybius, XXXVI 9 (above n. 79).

[83] For the dates of Polybius, see Schmid und Stählin (n. 40) ed. 6 II ("Die Nachklass. Periode") 1 384 n. 2. He was born about 201 B.C. and died at 82, hence about 120 B.C. For Cicero, see O. Plasberg, *Cicero in seinen Werken und Briefen* (*Das Erbe der Alten*, zweite Reihe XII, Leipzig, Dieterich'sche VBH., 1926) 8–9; below, n. 93.

[84] For the period from the Gracchi through Sulla, see Cary (n. 80) 281–345. R. Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1939), gives a rather cynical and highly colored account of the forces at work during the whole period from the Gracchi to Augustus, with particular attention to the part played by the old families in the attempt to preserve their position. Cochrane, (n. 110) 17–19, interprets the "revolution" as a protest by the proletariat "against the prostitution of a common good (*res publica*) to the interests of a narrow and selfish plutocracy."

[85] It may be questioned whether Tiberius Gracchus was at all imperialistic; he seems to have combined the traditional Roman point of view that the strength of the state rested in a healthy peasantry with the Greek concept that the assembly of the people represented the ultimate sovereignty of the state and that no control should stand in the way of its will. The following quotation from Hobson (n. 6) 103 sounds very similar to what the ancient sources, admittedly written two centuries or more after the Gracchan period, namely, Appian *Bell. Civ.* I 7–11 and Plutarch's *Tiberius Gracchus* 7 (see Cary [n. 80] 294 n. 4), put in Tiberius' mouth: "A military nation surrounded by hostile

empires must have within her boundaries adequate supplies of the sinews of war, efficient recruits, and a large food supply. We cannot safely rely upon the fighting capacities of a town-bred population, or upon food supplies from foreign lands. Both needs demand that checks be set upon the excessive concentration of our population in towns and that a serious attempt be made to revive agriculture and restore the people to the soil. There are two methods which seem possible. The one is a large radical scheme of land reform interfering with the rights of landowners by compulsory purchase or leasing on the part of public bodies, with powers to establish large numbers of small farmers on the soil with loans of capital sufficient to enable them to live and work upon the soil. The other method is Protection, the re-imposition of taxes on imported grain, cattle, fruit, and dairy produce, with the object of stimulating agriculture and keeping the population on the soil. Given the political sway of the propertied classes, it is certain that the latter course will be preferred. . . ." Brown, (n. 36) however, accepts a speech attributed by Appian, *Bell. Civ.* I 11, to Tiberius as evidence that he may have had imperialistic ideas derived from his Greek philosopher teachers. For the possibility that Tiberius was disturbed by the concentration of population in Rome, see H. Last in *Camb. Anc. Hist.* IX (1932) 7–10 and Cary (n. 80) 294 n. 4. The latter cites with scepticism the argument of D. Kontchalowski for this sociological purpose of Tiberius' law in his "Recherches sur l'Histoire du Mouvement Agraire des Gracques" in *Revue Historique* CLIII (1926) 161–186, especially pp. 179–185. Gaius Gracchus, in the face of the opposition of the landed classes, could not turn to Protection, so he turned, probably again under the influence of Greek theories of the responsibility of the state to support its population (Hasebroek [n. 8] 11–21; Last in *Camb. Anc. Hist.* IX [1932] 57–60), to the importation of grain by the state for sale (to prevent profiteering) and to the use of revenues from Asia (to finance his schemes of poor relief through the distribution of land, the importation of grain, and the foundation of colonies); see Cary (n. 80) 291.

[86] Despite the attempt of Cicero to humanize the personality of Cato the Censor in his essay *On Old Age*, it is generally agreed that Cato was a reactionary who epitomized the opposition of the conservative Roman landowning senators to the liberal and philhellene policy of the Scipios; see Haarhoff (n. 48) 209–215; Cochrane (n. 110) 32–34. Cato is not mentioned in connection with the expulsions of Greek philosophers from Rome in 161 and 154 B.C. (or 173 B.C., see Schanz–Hosius I [n. 72] 178–181, also 209–211). But he must have supported them because of his conviction that Greek manners would corrupt the state; see Duff (n. 72) 106; Haarhoff (n. 48) 212, 227, 234–235, 240; and particularly the statements of Cato's contemporary Polybius, XXXI 25 (XXXII 11 or XXXI 24) 5a, in connection with the author's praise of Scipio the Younger for resisting this corruption, and XXXIX 1 (12 or XL 6) on Cato's condemnation of Aulus Postumius, partly quoted above, n. 76. Cato urged in the Senate that the embassy of philosophers sent from Athens in 156/5 (below, n. 88) be dismissed as soon as possible, Plutarch *Cato Ma.* 22. When

the censor Crassus expelled Latin teachers of grammar and rhetoric from Rome in 92 B.C., it had come to be recognized that these subjects should be taught, but only by Greeks; the profession was unworthy of Latins. This represents, perhaps, a patriotic feeling rather than the moral opposition of Cato; see Duff (n. 72) 106; Haarhoff (n. 48) 235–236.

