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FROM PALESTINIAN NATIONHOOD TO PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM

Ghada Talhami

One of the most powerful arguments in favor of extending the right of self-determination to the Arab population of Palestine has been the affirmation of their cohesiveness as a national group. Because the right of self-determination implies the free exercise of the collective will of the nation, and because self-determination, at least in its most famous, Wilsonian version, was synonymous with popular sovereignty, ascertaining the national credentials of the Palestinians became a significant issue.¹ Most of the arguments on behalf of Palestinian eligibility, however, centered on establishing a legal case based on the validity of international agreements involving the Palestinians, as well as on the application of principles sanctified by international organizations.² As valuable as the juridical approach has been, it excluded the most apparent manifestations of Palestinian nationhood, namely the historical and sociological transformation of Palestinian consciousness and political behavior. It is only through the examination of the sociopolitical aspects of the Palestinian experience that one can arrive at an estimation of the political development of the Palestinian community and at an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of Palestinian national consciousness.

In the views of sociologists, beginning with Max Weber, human communities develop along certain lines and manifest similar tendencies irrespective of the ethnic characteristics of their membership. Experts on the development of modern nationalism such as Hans Kohn and Alfred Cobban share this approach. According to all these, the only distinguishing features identifying developed, semi-developed, and underdeveloped communities result from their stage of formation. Thus, it is possible to detect some similarities between certain stages of Palestinian sociopolitical development and stages in the development of European communities during the nineteenth century. The Palestinian Arab community, it is important to establish here, enjoyed by World War I a relationship which fits Max Weber's definition of communal relationship, based on "emotional, affectual, and traditional" ties. Although not yet at the stage of a community motivated by feelings of modern secular nationalism, the Arab community of Palestine enjoyed bonds which surpassed, even at that early date, Jewish solidary bonds. Weber commented on the weakness of the Jewish communal relationship in his *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, stating:

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Furthermore, it is only so far as this relationship involves feelings of belonging together that it is a "communal" relationship. In the case of the Jews, for instance, except for Zionist circles and the action of certain associations promoting specifically Jewish interests, there thus exist communal relationships only to a relatively small extent; indeed, Jews often repudiate the existence of a Jewish "community."³

By the time of the Balfour Declaration, when Zionist organizations first gained British endorsement for a Jewish national home in Palestine, the Palestinian Arab community was already a traditional and cohesive community. Perhaps its strongest bond, then as at the earliest dawn of Arab history, was the Arabic language. Despite their divisive judicial status as Muslim and Christian *millets* during the preceding Ottoman period, the Palestinians experienced the unity of language. Moreover, the Arabic language was the foundation of a common heritage and a common history. Historians and philosophers of modern nationalism stress the value of language as an evocator of the glorious past and the expressive agent of the uniqueness of the national soul, particularly during the development of nineteenth-century European nationalism.⁴ Even when precedence is given to the presence of an "active corporate will" in the development of modern nationalism, historians such as Hans Kohn admit to the significance of language as a distinguishing "objective factor" of modern nation-states.⁵ Similarly Weber, who gives primacy to the role of a common consciousness in the formation of a community, concedes the significance of language as a facilitator of that consciousness. "Of those cultural elements that represent the most important positive basis for the formation of national sentiment everywhere," he wrote, "a common language takes first place. But even a common language is not entirely indispensable nor sufficient by itself."⁶

The role of Arabic in the development of modern Arab nationalism has generally been analyzed as a manifestation of the literary renaissance preceding the resurgence of political nationalism. It is important to recall, however, the role played by the Arabic language in weakening the Islamic Ottoman loyalty which prevailed prior to World War I. Just as the development of European vernacular tongues signified the breakdown of the medieval state system and the weakening of Latin civilization, so the re-emergence of Arabic as the vehicle of expression of the new ideas of secular nationalism and Arab nationalism was an assault on both the internationalism and the communalism of the Ottoman Empire. The Arab people were in essence demanding their place in the sun, not as separate religio-ethnic communities but as one nation. The new political thought in the Arab world later separated into two streams, one that stressed a secular, Western-style nationalism, and one that attempted to assert the interdependence of Arab nationalism and Islam.⁷ In the words of 'Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz, a noted exponent of the latter view:

But we can affirm that modern Arab nationalism rests on language, history, literature, customs and character before everything else . . . If we take these bases . . . and

then investigate the attitude of Islam to each one of them we shall find complete similarity, indeed sometimes total agreement, between what nationalism calls for and what the Islamic religion approves. . . . When the Muslim Arab takes pride in his heroes the two sentiments of the pious Muslim and the zealous nationalist mix in his soul.⁸

Significantly, prominent Palestinian voices emerged as advocates of secular nationalism. Whether in the writings of the Christian Fayez al-Sayegh, or in the works of the Muslim Hazem Nuseibeh, who evoked the example of the pre-Islamic Arab tribes and their common Arab linguistic and cultural heritage, the emphasis was on a common Arab heritage rather than on an Islamic foundation.⁹

