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Ancient Imperialism

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# The Classical Review

JUNE 1910

## ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTIONS

### ANCIENT IMPERIALISM.

[On May 6 the Oxford members of the Classical Association invited their friends in Oxford to two meetings in connexion with the Association and with the hope of making it better known in the University. At the first of these meetings, held in the afternoon at All Souls, with Sir Wm. Anson in the chair, Mr. S. H. Butcher, chairman of the Association, and Prof. Gilbert Murray spoke on the claims of classical literature to the attention of the world. At the second meeting, held at 8.30 p.m. in Magdalen College Hall, with the Vice-Chancellor in the chair, five Oxford historians spoke on the subject of Ancient Imperialism, in special reference to Lord Cromer's January address to the C.A., and Lord Cromer followed. Many wishes have been expressed that the addresses should be printed, and they are accordingly given here with a few corrections by the authors. The programme was that Prof. Haverfield should introduce and speak on the Roman Empire, the Master of Balliol should discuss the Roman Republic, Mr. E. R. Bevan and the Rev. E. M. Walker Greek Imperialism, and Mr. D. G. Hogarth the general assimilation of subject races. These five speakers were restricted to 8 minutes each, and all of them kept more or less near this limit. The reader will understand that he has before him, not the report of a debate, but six addresses prepared beforehand on a given scheme.]

#### I. INTRODUCTION, ROMAN EMPIRE.

LAST January Lord Cromer gave the Classical Association as his presidential address a very remarkable discussion on 'Imperialism, Ancient and Modern'—which he then published in fuller form as a book.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Imperialism, Ancient and Modern*, by the Earl of Cromer (London: Murray). 2s. 6d.

The book aroused wide interest, not least in Oxford, and, at this meeting of Oxford members of the Association and their friends, it seemed suitable, and it has fortunately proved possible, to continue the discussion with the aid and presence of Lord Cromer himself.

Imperialism is a word of many meanings. To-night it does not include the ethics of conquest or the right of one race to rule another; this meeting will not be asked to wave flags or to disparage the setting sun. We deal with the forces or groups of forces which in all times and places tend to create, assist, hinder, or destroy Empires. From this point of view the discussion has (I think) special importance for University lecturers and teachers of history. The chief work of such men—apart from the indispensable but technical duties of research and of training future historians—is to widen the political imaginations of their audiences, and to make them realise that, quite apart from the personal factors of any moment, there are forces and tendencies not easily stated except in the abstract, but able, if ignored, to take very concrete vengeance. I am not, be it observed, recommending the study of history on the ground that it aids us to form political prophecies or draw political analogies. It does that, no doubt. But its real value lies in helping us to realise the existence and the true

character of various forces—it may be of geography or race feeling or religion or much else—with which we, like our predecessors, have to deal in our everyday politics.

Young students of ancient history do not, I think, always recognise this. They know—in general—little of the institutions of their own land or age—far less, probably, than their predecessors 80 years ago—though they know much more of the personalities, in all senses of that word. Though they often possess a good knowledge of ancient history, a comparison between Greece or Rome and the things of their own day has little meaning for them. I remember once insisting, through a course of lectures, on various likenesses and unlikenesses of the Roman provinces to British India. At the end, one of the audience came up and asked if he might put me a question. ‘You seem’ (he said) ‘to know something about India: can you advise me which would be the best province for me to choose if I get into the Indian Civil Service?’ It is, therefore, a special service to education when one who has a unique right, as Lord Cromer has, to discuss the conditions of modern Empire, points out the actual bearings of ancient history on our understanding of our own problems.

We should have liked to have included in our list of speakers some modern historians. But time is short, and we who begin the discussion have to prepare, and not to stop, the way. Moreover, the Classical Association is after all classical. So we have done no more than add to four local names that of a distinguished non-resident historian, Mr. Bevan.

The part of our subject which falls to me is the Roman Empire. Of this Empire I shall assert, for most of its life and over most of its lands, that it merits praise from the most uncompromising foes of despotism. I stand with Gibbon and with Mommsen in the old belief. The empire of the second and early third centuries brought (I think) more happiness to more of the known world than any age till the French Revolution, and that happiness was not confined to a dominant race or to an upper class. The Empire made mistakes enough—though in

counting these mistakes, I would urge that dates and places be carefully studied. Instances of the misgovernment or the sins or the depopulation of the Empire must not be sought from the Republic, nor must the aristocratic scandals of a capital be treated as typical of a whole realm. And I would further urge on those who judge an Empire by its blunders, that Empires are harder to manage than we at home usually think. It may well be doubted whether even to-day any single nation is quite equal to the ceaseless demand for able men, to the strain on the organisation, to the vast famines and pestilences and popular discontents, which are the evil heritage of imperial rule. We have much more to learn before any empire will show the happiness of a Holland or a Switzerland. But Holland and Switzerland are geographical accidents: and human nature must alter much before a whole world of them would be tolerable.