[87] For the remains, see the collections cited above in n. 70. Lucilius, the intimate of Scipio the Younger and frank commentator on men and policies of his time, does not in his surviving fragments reflect any imperial themes; see F. Christ (n. 72) 182: "Aus den im Vergleich zum Gesamtwerk spärlichen Fragmenten des Lucilius geht wenigstens die Unbesiegbarkeit Roms hervor"; also Schanz und Hosius (n. 72) I 156–157.

[88] The following argument is that of W. Capelle in his "Griechische Ethik und römischer Imperialismus," *Klio* XXV (1932) 86–113. Capelle is diametrically opposed to the view of Nestle, (n. 32) 237–242, that the ideas of Carneades on power politics prevailed at Rome. Kaerst, *Scipio Ämilianus* (n. 82), agrees with Capelle that Panaetius prevailed. Seel, (n. 82) 68, distinguishes two lines of thought: Heraclitus-Poseidonius-Sallust-Horace-Tacitus and Plato-Dicaearchus-Panaetius-Cicero-Lucan-Seneca. He thinks, p. 71, that the former accepted the Roman rule as a *de facto*, amoral, result of fate while the latter sought its justification in natural law; see below, n. 126. Capelle, pp. 94–96, refers to A. Schmekel, *Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa usw.* (Berlin, Weidmannsche BH., 1892) 55–63, for the analysis of Cicero's *De Republica* III; see also K. Sprey, *De M.T. Ciceronis Politica Doctrina* (Amsterdam Thesis, Zutphen, Nauta, 1928) 30–32. Sprey, pp. 23–52, compares the argument in *De Rep.* III with similar arguments in *De Leg.* I and *De Off.* III to support the derivation from Panaetius; see also M. Pohlenz, *Antikes Führertum; Cicero "De Officiis" und das Lebensideal des Panaitios* (*Neue Wege zur Antike*, II Reihe, [*Interpretationen*] Heft 3, Leipzig, Berlin, Teubner, 1934) 33. Schmekel discusses the political theory of Panaetius in pp. 225–229, without reference to imperialism, and the conflict between Carneades and the Middle Stoa in pp. 356–379. Schmekel is closely followed by B. N. Tatakis, *Panétius de Rhodes, etc.* (Paris, Vrin, 1931) 211–216. M. Van Straaten's *Panétius: sa Vie ses Écrits et sa Doctrine avec une Édition des Fragments* (Amsterdam, Paris, 1946) was not available for consultation. The difference in date between Polybius, who came to Rome in 167 B.C., above, p. 116, and the arrival of the philosophers was not in fact great. The first Greek teacher to establish himself at Rome seems to have been Crates of Mallos, a grammarian, in 165 B.C. (Tatakis, p. 21, dates after 159 B.C.); see Schanz und Hosius (n. 72) I 212–214. The embassy from Athens in 156/5 B.C., to ask for reduction of a fine, comprised Diogenes the Stoic, Critolaus the Peripatetic, and Carneades, a Sceptic of the New Academy; see Schanz und Hosius I 178–180; Nestle (n. 32) 240 n. 2; Haarhoff (n. 48) 153. Panaetius first visited Rome between 144 and 140 B.C. and again between 138 and 130 B.C.; see Schmekel 6–7; Tatakis 25–29; Schanz-Hosius I (n. 72) 212–214. Cicero com-

posed the *De Republica* between 54 and 51 B.C., see Sabine and Smith's preface, (n. 96) 43.

[89] Capelle (n. 88) 86–93; for Thrasymachus, etc., above p. 111.

[90] Capelle (n. 88) 93–113, particularly pp. 101–104 for an analysis of three passages in Strabo, III 144C, 154, and 156, not previously regarded as derived from Posidonius.

[91] For Aristotle on the "natural slave," see Capelle (n. 88) 107–111 and above n. 50. For the Stoics, see Schmekel (n. 88) 378–379.

[92] For Plato's influence, see Schmekel (n. 88) 34, 378. The early Stoics submerged the concept of the city-state in that of the universal brotherhood of man but the later Stoics, Panaetius and Posidonius, while still clinging to universal brotherhood as an ideal, accepted the city-state with a mixed constitution as the best practical political setting for the life according to reason and natural law; Schmekel 374–378; Sprey (n. 88) 13, citing Diogenes Laertius VII 131.

[93] The best life of Cicero in English, with summaries of his speeches and essays, is T. Petersson, *Cicero: A Biography* (Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press, 1920). See the more detailed article by Gelzer, Kroll, Philippson, and Büchner under Tullius no. 29 in Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll-Mittelhaus, *Realencyclopädie* (n. 53), zweite Reihe vol. VII (half vol. 13, 1939) 827–1274.

[94] Reference is to the *Verrines*, the *Manilian Law*, and the three speeches *Against Rullus on the Agrarian Law*.

[95] The modern works on the political theory of Cicero are too numerous to list, see recently V. Pöschl, *Römischer Staat und griechisches Staatsdenken bei Cicero* (*Neue deutsche Forschungen* Abt. klass. Philol. V, Berlin, Junker & Dünnhaupt, 1936). For the practical unreality of Cicero's views, see Seel (n. 82) 6–11; and Christ (n. 72) 183, who sees in Sallust, Cicero, and Lucretius a "tragic" loyalty to a bankrupt past.