Palestinian Arab nationalism, although part of this wider Arab torrent of nationalism, was eventually sharpened by the emergence of two additional elements considered the main causative factors behind the development of modern nationalism. These were, first, the presence of common aspirations such as the desire for a sovereign government, and second, a feeling of distinctness from third parties.¹⁰ Thus, while Arab nationalism in other countries focused on the achievable goal of political independence first from Ottoman authority and then from Britain and France, Palestinian nationalism was forced to confront the inevitably more complex reality of organized Zionist efforts and European settlers backed by some of the great powers of the day. Inevitably, this heightened national consciousness made of the Palestinians a nation according to the criteria described by Cobban:

“The best we can say is that any territorial community, the members of which are conscious of themselves as members of a community, and wish to maintain the identity of their community, is a nation.”¹¹

Max Weber was very clear in his definition of the nation as a “community of sentiment” which is comfortable only after acquiring a state of its own and which always struggles towards that end. Terming it a subjective phenomenon, Weber claimed that the nationalist sentiment translates into a feeling of solidarity on the part of a certain group of people in the face of others. This nationalist sentiment of solidarity, however, is rooted in objective factors such as race, language, religion, customs, or political experience.¹² This definition does not distinguish between the development of the nation as a culture-nation and a state-nation. A culture-nation, or *Kulturnationen* in Meinecke’s definition, is a nation possessing “a community of language or culture” but which may not possess common political bonds. A *Staatsnationen*, on the other hand, is a nation possessing common political aspirations based on the commonality of culture. When the two types of nation merge, the concept of self-determination becomes even more applicable. Alfred Cobban, historian of the French Revolution, reminded us that before the emergence of modern nationalism, the term “nation” was always understood in a non-political and mainly linguistic sense,

and that it was used in this sense by the medieval universities. He stressed that only by the beginning of the eighteenth century did the term "nation" lose all linguistic and cultural significance and acquire an exclusive political meaning.¹³ Weber too emphasized the distinction between a nation and a state. For the distinct characteristics which attest to the individuality of a national community, he used the broad term *Kultur*. A community was considered a nation if indeed it was one, or if it desired its own autonomous state. The nation was likened to a *Gemeinschaften*, bound by feelings of solidarity, whereas the state was likened to a *Gesellschaft*, an association created for a specific objective. The nation, furthermore, belonged to the realm of *Kultur*, while the state belonged to the realm of "power."¹⁴ Weber's careful distinction between the nation and the state did not mean denial of legitimacy of national groups and sympathy for their political aspirations. Indeed, he strongly endorsed the desire for independence on the part of the different nations within the Hungarian, Russian, and Turkish Empires.¹⁵ The desire for independence is the result of the numerical preponderance of these submerged nations while under foreign rule. In the words of Vatro Murvar, a leading expert on the submerged nations: "They [the submerged nations] represent solid majorities within their own compact, continuous national territory. In spite of all their sufferings, losses and even genocide attempted by their oppressors, they are still majorities."¹⁶

The struggle of the Palestinian people to achieve legitimacy and acquire a state is a case in point. By World War I, the Palestinians were a cultural nation defined juridically under the Ottomans as two separate communal groups, Muslim and Christian. In her comprehensive study of the emergence and transformation of the Palestinian national movement during the first half of this century, Ann M. Lesch outlines clearly the Palestinian rejection of the communal compartmentalization of the Ottoman millet system, as well as resistance to the absorption of the Palestinian question by the wider current of Arab nationalism. Both of these efforts hastened the unusual transformation of Palestinian nationalism into a secular and political nationalism devoid of sectarianism and focused on maintaining title to a certain corner of the Arab world. The rejection of the communal system, moreover, was not without its price, for it deprived the Palestinians of the opportunity to participate in some limited form of decision-making under the British Mandatory Government. When the British authorities in 1922 proposed to establish a Palestinian legislative council composed of eight Muslims, two Christians, two Jews, and eleven government officials, the Arab Executive rejected the plan. This rejection was based on the proclaimed fear that the British officials and Jewish representatives would combine their votes to insure the retention of the hated Balfour Declaration. Moreover, this refusal to accede to British plans for electing secondary electors to the proposed Council in 1923 was voiced equally in Muslim and Christian circles, by lay and religious leaders alike.¹⁷

The Muslim-Christian response to the excesses of the Mandatory Government and the vigorous efforts of the Zionist organization at this early date soon took