In praising the Empire, two concessions must be made. First, its performance was unequal. In the west—in Europe as far east as Scupi—and in Algeria and Tunis Rome found in great part peoples racially akin to the Italian, and peoples, too, which were still uncivilised; these rapidly became Italian, and in time formed modern Europe. That was a great work. But in the east Rome found the old coherent forces of Greek civilisation and of the yet older Oriental culture. It did not change these: to the Greek lands it brought a measure of good government, but not progress, and though many Greeks passed into the Roman service and some into the Senate, the east did not become Romanised. Here Rome met that most serious of all obstacles to assimilation, races whose thoughts and affections and traditions and civilisation had crystallised into definite form. This is the true obstacle to Imperial assimilation and even to peaceful rule. ‘To cast the nations old into another mould’ is not really given to human endeavour. It does not so much matter whether the crystallisation has been caused by a political religion or a national sentiment or undying memories of the past: the point is the coherence which results. In India, I am told, we might assimilate in some sort the uncivilised hill-

tribes, if geography let us bring sufficient influences to work. But the civilised Hindoos and Mohammedans have crystallised. They offer to us somewhat the same resistance as the Croats at Agram or the Poles in Posen offer to various European powers. In such cases the civilisation of the dominant race does not act as solvent or assimilator. Its power to do that is limited to the uncivilised or incoherent units. Coherence is, I think, an even greater bar than colour—on which latter question Lord Cromer has some most excellent remarks in his book. Colour, after all, has gradations. The northern white must contrast sharply with the tropical black, but the darker races of the Mediterranean do not feel so distant from either. In the Roman world a political colour-sense hardly existed: the nearest parallel to it was the Roman horror of the slave-born, which produced the curious and persistent restrictions on the *libertini*. Still, it must be noted that races like the negroes were rare in the Roman Empire; they were, therefore, neither dangerous nor obtrusive, and this motive for a colour-sense was absent. Moreover, Roman law long forbade the Egyptian peasants to become Roman citizens, and in a way recognised their racial unlikeness.

Lastly, I wish to concede this also, that, left to itself, the Roman empire would have presently failed. Probably it would have become like China: that, at least, is suggested by certain changes in the guild and serf systems, which point to an arrested culture and a caste system. That is the worst crystallisation of all. But at a remote period the barbarians of central Asia, driven from their homes (it may be) by increasing drought, began to move upon both China and the west. China and Rome alike built walls against them. The Chinese built the better walls, and we are here to-night.

F. HAVERFIELD.

## II. ROMAN REPUBLIC.

Lord Cromer has set us the problem<sup>1</sup>—How was it that Rome so greatly succeeded, where modern nations so con-

spicuously fail, in uniting her subjects with herself? I propose to offer a suggestion as to one reason for the difference. Let us see how the matter appeared to a Roman Consul who was also a Greek historian, and whose name indicates his position between the two peoples—Dio Cassius. Looking back early in the 3rd century on the accomplished fact, Dio describes the goal of the movement as follows<sup>2</sup>—‘That when they share in the citizenship, they may be our faithful confederates, as if they were all inhabitants of one single City, and that our City, and esteem this in very truth a City, and their own towns only its territories and villages.’

Thus the Roman world was, in idea, not one nation, but one city. The difference is very important, and here, as I believe, we may recognise one great advantage which the Romans possessed over ourselves in carrying out the work of assimilation; an advantage involved in the conception of citizenship which they shared with the Greek States, as opposed to the modern bond of allegiance to a common sovereign. In the *πόλις* every full citizen is a portion of the Sovereign. His citizenship is a citizenship of personal privilege. Every state, so far as its power goes, would divide the human race into two opposed species, the privileged citizen and the non-privileged alien. This is as true for Seriphus as for Athens, and it is not her fault if to be a Seriphian is not esteemed the pinnacle of human greatness.

If the state acquires conquests, the conquered are still aliens, subject aliens, between whom and the citizens there is a great gulf fixed, a gulf which tends to become deeper if the growing power of the supreme state causes the exclusive privilege of the citizens to become more and more valuable. So far we have no opportunity for basing imperialism on anything more permanent than the force of the ruling state. ‘Quid aliud,’ says Claudius,<sup>3</sup> ‘exitio Lacedaemoniis et Atheniensibus fuit quamvis armis pollerent nisi quod victos

<sup>2</sup> Dio. *Hist.* lii. 19. 6.

<sup>3</sup> Tac. *Ann.* xi. 24. 5.

<sup>1</sup> *Ancient and Modern Imperialism*, p. 115.

pro alienigenis arcerent.' It was the great original conception of Rome that it was possible to use the very depth of the gulf to enhance the importance of the bridge which she built over it.

Now what are the possibilities of the two doctrines as to the bond of union in a state? The modern idea, that of common allegiance to the Crown, is an admirable machinery for a colonising power; it supplies a happy mean between cutting loose your colonists, as did the Greeks, and trying to govern them, as did the Spaniards. The tie is independent of administrative interference. The Englishman, the Australian, and the Canadian may each work out his destiny and regulate his life by the laws and conditions of his own community, but the doctrine that all equally owe loyalty to the King preserves without friction a healthy sentiment of Union which renders common defence and mutual assistance a natural duty and a normal result.