[96] The translation of *Cicero On the Commonwealth* by G. H. Sabine and S. B. Smith (Columbus, Ohio, Ohio State University Press, 1929) has a summary of the political theories upon which Cicero drew but does not refer to his view on imperialism. See, however, the remarks of Vogt, (n. 102) 89–93. A. N. Sherwin-White, (n. 122) 270–275, has an interesting discussion of the concept of the Roman empire as *omnes gentes*, and disputes the view of Korneman that this implied an absence of real loyalty to Rome and the strength of provincial "nationalism." Sherwin-White traces the use of *gentes* for the provinces to Sallust and particularly to Cicero but thinks that by this word Cicero recognized the unification of various peoples under Rome's rule, just as later the phrase *orbis terrarum* came to describe the world-wide extent of the empire.

[97] *De Rep.* V 1 1, from Augustine *De. Civ. Dei* II 1 and Nonius p. 417 7, begins with the famous verse of Ennius: *Moribus antiquis res stat Romana virisque* and continues shortly thereafter; *nam neque viri nisi ita morata civitas fuisset, neque mores, nisi hi viri praefuissent, aut fundare aut tam diu tenere*

potuissent tantam et tam fuse lateque imperantem rem publicam. Compare Sallust's reflections on the rise and decay of Rome in *Bell. Cat.* 53, especially § 4: *paucorum civium egregiam virtutem cuncta patravisse.* See Christ (n. 72) 145–146 for the theme that fruitfulness in worthy leaders is the source of empire and pp. 146–155, 178 for moral virtues as its foundation.

[98] *De Rep.* III 24 35, from Nonius p. 498 13: *noster autem populus sociis defendendis terrarum iam omnium potitus est*; compare *De. Off.* II 8 27: *patrocinium orbis terrae verius quam imperium*; *De Leg.* III 3 9: *imperia, potestates, legationes . . . sociis parcunto etc.*; *De Leg.* III 7 17 (placed here in the Loeb ed., from Macrobius, see Müller's Teubner ed. of the *De Leg.*, 1905, p. 450 fragment 3): *qui poterit socios tueri, si dilectum rerum utilium et inutilium non habebit.* See Sprey (n. 88) 50–54. H. Wachtler, in his *Kommentar zu Cicero De Rep.* (Leipzig, Berlin, Teubner, 1930) 48, cites on *De Rep.* III 24 35, Polybius' comment, XXXI 10(18) 7 (above, n. 78), on the way in which the Romans advanced their own interests while ostensibly benefiting those who made mistakes and Virgil's famous formula for Roman rule in *Aen.* VI 852, quoted below, n. 121. Wachtler says that the English use the same "Rechtsfiktion."

[99] *De Rep.* III 25 37, from Augustine *Contra Iulianum Pelag.* IV 12 61: *an non cernimus optimo cuique dominatum ab ipsa natura cum summa utilitate infirmorum datum?* See Capelle (n. 88) 93; also Augustine *De Civ. Dei* XIX 21, who connects this passage from Cicero with the justification of slavery and imperialism; compare Aristotle on slavery, above, n. 50.

[100] *De Rep.* IV 7 7, from Nonius p. 24 21: *nolo enim eundem populum imperatorem et portitorem esse terrarum. optimum autem et in privatis familiis et in re publica duco esse parsimoniam.* Cicero may have in mind the arguments of the demagogues that revenues from the empire should be devoted to the support and amusement of the ruling Roman *populus*, see above, nn. 8, 10, 85, and p. 117. Sprey, (n. 88) 185–186, thinks that Cicero is indirectly criticizing Gaius Gracchus, who exposed the provincials to the rapacity of equestrian financiers by his law on the taxes of Asia. Vogt, (n. 102) 90 n. 65, thinks that Cicero's consciousness of the duty of the ruler to care for the ruled, as pragmatically set forth in his letter on provincial government to his brother Quintus, *Ad Quint. Fr.* I 1, especially §31, is not purely the result of his studies in Greek philosophy but also reflects the basis of the confidence of the subjects in Rome, her *fides*. Vogt's criticism is directed against R. Harder, who, in discussing Cicero's concept of *humanitas* in an article "Nachträgliches zu *humanitas*" in *Hermes* LXIX (1934) 71–73, traced Cicero's advice to Quintus back to Plato through Panaetius. Whatever the source, both agree that Cicero regarded it as a duty of the ruler, that is, the Roman governor, to consider the interests of the ruled, the provincials.

[101] *De Rep.* VI 16 16, from Macrobius, concluding: *iam ipsa terra ita mihi parva visa est, ut me imperii nostri, quo quasi punctum eius attingimus, paeni-*

teret. Scipio the Younger, according to Polybius, feared that the fate which he had imposed on Carthage would someday overtake Rome, see XXXVIII 21 (XXXIX 5 or XXXIX 3), derived from Plutarch *Apophthegmata* p. 200 and Appian *Punica* 132. It is Appian who has Scipio quote the famous lines which Homer, *Il.* VI 448–449, places in the mouth of Hector, prophesying the eventual fall of Troy. Polybius himself believed that political institutions, like all of nature, passed through a cycle of growth and decay and that the Roman constitution, excellent as he found it, would someday suffer a change for the worse, VI 9 12, 57. Possibly he felt that this was beginning in his own day, see above, n. 78, and, for Sallust, below, n. 105. In general, compare Vogt (n. 102) 35–39 for Cicero's belief that all things human ultimately decline, but contrast pp. 72–101 for Cicero's belief in the eternal character of Rome. Such inconsistencies depend on the particular mood and occasion of Cicero's writing. Politically speaking in human terms, Rome would endure forever; religiously and viewed in the light of eternity, her rule was temporal.

[102] J. Vogt, *Ciceros Glaube an Rom* (*Würzburger Studien zur Alt.-wiss.* VI, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1935), who follows Capelle in his view of Roman imperialism; see p. 91, where he also cites Pohlenz, *Antikes Führertum usw.* (n. 88) 31–33. For Cicero's belief in the mortality of man and the eternity of the divine spirit, see Vogt, 76–81, 93–99.

[103] Duff (n. 72) 408. Cato the Younger condemned Caesar's breaches of faith in Gaul so bitterly that he tried to have him handed over to the Gauls, Nestle (n. 32) 239, Plutarch *Cato Ut.* 51.

[104] See Frank (n. 8) 329–347; E. Meyer, *Caesars Monarchie und das Principat des Pompeius* (ed. 3, Berlin, Cotta, 1922); Cochrane (n. 110) 6–8. For the influence of Hellenistic ideas on Caesar, see briefly Bury (n. 48) 14–15. Augustus, for all his "traditionalism," also learned much from the Hellenistic monarchies, see M. Hammond, "Hellenistic Influences on the Structure of the Augustan Principate," *Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome* XVII (1940) 1–24. H. Rudolph, *Stadt und Staat im römischen Italien* (Leipzig, Dietrich, 1935) 243, thinks that Caesar had in fact made the transition from city-state to empire. This leads Seel, (n. 82) 13 n. 1, to think that the travail of the Roman empire to attain the ecumenical form during the following centuries was a tragic waste.

[105] Not only were Cicero and the conservative senators blinded by their devotion to traditional political theories or by their own selfishness to the need for change, Syme (n. 84) 22–24, but even so loyal a supporter of Caesar as Sallust could not escape the tradition of the city-state and appreciate Caesar's ecumenical policy, according to Seel (n. 82) 12–17, who accepts the genuineness of the two letters to Caesar preserved under the name of Sallust. A fragment of Sallust's *Histories* opens with the statement that the Roman empire had reached its greatest extent with the conquests of Caesar, in 53 B.C.: *Res Romana plurimum imperio valuit Servio Sulpicio et Marco Marcello consulibus,*

omni Gallia cis Rhenum atque inter mare nostrum et Oceanum, nisi qua paludibus invia fuit, perdomita. Sallust goes on to remark that the state had the best morals and most harmony, *optimis autem moribus et maxima concordia egit*, between the Second and Third (last) Punic wars, not through any inherent love of justice, *amor iustitiae*, but through fear that peace would be unstable as long as Carthage survived. After the destruction of Carthage, discord, avarice, ambition (= corruption), and the other evils customary in a period of success increased at Rome. And before the Second Punic war the state was rent by the struggles between the patricians and the plebeians. This passage is no. 11 of bk. I in Maurenbrecher's (Leipzig, Teubner, 1891) ed. p. 6. It has recently been discussed textually by W. Clausen in "Notes on Sallust's *Historiae*" in the *American Journal of Philology* LXVIII (1947) 300–301. The passage has been reconstituted by combining a citation in Victorinus *In Rhet. Cic.* with one in Augustine *De Civ. Dei* II 18 and Clausen adduces a paraphrase from Velleius Paterculus I 12 6. With Sallust's opinion, compare Polybius, above, n. 78, and Cicero, above, n. 101. The opposition to Caesar's ecumenical policy on the part of the Italians, as against that of the Romans represented by Cicero, Sallust, and their fellows, was anticipated by the assassination and did not find expression until Augustus rallied it against Antony's attempt to perpetuate (or exaggerate?) Caesar's ideas; see Syme (n. 84) 284–289; *Camb. Anc. Hist.* X (1934) 90, 98; Cochrane (n. 110) 15–16.

[106] The present writer has argued for the sincerity of Augustus in *The Augustan Principate* (Cambridge, Mass., Harv. Univ. Press, 1933), see especially pp. 21 and 209 n. 15. Compare Cochrane (n. 110) 2–3. For an extremely cynical view of his sincerity, see Syme (n. 84) throughout the latter part. See also H. S. Jones in *Camb. Anc. Hist.* X (1934) 127–132 and Adcock in pp. 587–590; W. Weber, *Princeps* I (Stuttgart, Berlin, Kohlhammer, 1936) 137*–140* n. 557. For the favored status of the Italians, Adcock in *C.A.H.* X 585, 587, 603–607.

[107] The general view is that whether or not Augustus' cessation of expansion was due to the defeat of Varus in 9 A.D. or to a fundamental appreciation that the resources of the empire in men and money would not stand the strain of further conquests, he did establish a policy not to make further conquests, see briefly Cary (n. 80) 495–496; Frank (n. 8) 349–354; Hammond "Economic Stagnation" (n. 108) 75 n. 49, 87 n. 101. W. Kolbe, "Forschungen über die Varusschlacht," *Klio* XXV (1932) 168, concludes that the defeat of Varus did not stop Augustus' attempt to establish the Elbe as his German frontier and that it was the resistance of the Germans, inspired by Hermann's (Arminius') victory, which finally forced Tiberius to give up the attempt. Tacitus, *Ann.* IV 32, calls Tiberius *princeps incuriosus preferendi imperii*, and, *Ann.* I 11 4, *Agr.* 13 2, attributes this policy to the advice of Augustus; see Seel (n. 82) 34 n. 1, 76.