But how will the same system work in the presence of conquest? You have given up the distinction between citizen and subject; and so all are in law on a level as subjects of the Crown, with the same claims on the paternal bounty of the State. Thus the conquest has to be swallowed whole; admission to the ranks of the conquering nation is pressed on the vanquished at a moment when they are most inclined to dislike it, and this dislike may be propagated through generations and may be as great a bar to unity as was the exclusiveness of Spartans or Athenians. Poles refuse to become Germans or Slavs to become Austrians: the Irish regard as a wrong that Act of Union which corresponds to the admission of the Italians into the Roman State by the Lex Julia, a boon which the Italian allies sought for with years of importunate petition, and which they looked on as the charter of their liberties when they had at last obtained it at the point of the sword.

The Romans had a much less paternal view of the duties of conquerors. The Gauls, says Cicero,<sup>1</sup> had been 'defeated in great wars to the end that they might

always obey the Roman people.' The conquered enemy was an inferior creature, but one capable of being transformed at the touch of the magic wand of the law. The Sicilian or the Gaul never for a moment supposed that he was the equal of his conqueror. He was on the wrong side of an arbitrary line of distinction, subject to the axe and the rods, while the Roman might not be touched in life or person. The legal barrier between citizen and subject was too absolute to require reinforcing by any 'natural' distinctions of race, colour or language. But the very circumstance that it was an arbitrary line enabled a subject to be passed over it by arbitrary enactment, by the *fiat* of the Sovereign Populus Romanus. Thus it became possible to set up the citizenship of privilege as a goal to which the élite of the subjects might attain by doing good service to their masters or by winning their favour. It is noticeable that the enfranchised subject generally like the manumitted slave took the Gentile name of the patron by whose advocacy he had obtained the citizenship. Hence the number of Julii, Claudii and Flavii in the provinces.<sup>2</sup> It was a happy thought likewise that in the Latin communities a local magistracy was the path to the Roman citizenship. On the other hand, fraudulently to usurp the citizenship was a capital offence. No pains were spared to make the citizenship a prize, and as a prize it proved the greatest solvent, not only of the barrier between the Roman State and its subjects, but of the barriers of mutual exclusiveness between the subject States themselves. To become a Roman was the object of ambition alike for the Syrian and for the Gaul, and in attaining it each became the fellow-citizen of the other.

I know of only one statesman in modern times who firmly took his stand on the ancient ideal of citizenship, and that one was President Paul Kruger; it has always been my conviction that the real meaning of the Boer War is to be found in the necessary conflict between the two ideals, the English doctrine that all the white

<sup>1</sup> *Pro Font.* 2. 13.

<sup>2</sup> See *Ancient and Modern Imperialism*, p. 99, n. 1.

inhabitants of the country should be on equal footing, and the Boer doctrine that the Englishman was an inferior creature, just because he was not a citizen, and that he ought not to be allowed the honour of becoming a Boer until he had earned it by years or even generations of acquiescence in a subject position. President Kruger's mistake was not in the efficiency of the machinery which he set up; it would have made all South Africa into a Boer Republic, if he had been allowed a century or so to work it. But he forgot that Englishmen could not accept the degraded *status* of subjects among citizens, and that the British Government could not submit to leave them sitting as suppliants on the lowest step of the altar. (Lord Cromer, interposing: 'He forgot Lord Roberts.') The circumstance that the Boers seem now heartily to have accepted the modern doctrine of equality in the sight of the law seems the best augury for the future of the country.

It is interesting to notice how many difficulties were solved by the ancient conception of citizenship. For instance the controversy which raged over the 'Ilbert Bill,' the question of the jurisdiction of a native magistrate in India over Europeans, would have seemed ludicrous to a Roman. He would have said—'if the native be a subject it is manifestly improper that he should judge a citizen: if he has been made a citizen, it is equally obvious that there can be no objection to his doing so.' In the same way with marriage: The *jus conubii* is a purely artificial right. The Roman man or woman may contract marriage with any citizen, of whatever race or colour, and there were doubtless differences in these respects amongst slaves enfranchised in Rome, but not with any alien, however civilised, unless the *jus conubii* is there by special privilege. This privilege again is simply a matter of law: it exists with certain communities, as for instance with Latin towns: it exists for certain individuals, as when Vespasian<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 'Jus tribuo conubii, dumtaxat cum singulis et primis uxoribus, ut etiamsi peregrini juris feminas matrimonio suo junxerint, proinde liberos tollant, ac si ex duobus civibus Romanis natos.'

grants to each of his discharged veterans the right to contract marriage with a foreign woman.