[108] Frank (n. 8) 354–355. Tacitus, *Ann.* II 61 2, *Hist.* I 1 with Spooner's note, p. 105 (London, Macmillan, 1891), regarded Trajan as a reviver of the

ancient tradition of conquest. M. Rostovtzeff, in *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1926) 307–315, thought that Trajan's conquests placed a strain on the resources of the empire which contributed to gradual economic decline during the second century A.D., see M. Hammond, "Economic Stagnation in the Roman Empire" in *The Tasks of Economic History* (*Journal of Economic History* suppl. VI, 1946) 76 n. 50; Toynbee (n. 23) 536.

[109] Tacitus *Ann.* I 9 6; *Camb. Anc. Hist.* X (1934) 601.

[110] Above, nn. 2–3. A stimulating discussion of the intellectual bases of the Roman empire and of their failure may be found in C. N. Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture: A Study of Thought and Action from Augustus to Augustine* (London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1944, corrected reprint from Clarendon Press ed. of 1940). The first three chapters, on the bases of the Augustan Principate as they developed in the later Republic, are particularly relevant. For the ecumenical character of the Roman empire, see Cochrane's remarks on pp. 72–73.

[111] Hammond, *Augustan Principate* (n. 106) 111–112. To the references given in Hammond 268 n. 16, add R. Reizenstein, "Die Idee des Principats bei Cicero und Augustus," *Nachrichten der kgl. Gesell. der Wiss. zu Göttingen*, phil.-hist. Kl. for 1917, 399–436, 481–498; R. Heinze, "Cicero's 'Staat' als politische Tendenzschrift," *Hermes* LIX (1924) 73–94.

[112] For *auctoritas*, see M. Grant, *From Imperium to Auctoritas* (Cambridge, Eng., Camb. Univ. Press, 1946) 424–453, especially p. 443 n. 4 for references to earlier discussions.

[113] L. R. Taylor, *The Divinity of the Roman Emperor* (Monograph I, published by the American Philological Association, Middletown, Conn., 1931) 142–227.

[114] Adcock in *Camb. Anc. Hist.* X (1934) 586. Toynbee, (n. 23) 495, notes that Augustus had a head of Alexander on his second seal-ring, Suet. *Aug.* 50 (his first had borne a sphinx). Suetonius comments that this seal was used by the succeeding princes. Augustus, like Caesar, was not unconscious that the Roman empire was heir to Alexander's plans and the name and achievements of Alexander exercised a great fascination over succeeding emperors, who felt them a challenge to the Roman sway; see A. Jardé, *Études Critiques sur la vie et le règne de Sévère Alexandre* (Paris, Boccard, 1925) 3 n. 1, and any index to the *Scriptores Historiae Augustae* under "Alexander." Trajan particularly felt the rivalry of Alexander, Dio LXVIII 29 1, 30 1.

[115] Christ (n. 72) 172–173; Frank (n. 8) 348–349.

[116] Christ (n. 72) 155–168, 173–174; above, n. 97; M. P. Charlesworth, "The Virtues of a Roman Emperor: Propaganda and the Creation of Belief," The Raleigh Lecture in History, *Proceedings of the British Academy* XXIII (London, Milford, 1937) 6–13. The sincerity of the Augustan poets in their praise of Augustus is much disputed; Syme, (n. 84) 459–475, entitles his chapter XXX

"The Organization of Opinion." E. K. Rand, in *The Building of Eternal Rome* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1943) 36–80, believes that the poets sincerely advocated "The Ideal Empire and its Fulfillment" (ch. II); see also Christ (n. 72) 186–191 and, for Virgil and Horace, Seel (n. 82) 17–37; Knight, *Roman Vergil* (n. 45) 56, 302–303.

[117] Schanz und Hosius (n. 72) II (1935) 310–313; Duff (n. 72) 650–651; Cochrane (n. 110) 86–90. Livy's preface, perhaps written before the establishment of the principate, shows a tone of pessimism over the present compared to the past which recalls the backward-looking attitude of Cicero and Sallust, above, nn. 95, 105, and also the pessimism of Horace's poems during the civil wars, notably *Epode* 16 and *Odes* I 14; see Seel (n. 82) 33. See also below, n. 126.

[118] Livy XXII 13 11: *quia iusto et moderato regebantur imperio nec abnuebant, quod unum vinculum fidei est, melioribus parere*; see Capelle (n. 88) 97; Seel (n. 82) 69.

[119] For F. Christ, see above, n. 72.

[120] Schanz und Hosius (n. 72) II (1935) 68–70; Duff (n. 72) 461–464; Rand (n. 116) 57–62; Cochrane (n. 110) 27–30.

[121] *Aen.* VI 847–853 (see above, n. 98):

> *Excudent alii spirantia mollius aera*
> *(credo equidem), vivos ducent de marmore vultus,*
> *orabunt causas melius, caelique meatus*
> *describent radio et surgentia sidera dicent;*
> *Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento*
> *(hae tibi erunt artes), pacisque imponere morem,*
> *parcere subiectis et debellare superbos.*

Nestle, (n. 32) 242, takes a rather cynical view that Cicero and Virgil express simply a practical maxim achieved by political cleverness, one in which England excels. Horace, less interested in government, gave Greece full credit for the early civilization of Latium when, in his letter to Augustus on contemporary literary trends, he remarked, *Ep.* II 1 156–157: *Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit et artes / intulit agresti Latio.* Horace does, however, recognize Roman virtue, especially in *Odes* III 1–6 and in bk. IV; see Duff (n. 72) 526–572; Seel (n. 82) 35–37; Rand (n. 116) 66–68, 72–74; Haarhoff (n. 48) 265–274.

[122] A. Sherwin-White, *The Roman Citizenship* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1939) 17–227.

[123] Hammond, "Economic Stagnation" (n. 108) 83–84. It came to be realized that even slavery was not, as Aristotle had maintained (above, n. 50), based on nature but was an institution of civil law, contrary to nature, see Poste, *Institutes of Gaius* (ed. 4, Oxford, Univ. Press, 1904) 37–38, citing Florentinus in *Dig.* I 5 4; and, Ulpian in Justinian's *Dig.* L 17 32; R. H. Barrow, *Slavery in the Roman Empire* (London, Methuen, 1928) 158–172.

[124] For *Urbs* = *Orbis*, Christ, (n. 72) 81–82, cites Propertius; then Ovid *Fasti* II 683–684:

Gentibus est aliis tellus data limite certo:
Romanae spatium est urbis et orbis idem;

then Manilius; and finally Rutilius Namatianus (below, n. 132) I 63–66:

Fecisti patriam diversis gentibus unam:
Profuit iniustis, te dominante, capi;
Dumque offers victis proprii consortia iuris,
Urbem fecisti, quod prius orbis erat.

Dio Cassius, LII 19 6, writing in the early third century, at the time when Caracalla extended the citizenship to almost all inhabitants of the empire by his Edict of 212 A.D., makes Maecenas advise Augustus to extend the citizenship to all, so that they will think of Rome as their only city and the rest of the empire as only its fields and dependent villages.

Claudian, *De Cons. Stil.* III 150–153, at the end of the fourth century A.D. portrays Rome as a mother who calls all humanity under her protection. He concludes: *cives vocavit quos domuit*; see Christ (n. 72) 28, 87; Cromer (n. 4) 17; Toynbee (n. 23) 223. Toynbee, pp. 222–223, contrasts the admiration which Rome inspired in her subjects with the detestation of the British Raj in India, despite the fact that the British conferred benefits on India equal to those which Augustus brought to the Mediterranean world. Yet in the fourth and fifth centuries A.D. the oppressed population of the Roman world welcomed the barbarians in preference to the exactions of their own government, Thompson, *Ammianus* (n. 48) 129–132.

[125] Romans *vs.* barbarians, see Jüthner (n. 48) 80–87; Haarhoff (n. 48) 216–221.

[126] For Tacitus, see G. Boissier, *Tacitus and Other Roman Studies* (Eng. trans. by W. G. Hutchinson, New York, Putnam; London, Constable, 1906) 135–144. On pp. 140–141, Boissier minimizes Tacitus' admiration for the Roman republic. Seel, (n. 82) 37–40, sees Tacitus as torn between his devotion to the traditional Roman culture and his recognition of the need for empire. Christ, (n. 72) 194–197, thinks that this inner conflict led in both Tacitus and Juvenal to a fundamental pessimism which attributed the collapse of the old ideal to the decay of the antique Roman virtues; see above, nn. 95, 105, 117. Tacitus, *Ann.* XIII 56, places in the mouth of a governor of Lower Germany, Dubius Avitus, a speech in which he urges the land-hungry Ampsivari to submit to Roman rule in A.D. 58, and includes the following statement: *patienda meliorum imperia; id dis, quos implorarent, placitum, ut arbitrium penes Romanos maneret, quid darent, quid adimerent, neque alios iudices quam se ipsos paterentur.* Capelle, (n. 88) 97–98, takes *meliorum* in the sense of morally better and argues that Tacitus here supports the Panaetian-Ciceronian justification for Roman rule. He compares Livy XXII 13 11 (above, n. 118). Seel, on the other hand, (n. 82) 69–71, regards *meliorum* as equivalent to "stronger"