Now to turn to India: we have no such prize to give as that of the Roman citizenship, and so we have not the most potent instrument of assimilation. We have no solvent before which the walls of partition, colour, race, religion, social prejudices will go down. It follows that we cannot make Englishmen of the Hindoos, nor can we make of them an united Indian people; nor again, while they remain divided as they are, can we leave them to be destroyed by internal anarchy. And so we come back by another path to the unfortunate position of the Athenians and Spartans. We must remain an army of occupation, an alien conquering race, not because we keep off the conquered, but because we cannot get at them.

While we recognise the limits of our possibilities, we need not be appalled by them. Lord Cromer<sup>2</sup> has quoted Prof. Gwatkins as saying 'Rome was the first of the Great Empires, and almost the only one to our own time which turned subjects into citizens, and ruled them for their own good, and not for selfish gain.' The first of these results is impossible for us; the second, if we will possess our souls in patience, we may realise far more than the Romans ever did.

J. L. STRACHAN DAVIDSON.

### III. GREEKS AND BARBARIANS.

Lord Cromer's book is based upon the great fact that the modern antithesis between Europeans and the people of other civilisations is analogous to, and in a sense the continuation of, the old antithesis between Hellenes and 'barbaroi.' Just as the Hellene felt himself the representative of a culture which distinguished him from all the rest of the world, so does the European of to-day. Just as in ancient times when the East, after the legions had thundered past, 'plunged in thought again,' it was not the old thought, but a thought vastly modified by the Greek schoolmaster, philosopher, rhetorician, so to-day when

<sup>2</sup> *Ancient and Modern Imperialism*, p. 51.

Europeans have won material predominance, they have made it their deliberate policy to impart European education. Obviously then there is a great resemblance between the relation of the Greek to the barbarian, and our own relation to Oriental races. In some ways however there are striking differences. It is about these I want to speak to-night. It seems to me then that in one way the Greek was much more liberal-minded than we are; in another way much more narrow-minded. He was more liberal-minded in his comparative freedom from racial antipathy. This is just the factor which so complicates and embitters our problem to-day. Our system of education in the East goes on the theory that our form of culture is transferable, and yet when we have drawn men of alien races within our pale, we find a difficulty in regarding them as full members of our society. Probably the social exclusiveness of Englishmen does as much, or even more, to create resentment than any political grievance.<sup>1</sup> So far as this exclusiveness is simply *bourgeois* stupidity, intolerant of the unfamiliar, it is wholly regrettable. But we have to remember, if we are to be fair, certain things which made it much easier for the Greek to be liberal. In the first place, the Orientals with whom he came into contact were nearer to him, geographically and in complexion. Secondly, Greek civilisation was only a few generations old, and had not branched off so widely or developed the elaborate complexities of modern culture. Thirdly, the Greek was very deficient in the historical sense. The ideas, so omnipresent with us, of biological and historical evolution, of mental varieties, hardly came within his consciousness. We see much more clearly how intimately a particular type of social and mental life is connected with a particular series of historical antecedents, and to some extent the slowness of Europeans to believe in the real Europeanisation of Asiatics rests upon

the true perception of the impossibility of transplanting ideas and institutions which have grown up in one soil straight away into another and alien one. How little all that was realised by the Greeks may be seen in the later Greek philosophy, especially in Stoicism, the really popular philosophy of the Hellenistic age. The *Reason, Logos, Nous* was something ready-made and fixed, inherent in all men from the beginning; to all men who followed it, it would dictate a uniform line of conduct, so that in this respect distinctions of race and social standing would not come into consideration at all. (Kaerst, in his last volume, has drawn attention to this absence of the 'historisches Moment' in Stoicism.) Perhaps to-day we err on the other side of laying such stress on the varieties of human mentality as to forget the underlying humanity which makes all akin.

The attitude of the ancient Greeks finds an interesting illustration in a quotation which Strabo makes from the philosopher Eratosthenes. Aristotle was credited with having given Alexander the advice to bear himself towards the Greeks as *primus inter pares* (*ἡγεμονικῶς*), but towards the barbarians as an absolute master (*δεσποτικῶς*). Eratosthenes finds fault; it would be better, he says, to distinguish men by moral character, not by race. There are many undesirable sorts of Greeks and many civilised (*ἀστυεῖοι*) barbarians, such as the Indians and Persians. This passage was no doubt in the mind of Plutarch, or whoever it was that wrote the first of the two tracts *De Alexandri fortuna aut virtute*. This writing is the most emphatic expression of the Greek's consciousness of a mission to the world, as a civilising power. We must not, he says, make the distinction of Hellene and barbarian depend upon race or fashion of dress, but upon virtue and vice. Nor can it be said that this was only a dream of philosophers and men of letters. As a matter of fact, the Orientals who adopted Hellenic culture in the age after Alexander do not seem to have had race prejudice against them. How many of the names in Susemihl's history of Greek literature in the Hellenistic age are those of Phoenicians! One Phoenician,

<sup>1</sup> Lord Cromer observed, later on in the evening, that he agreed with this view, 'but (he added) it has to be remembered that the exclusiveness is not all on one side.'

of Carthage, Clitomachus, known to his fellow-countrymen as Hasdrubal, sat in the seat of Plato, as president of the Academy.