and connects Tacitus with Posidonius and Horace as an advocate of a pragmatic justification which he distinguishes from the ethical one of Panaetius, see above, n. 88. Both Capelle, p. 99, and Seel, pp. 71–72, adduce in support of their views Seneca *Epist. Mor.* 90 4–5, in which Posidonius is cited for the view that in the golden age rule was not by law but by the decision of the "better," *commissi melioris arbitrio*. Seel attempts to distinguish between Posidonius' "mythischen Ideal" and Seneca's "gültiges Naturgesetz" on the basis of Seneca's phrase: *naturae est enim potioribus deteriora submittere*. But the general tone of the passage seems to make Seneca agree with Posidonius in identifying *melioris* with *optimum*, *rector*, and *sapiens*; terms which amount approximately to Cicero's ideal of the *princeps* in *De Rep.* V, above, n. 111. One difficulty in discussing Tacitus, as with Thucydides, above, n. 37, is to determine how far views placed in the mouths of historical personages represent the historian's own opinion and how far simply what he thought that the personages in question should say. Thus the famous remark in *Agr.* 30 7 that the Romans falsely call plundering, slaughter, and seizure "empire" and where they make a desert, they name it peace, *auferre trucidare rapere falsis nominibus imperium, atque ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant*, is placed in the mouth of the British chief Calgacus when he harangues his troops for their last stand against Agricola at *Mons Graupius*. It does not follow, as Seel (n. 82) 70–72 holds, that Tacitus realized what Rome's rule meant for her subjects; see also Christ (n. 72) 195–196, who compares Tacitus and Juvenal in this respect.

[127] M. Hammond, "The Political Thought of Pliny the Younger," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* XLIX (1938) 115–140, especially p. 117 on the superiority of Romans to others and pp. 121–129 on the emperor.

[128] Bury (n. 48) 28–30; Kohn in *Enc. Brit.* (n. 3) XL 121 and in his *World Order in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass., Harv. Univ. Press, 1942) 114–127; K. Jäntere, *Die römische Weltreichsidee und die Entstehung der weltlichen Macht des Papsts* (*Annales Universitatis Turkensis = Turun Yliopiston Julkaisuja*, listed in the Union List of Periodicals as *Aabo* [=Turku], *Suomalainen Yliopisto*, series B, vol. XXI, Turku, 1936).

[129] The position of the Epicureans seems to have been anti-imperialistic, see Nestle (n. 32) 237, with reference to R. Philippson, "Die Rechtsphilosopie der Epicureer," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* XXIII (1910) 289–337, 433–446. Philippson deals mainly with the views of Epicurus on the nature of justice and the function of the state; in pp. 308–309, he discusses Epicurus' criticism of political ambition, with a citation of Lucretius V 1120–1121, a criticism which might by implication extend to imperialism. Professor E. Havelock remarked in conversation that Lucretius' description of the origins of the social order in bk. V is anti-imperialistic, note especially lines 1–53 for a criticism of the Stoic hero Herakles, pacifier of the world, as against Epicurus' rational conquest of the mind, and lines 1105–1160, where he criticizes ambition and the desire for power; see Cochrane (n. 110) 37–38. On the other hand, Christ, (n. 72) 184–

185, finds in the prayer to Venus for peace for Rome, bk. I line 40 (see also Christ p. 105), the first clear appearance in Roman poetry of the ecumenical concept of Rome's rule. Christ also sees admiration for Rome in Lucretius' lines on her revival after the Hannibalic War, III 836–837; see above, n. 95, for Lucretius' pessimistic strain as regards his own times. Conflicting views appear in Roman poetry that on the one hand the Roman state is eternal, Christ 59–64, and on the other transitory, Christ 65–68, 70–72; compare above, n. 101, for Scipio the Younger and Cicero. Seel, (n. 82) 33–37, calls attention to the conflict between the individual and the state in Horace, a recurrent problem in Roman literature and one which goes back to the breakdown of the city-state in the fourth and even fifth centuries B.C.; see Nestle (n. 32) 235. Cromer, (n. 4) 22 n. 1, refers to Florus *Epitome* I 47, the summary of Rome's expansion, where he wonders whether Rome's imperial mission has not in fact been her ruin.

[130] Cromer, (n. 4) 126 n. 1, quotes the Duke of Wellington: "If ever we lose India, it will be Parliament that will lose it for us." Cromer, pp. 126–127, opposed any ultimate surrender of the British supremacy in India.

[131] The earliest example of "might is right" in English seems to be from an early fourteenth-century political song, published by T. Wright for the Camden Society in his *Political Songs of England, etc.* (London, Nichol, 1839) 254; see B. Stevenson, *The Home Book of Quotations* (ed. 5, New York, Dodd Mead, 1947) 1303–1304 under "might, 21," who dates in 1311, and W. G. Smith, *The Oxford Dictionary of Proverbs* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1935) 297 under "might," who dates about 1327. Stevenson gives, as the origin of the remark, Jowett's translation of Thrasymachus in Plato's *Republic* I 338C: "I proclaim that might is right, justice the interest of the stronger"; see ed. 1871 vol. II 158. But a comparison with the Greek, quoted above, n. 39, shows that Jowett arbitrarily inserted "might is right" and these words are omitted in ed. 3 (1892) vol. III 15. Lord Rosebery's comment is given by Hobson (n. 6) 160, see above, n. 12.

[132] Rut. Namat. I 91; see the edition by C. H. Keene (London, Bell, 1907), who on p. 7 dates the journey of Rutilius to Gaul, which the poem relates, in A.D. 416. Recent scholars have, however, settled on 417 A.D., see the edition by J. Vessereau and F. Préchac (Paris: *Les Belles-Lettres*, 1933) xii–xiii and the literature there cited. In general, see Ida Cirino, *L'Idea di Roma negli Scrittori Latini e particolarmente in Rutilio Namaziano* (Naples, Loffredo, 1934).

[133] Above, n. 19.