And yet in one way, the Greek seems to have been narrower than the modern European. If he had less racial prejudice, he had greater cultural prejudice. In the very phrase of Plutarch just quoted, that the distinction of *Hellene and barbarian* must be taken to have reference not to race, but to *virtue and vice*, there is not only large-heartedness, but an ingenuous assumption. The Greek could not easily bring himself to think of any other form of culture as worth anything beside his own. The expression of Eratosthenes seems to have gone beyond the ordinary feeling of the Greeks in asserting Indians and Persians to be fully civilised as they are already. It is noteworthy that the sentiment is not repeated in Plutarch's tract, where Indians and Persians are only a field ripe for Hellenic propaganda. There was, it is true, a feeling of awe at the great antiquity of Babylonian and Egyptian wisdom—a sort of emotional thrill. There was the theory current since the days of Herodotus which traced back the beginnings of Greek religion and philosophy to Egypt and the East. The theory, as far as philosophy was concerned, provoked vehement contradiction. Diogenes Laertius opens his work by attacking it and asserting that philosophy has a good Hellenic origin. And even where the theory was held, it seems rather to have stirred the imagination vaguely than to have prompted any serious study of non-Hellenic civilisations. It is significant that even the Greek authors who wrote about Oriental antiquities did not take the trouble to learn the Oriental languages. I do not know that we ever find a Greek learning a foreign language from any scientific interest. Here our attitude is undoubtedly more wide-minded.

It is with the spread of Christianity that the non-Hellenic languages and nationalities begin to assert themselves against all-enveloping Hellenism. We get the revolt in the Assyrian Christian Tatian who bitterly attacks the Hellenic mythology

in the name of 'barbarian philosophy'—so he styles the Jewish-Christian teaching. We get it in the growth of Coptic, Armenian, Syriac literature in which old languages, after centuries of suppression, come to life again as the vehicles of Oriental Christianity.

E. R. BEVAN.

#### IV. GREEK IMPERIALISM.

My remarks will be addressed to the position that Imperialism plays no part in Greek History; that the conception of Imperialism was wholly foreign to the Greek mind, so foreign that the Greek language did not contain any expression to convey the idea. I am not prepared to find the missing word; but I think we can find in the history of Greece both the idea and the thing. When the greatest of Greek historians makes Pericles boast *Ἑλλήνων ὅτι Ἕλληνες πλείστον δὴ ἤρξαμεν*, we feel that we are not far from the spirit of Imperialism; and when the greatest of Greek orators describes his native city as *αἰεὶ περὶ πρωτείων καὶ τιμῆς καὶ δόξης ἀγωνιζομένη*, we may trace in these words the temper of an imperial race. To find the thing, we need not look to Macedon (though, at the present day, most historians would allow the Greek race a larger share in Alexander than Grote was prepared to concede); we must look to the opposite end of the Greek world; to a land, a people, and a ruler, whose claim to be genuinely Greek has never been impugned. An empire which included the whole of Greek Sicily, much of Greek Italy, and something else besides, was a great empire, if we judge it by the scale of Greek History; and an empire which lasted half a century was, if judged by the same scale, more than a brief and transitory episode. The career of Dionysius proves what the Greek could accomplish in the way of Imperialism, when the conditions were favourable; *i.e.*, under a monarchical system, and in the presence of the constant menace of a foreign peril. If we turn from the Western Mediterranean to the Ægean, we find an empire of a different type. Why was the empire of

Athens so different in character from the Roman Empire, or from our own? Why did an empire, not dependent, like that of Dionysius, upon the hazard of a single life, last less than three-quarters of a century? Three reasons may be suggested. In the first place the principles upon which it was based were contradictory. Imperial Athens was a democracy with democracies for her subjects. That liberty which she claimed as the indefeasible right of her own *δῆμος* ('perfect liberty to manage their own affairs,' in Adam Smith's phrase) she denied to the *δῆμος* of the states over which she ruled. In the second place, the tyrant city, like the individual tyrant, never succeeded in legitimating its authority. It is a commonplace that the Greek tyrant remained outside the constitution; that he failed to invest his *de facto* sovereignty with legal sanctions. In the same way, the Athenian state shrank from the use of the term 'empire.' In theory the empire was an alliance, and the subjects were allies. In official documents, at any rate, imperial formulæ (*e.g.* *ξύμμαχοι δὲν ἄρχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι*) are rare and late. In legal fictions there are always latent possibilities of mischief. Finally, it must never be forgotten that the empire of Athens rested upon the support of a political party. It was as true of the fifth century B.C. as of the fourth, that in every Greek state there were two cities—the city of those who have, and the city of those who covet what the others have. There seems to have been a working agreement between the demagogues at Athens and the *προστάται τοῦ δήμου* (the leaders of the 'Have-Nots') in the subject-states. I am afraid that the evidence seems to show that Athenian justice was sometimes prostituted to political ends. There are few more graphic touches to be found in ancient literature than in the passage in that curious treatise on the constitution of Athens, which once passed under the name of Xenophon, in which the writer, himself a contemporary, describes the way in which the aristocrats in the subject-states, when summoned to Athens to stand their trial upon some trumped-up charge, were compelled to pay court to the mob of

jurors, the *γέροντες ἡλιασταί*. He depicts them as hanging about the purlieu of the courts, as flattering and fawning upon the jurymen and employing all the arts of conciliation. Yet these were men who were proud of their blue blood; perhaps, like Hecataeus, reckoning back their pedigree to a god in the sixteenth generation; and justly proud of a great tradition of culture and of manners. They had good reason to know that the Athenian law-courts might be employed against them as a terrible engine of oppression. We can imagine their sentiments towards those whose favours they were compelled to court; the sentiments of Coriolanus towards the Roman mob. But we must not be too hard upon Athens. The writer of the treatise to which I have referred predicted that, if ever the propertied classes got the upper hand, the days of the Athenian empire would be numbered. The moment came when they got their chance, and the prediction was fulfilled.

REV. E. M. WALKER.

#### V. ASSIMILATION.

I wish to speak very briefly on a subject which was treated at considerable length in Lord Cromer's address, namely the *Assimilation of subjects by Imperial peoples*. Lord Cromer compared with great force and justice the Roman Empire with other empires, notably our own, in respect of such assimilation: and with equal justice he pointed out certain cardinal reasons why Rome attained to a measure of success which has been denied to modern powers. One of these reasons stands out pre-eminently. But for certain comparatively small communities, such as the Jewish (with which Rome failed as conspicuously as any modern power), she had neither national unities nor cohesive social systems to deal with; while, at the same time, those great social weapons, Christianity and Islam, had yet to be developed. In this fortune one later imperial power has rivalled her, and this power alone has attained something like her success. That power is the Ottoman Turk. Overrunning, as Rome did, regions inhabited by broken

remnants of peoples, destitute of any coherent social system, or spirit of unity, the warlike tribal union of the Turks brought with it the strong and simple social system of Islam, and so effectually assimilated the majority of the conquered people, that they regard themselves as Osmanli to this day. Even Christianity—be it said the imperfect and often merely superficial Christianity of the Eastern half of the Roman world—did not prevail against it; and it is roughly true that the limits ultimately set to its assimilative action were limits imposed consciously by the Turks themselves, with the object of preserving their own privileged position, and of securing the continued existence of a Gibeonite population within their borders. But I will try to go one step farther than Lord Cromer went, and ask, what did this Roman imperial assimilation mean? If it meant what I think it did, is it what those mean by it who deplore our own ill-success in assimilation, and enjoin on us to mend our ways in the interests of our imperial permanence? Let me come straight to my point. The Romanising of the ancient cosmos is not a conspicuous phenomenon before the third century, A.D., at earliest. But is not another phenomenon equally conspicuous in that epoch—the cosmopolitanisation of Rome? To use no other proofs, it is the century in which a Syrian and an Arab were Emperors of Rome. In a word, this assimilation, was, it seems, as much imposed on Rome as imposed by her, and the Empire of Rome was already passing into the Roman Empire. The peoples which Rome had dominated were dominating her, though in her own name, and the Romans, properly so-called, had ceased, by their own success in assimilation, to be an imperial people at all.

It is often said, that the great bar to success in imperial assimilation, is Pride of Race, issuing generally in contempt of colour. This may be of varying degrees of intensity between the attitude of a southern Anglo-Saxon in the United States towards a nigger, and the attitude of a northern Anglo-Saxon to a *dago*: but it is always contempt. Now, if this be so, what about Rome? Her literature of the late Republic

and early Empire is strongly inspired by such Pride of Race. You may find ample evidence of it in Virgil, in Horace, and in Juvenal, coupled with its necessary corollary, contempt of other races. Yet Rome ended by assimilation. Look back in history to the Greeks. I let the little so-called Empires of free Greece go by, and pass to the first Greek Empire on a great scale, that of Alexander. The Conqueror himself, as all the world knows, made repeated efforts to blend Macedonians and Greeks with his Oriental subjects. His attitude is neither here nor there. He had the mania of Universal Empire in his soul, and at most was an Imperialist Whig, who wanted the world levelled up, so he might remain exalted above it. But it is very much to the point, that he met at every attempt, whether on the Caspian shore, in Afghanistan, in Bactria, or on his return to Susa, with the strongest opposition possible, based on sheer Macedonian and Greek Pride of Race. Yet within two centuries after his death, the Greek was forming, in Egypt, in Syria, and even farther East, that same sort of amalgam with the non-Greek Oriental which he forms at this day.

The lesson of history, then (for what it is worth), seems to be that all imperial peoples have begun with a period of non-assimilation, or at least of no conscious desire to assimilate. They have passed to a second stage of desire to assimilate, and even, as time goes on, to accommodate themselves to their subjects. On that has followed a third stage of active assimilation, exerted, however, as much by their subjects on them, as *vice versa*, and resulting ultimately in the production of a more or less complete social uniformity, which is the greatest common measure of former rulers and former subjects. In a fourth and last stage the original ruling race has ceased to be imperial.