[134] Cyrus conquered the Medes in 549 B.C., Gray in *Cam. Anc. Hist.* IV (1926) 7. The forces of Xerxes were turned back from the high-water mark of conquest at Plataea and Mycale in 479 B.C., Munro in *Camb. Anc. Hist.* IV 340–341. Darius was found dying by Alexander's troops in Bactria in the spring of 330 B.C., Robinson (n. 49) 140–141.

[135] The date for the foundation of Augustus' principate may be taken

variously as the Battle of Actium in 31 B.C., the Restoration of the Republic in 28/27 B.C., or the final settlement in 23 B.C.; see Hammond, *Aug. Princ.* (n. 106) 246 n. 14. The western empire is traditionally regarded as having come to an end with the deposition of Romulus Augustulus in 476 A.D. and the eastern with the capture of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453 A.D.

[136] The break between the Roman and the Byzantine empire is variously dated from Constantine, 306–337 A.D., for instance, by Cary (n. 80) following the *Camb. Anc.* and *Mediaeval Histories*, to Justinian, 521–565 A.D., for instance, by A. E. R. Boak, *A History of Rome to 565 A.D.* (ed. 3, New York, Macmillan, 1943).

[137] Above, p. 115; the doctrine is most clearly expressed by Aristotle, *Politics* III 13 12, 1283 b 42–1284 a 3. Fustel de Coulanges, *La Cité Antique* (Paris, Hachette, ed. 16, 1898) 239, thought that the inability of the ancients to think beyond the limits of the city-state was due to the self-sufficiency of the religion of the city-state, which did not permit of the extension of such things as communal meals, etc. beyond its limits. Professor Ferguson suggests that the ultimate failure of the Roman empire to preserve popular sovereignty at the imperial level was to some degree balanced by the vigorous civic life in the municipalities, which the emperors encouraged and established throughout the empire; see such books as J. S. Reid, *The Municipalities of the Roman Empire* (Cambridge, University Press, 1913); A. H. M. Jones, *The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1937), and *The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1940); A. Sherwin-White, *The Roman Citizenship* (n. 122). But these municipalities were in fact run by oligarchic cliques of the well-to-do who could afford public office, with its heavy financial obligations, and who made what profit was to be made therefrom. In the end, the well-to-do were ruined in consequence of their selfishness since the central government, as it got into financial difficulties, increasingly held them responsible for the payment of the ever more burdensome taxes; see M. Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (n. 108; the latest edition is the Italian, Florence, La Nuova Italia, 1933) throughout; S. Dill, *Roman Society in the last century of the Western Empire* (ed. 2, London, Macmillan, 1906) 227–281; F. F. Abbott and A. C. Johnson, *Municipal Administration in the Roman Empire* (Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1926) 197–231. The recent economic historians of the ancient world hold, in fact, that the failure of "classical" society may be attributed to this selfishness of the well-to-do who perverted the doctrine, fundamental to the orthodox theory of the city-state, that wealth imposed an obligation of public service to the view that the privilege and profit of public office should be a prerogative of the rich; see Hammond, "Economic Stagnation" (n. 108) 85–86 (ruin of well-to-do in cities by taxation), 88–89 (views of Frank, Rostovtzeff, and Heichelheim).

[138] Haarhoff (n. 48) 104–118, with further references in his notes; E. Barker

in *Camb. Anc. Hist.* VI (1927) 506–509; see above, n. 22, especially Zimmern's article "Ath. and Am."

[139] Ulpian, in Justinian's *Dig.* I 4 1 pr. (compare *Inst. Iust.* I 2 6), attributed the *imperium* of the emperor to the *lex (? regia)* which conferred it upon him. Augustus had derived his powers from at least formal votes by the assemblies, Hammond, *Aug. Princ.* (n. 106) 25–28, but by the end of the second century, when Ulpian wrote, it is hardly likely that even a formal popular vote survived, though the senate, in lieu of the people, continued to confirm the power in fact bestowed by the acclaim of the troops or determined by hereditary succession.

[140] Divine sanction for the imperial power only became explicit in the third century A.D., Alföldi in *Camb. Anc. Hist.* XII (1939) 194, 204; Mattingly on p. 309; Toynbee (n. 23) 484.

[141] Hammond, "Economic Stagnation" (n. 108) 90, with further references in n. 107.

[142] Toynbee, (n. 23) 317–318, attributes the failure of what he calls the Hellenic Society (that of Greece and Rome together) in part to its "idolization of an ephemeral institution," namely the city-state. See also pp. 183–184 for his criticism of the mass production of city-states in the Hellenistic and Roman world, which simply perpetuated a form without substance and which depended for such vitality as the cities had on the support of non-citizen native labor. He classifies this idolization of the city-state as a utopia and holds that utopias are usually static in character and are simply attempts to arrest the disintegration of a declining civilization. On pp. 361–363, he quotes a passage from Macaulay's *Essay on History* in which it is claimed that the exclusiveness of the Greeks and Romans brought them almost to the stagnant condition of such "petrified societies" as Egypt and Greece; a fate from which they were saved by the internal, moral revolution of Christianity and the external challenge of the barbarian tribes. On p. 549, he regards the concepts of Concord (Homonoia) and a World Commonwealth in the thought of Alexander and the Stoics as a symptom of an attempt to rally the disintegration of the Hellenic Society.