Our own Empire is still young—not two centuries old. We are still in the first stage of Imperialism, or at farthest, at the opening of the second. Rome attained her conspicuous success in assimilation in the third stage. If ever we reach that third stage—I do not say that, under the different

conditions of modern politics we shall reach it, but if we do—then there will be a sufficient basis for comparison between the two Empires ; but not before. At present the comparison is not altogether valid.

As I am not standing here to prophesy, so I do not mean to moralise. I do not offer an opinion which is the highest imperial ideal—to look forward to taking the mother's position among grown-up and independent nations which we have brought forth, or to aim at maintaining a matriarchal sway over nations always adolescent but never adult. I wish only to emphasise two points, that the comparison of ancient and modern Empire in respect of assimilation is probably misleading because premature ; and that, so far as the lesson of history goes, success in assimilation has not been hitherto a condition of imperial permanence.

D. G. HOGARTH.

#### VI. HISTORY AND POLITICS.

In the very brief remarks which I am about to address to you, I have to claim a full measure of your indulgence, for the real truth is that my thoughts have recently been so much occupied with the treatment which is likely to be accorded to the senate of the United Kingdom that they have been, to some extent, diverted from the proceedings, whether of senators or Emperors who lived some twenty centuries ago. I think, however, I may say that the main object I had in view in contrasting ancient and modern systems of Imperialism has been attained. That object was to draw attention to the matter, and to elicit the opinions of others, who most assuredly in respect of certain branches of this very wide subject, are far better acquainted with the facts than myself, and therefore far more qualified to draw accurate conclusions from them. The very interesting and instructive discussion to which we have just listened affords abundant testimony that this object has been achieved.

I will not make any attempt to range over the numerous points which have been raised in the course of this discussion. I cannot pretend to that intimate knowledge

with classical history and literature which would alone enable me to deal with them off-hand. I trust, however, I may be excused for indulging in a certain feeling of self-congratulation that I have passed through what is, to me, the somewhat terrifying ordeal of Oxford criticism, without being condemned for any very heinous offences. Let me add that on one point, even before I came here to-day, I had come to the conclusion that if I had to write my humble essay over again, I should modify its language. I admit that, being perhaps to some extent led away by the brilliant work of Mr. Ferrero, I may have done somewhat less than justice to the spirit which animated Roman Imperialism. That Imperialism, as we all know, was ushered into the world by the first Punic war, which left Rome the undisputed mistress of the Mediterranean. It then, as it would appear, passed through three phases. During the first period, the Senate displayed an amount of political insight and subtle tenacity of purpose which rendered it, in the words of its most recent historian, Mr. Heitland : 'The most efficient public body in the politics of the ancient world.' There is a line of Ennius quoted by Mr. Heitland which shows the sentiments then entertained by the subjects of Rome towards their Imperial mistress. Ennius, you will remember, was a Greek, and a native of Rudiae in Calabria :

*'Nos sumus Romani, qui fuimus ante Rudini.'*

There is here no sign of that humiliation which we are accustomed to connect with an attitude of subjection. Rather does the poet evince pride in becoming a part in the only powerful State which was then in existence.

Then followed the period of decay and corruption, when power was divided between a rabble and a degenerate aristocracy, when misgovernment produced civil war, and when honest men, who, like Rutilius Rufus and Scaevola, tried to do their duty by the subject-races, were hounded to death or exile.

The third phase was that of personal rule, when everything depended on the qualifications of the ruler. I should per-

haps have more fully recognised in my essay that when the ruler was a Trajan or one of the Antonines, the policy of Imperialism, if judged by the standard of the time, merits encomium.

These, however, are considerations which only deal with the remote past. My main object was to enquire whether from the past we could draw any useful lessons for guidance in the future. In dealing with this branch of the subject we have to steer clear of two dangers. Without doubt, it is unwise to neglect the lessons of history. Experience shows that political prophecy, which must, to some extent, be based on the study of history, is perhaps not so difficult as is often supposed; that is to say, it is not very difficult, if the prophet abstains from details, and merely confines his prophetic utterances to very wide generalisations. The French Revolution was predicted not only by those who, like Arthur Young and Lord Chesterfield, visited France very shortly before its occurrence, but, as may be read in the *Memoirs of St. Simon*, by Marshal Vauban, who died at a green old age in 1707. When the second Empire was established in 1851, the course which it would run was predicted by De Tocqueville and others, and it is only necessary to read the classic work of De La Gorce, which cannot be too highly commended to the rising generation of politicians, in order to appreciate the very remarkable accuracy of those predictions. There can, indeed, be no doubt that in politics, as in natural sciences, similar combinations will bring about similar results. If the similarity of the causes can be established, which is generally very difficult, the final result may be predicted with a certain amount of assurance, though here I may add that, so far as I can judge, political prophets, though they have often been right in their predictions, have generally not allowed a sufficient margin of time for the evolution of ideas and circumstances. The fall of the temporal power of the Pope, and the disestablishment of the Anglican Church in Ireland, are both illustrations of events that could, without any great difficulty, have been foreseen, but in both cases the

institution doomed to eventual destruction lingered on for a much longer time than was supposed to be probable by political observers. I think I have read somewhere in Horace Walpole's memoirs that he predicted that the system of government then adopted by the Sultans of Turkey could not last for more than ten years. He was right in his prediction, but he was wrong by a century and a half in his time limit.

Whilst, however, it would be unwise to neglect the teaching of history, it is essential to steer clear of what is perhaps even a greater danger, namely, that of being ensnared by the pitfall of false analogies. This danger is sufficiently manifest.

In the first place, we can never feel certain, in dealing with the remote past, that we are in possession of all the real facts. Allow me to draw an illustration from contemporary history. I wonder whether an historian, writing in A.D. 4000, will say that the British electors in 1910 approved or disapproved of the Budget introduced into Parliament last year by the present Government? As we cannot answer that question with any degree of certitude ourselves, I think posterity will be puzzled to give an answer to it. The future historian will perhaps also be still more puzzled to appraise at its right value the relative political importance of Mr. Asquith, Mr. Redmond, and Mr. William O'Brien. Again, will the future historian, writing 2,000 years hence, say that the British House of Lords, in 1910, was a mirror of all the accumulated centuries of political thought and wisdom, or will he characterise that assembly as composed only of gamblers and fox-hunters? He will be able to give excellent authority for advancing either of these views.

Considerations of this nature are perhaps sufficient to make us pause before we try, for instance, to establish a parallel between, let us say, Crassus, and a modern plutocrat who takes part in politics. It would perhaps be safer for us to confine ourselves to the well-established fact that whereas Crassus led an army against the Parthians, and lost his life in the adventure, on the other hand, the most influential holder of

South African mining stock did not command any portion of the army in the recent Boer war.

Apart, however, from the difficulty of arriving at an accurate knowledge of the facts, it is obvious that the conditions of society differ so widely as to render conclusions drawn from analogy dangerous. The mere fact that slavery pervaded the whole political and social system of the ancient world is, of itself, sufficient to establish the validity of this view. Moreover, the objects we seek to attain are very different from those of the ancient Imperialists, and the machinery through which we seek to reach those objects differs no less widely.

The motto of Imperial Rome was 'ubi castra ibi Respublica.' On the other hand, we endeavour, by the spread of ideas, to extend our influence widely beyond the limits of our garrisons, and we are quite right to do so, although I may remark in passing that however high our moral ideas may be, it should never be forgotten that they cannot be realised unless the soldier and the policeman are ready to hand to maintain order.

With the Romans, education was a purely family matter. We think it our duty to take State action in the direction of educating our alien subjects. Again, we are quite right to do so. I wholly agree with that portion of Lord Macaulay's famous minute in which he says that it would be an ignoble policy, and one unworthy of a great nation, to keep a subject-race in ignorance in order that they may be

more easily governed. But I cannot at all agree that the method adopted in India, under Lord Macaulay's auspices, in order to carry out this enlightened policy, was either farsighted in our own interests, or that it really tended to promote the true interests of our Indian subjects. Our machinery, moreover, is different. The records of the ancient world may be searched in vain for any guidance to show whether modern democracy—that well-intentioned, but somewhat blundering giant, which has only of recent years begun to feel its real strength—is capable of sustaining the burthen of Empire at all. That, however, is really the great problem which now has to be faced. That the democracy does sympathise, and will continue to sympathise with the boon of self-government being accorded to subject-races cannot be doubted. Will that sympathy be tempered by a sturdy recognition of the real facts of the case? Will it take action which is statesmanlike, or that which is reckless? Will it, moreover, stand the test of measures hostile to its own material interests being adopted by the communities which it will create? These, I repeat, are the main issues of the future, and, in dealing with them, let us by all means study the past, and derive whatever lessons we can from its history. But do not let us, for one moment, think that any analogy between the events of the modern and ancient world will be sufficiently close to afford an unerring guide for political action in the present.

LORD CROMER.

## NOTES

### NOTE ON THE POSITION OF RHODUNTIA.

THIS fort, mentioned by Livy<sup>1</sup> in his account of the battle of Thermopylae, is

<sup>1</sup> XXXVI. 16. *ad fin.* Duo (milia Aetolorum) trifariam divisa Callidromum, Rhoduntiam et Tichiuunta — haec nomina cacuminibus sunt — occupavere. Appian (*Συριακή* 18, 19) mentions only Tichius.

usually placed in the mountains immediately above the pass. Kromayer<sup>2</sup> locates both it and Tichius very definitely in the Great Ravine of Anthela. According to him the theatre of Flaccus' operations is entirely contained by Cato's line of march,

<sup>2</sup> *Antike Schlachtfelder in Griechenland*, Vol. II., map.