the form of bi-religious, and sometimes even secular, institutions determined to confront both the British and the Zionists. Realizing that British determination to maintain the millet system would only benefit the united Jewish community, Palestinian Muslims and Christians soon moved towards creating a common Arab front. This was in response not only to the formalization of communalism in the plans for a legislative council, but also to British approval of the Jewish Agency's autonomous control over the Jewish community, to the extent of levying taxes towards financing autonomous Jewish educational institutions.¹⁸ Beginning with the establishment of the Muslim-Christian Society in 1919, with a membership of about two hundred, the Palestinians attempted to confront the Zionist threat not as two divided religious communities but as a unified bi-religious front.¹⁹ Although initially the Muslim-Christian label was retained, within a short period of time the term Arab came increasingly into use. A fascinating light was thrown on the nature of Palestinian resistance when the Third Arab Congress was convened in December 1920, at Haifa. The Congress was convened to give expression to a new direction for the Palestinian political movement following the flight of King Faisal (Emir Faisal) from Damascus when Syria fell to the French in July 1920. Having witnessed the demise of the pan-Arab movement led by Faisal and the older members of the Palestinian political movement who had previously participated in the work of the First (1919) and Second (1920) Arab Congresses held at Damascus, participants in the Third Congress moved to create separate Palestinian bodies. Thus the Third Arab Congress, though retaining the Arab label, inaugurated in essence a separate course for the Palestinian movement. The Third Congress elected a new executive committee, known as the Arab Executive, and entrusted it to the hands of Muslim dignitaries such as Musa Kazim al-Husayni and 'Arif al-Dajani, and Christian dignitaries such as Ibrahim Shammash and Ya'qub Bardakash. Those two Christian committee members joined seven other Muslims to provide leadership for a new movement which did not even attempt to remain part of the Arab mainstream. While the two previous congresses had enunciated the demand to keep Palestine Arab and part of Syria under Faisal, the Third Congress did not even mention the Arab nationalists' designation for Palestine, namely "Southern Syria."²⁰

The Third Congress in reality was acknowledging the disillusionment of the Palestinians with Faisal's flirtation with Zionist leaders and his weakness towards the European powers. Some Palestinians had actually desired a limited cultural union with Syria as early as 1919, and the Palestinian press called for a separate campaign on behalf of Arab Palestine instead of linking the Palestinian struggle to the struggle for Arab Syria.²¹ From that point onwards, the question was not, as Don Peretz once suggested, whether the nationalism of the Arabs of Palestine was "Palestinian-Arab," or "Arab-Palestinian;"²² rather, the Palestinians proceeded to chart their own course, since the dream of a unified Arab state had been shattered beyond repair.

The ability of the Palestinian leadership to transcend sectarian divisions received

no encouragement from the Mandatory Government. Both the British Government and the Jewish Agency, the governing body of the Jewish community, attempted to thwart this secularist Palestinian trend and the shift towards a nationalist rather than a communal campaign. The British refused to deal with or recognize the new Arab political organizations on the pretext that their officers were not elected by the public at large.²³ The Zionists reacted to this Arab closing of the ranks by sowing division within the Palestinian community wherever and whenever possible. Thus began the studied campaign of H. M. Kalvarisky, head of the Arab Department of the Zionist Executive, in Jerusalem in 1921 to organize pro-British National Muslim Associations. These, along with Kalvarisky's other brain-child, the pro-Zionist Arab National Farmers' Party composed of several agricultural associations supported with Jewish funds, failed and came to a halt in 1926.²⁴

Opposing the popular will became particularly difficult for these organizations when the Supreme Muslim Council became closely identified with the national movement under the leadership of Haj Amin al-Husayni. Formed in 1921 to oversee the communal affairs of the Muslim community and its religious trusts, the Supreme Muslim Council frequently adopted such anti-Zionist measures as the *fatwa* (religio-legal opinion) which forbade land sales to non-Palestinians. Through its custodianship of Muslim religious trusts and sites, the Supreme Muslim Council spearheaded efforts to convene several international Islamic Congresses, which in turn advocated the maintenance of Islamic control over Jerusalem. More importantly, the Council, through its participation in the general strike of 1936, played a pivotal role in the national opposition to British and Zionist policies.²⁵

Finally, Haj Amin al-Husayni agreed in 1936 to combine the office of Mufti with that of president of the Arab Higher Committee, which attempted to coordinate strike activities all over Palestine.²⁶ While heading that body, which constituted the highest Arab political organ between 1936 and 1939, Haj Amin was aided by the efforts and diplomatic skill of two prominent Christians, George Antonius and Alfred Rock.²⁷ The assumption of national leadership by Haj Amin apparently was quite acceptable to representatives of the Palestinian Christian community. Such were the nationalist and patriotic credentials of the president of the Supreme Muslim Council that the Palestinian followers of the Greek Orthodox rite invited him to support them in the long-standing dispute between the Palestinian following and the Greek hierarchy of the Church. Having failed to secure the intervention of the British Government in the tangled affairs of their bi-national church, the Palestinian membership invited Haj Amin as head of the Supreme Muslim Council to address the 1929 Greek Orthodox Annual Convention at Ramallah. Haj Amin's pronouncement during that convention that the Orthodox Problem was an integral part of the Palestinian political problem finally prompted the British Government to dispatch a royal commission from London to examine this issue and set the Greek Orthodox Church on the road to reform.²⁸

Thus, British and Zionist perceptions of the nature of Palestinian resistance

were proven to be out of touch with reality. But in one area specifically, the Palestinian movement prior to 1948 succumbed to colonial designs and to the cumulative effect of economic and political manipulation by British and Zionists alike. This was the class composition of Palestinian society and the class affiliation of the Palestinian leadership. Strongly controlled by the urban elite and representatives of the powerful leading families, the Palestinian national movement remained focused on family loyalty and family alliances and rivalries until the defeat of 1948. Although united in their effort to resist Zionist immigration and British control, the Palestinians were led by a traditional leadership which attempted to infuse its support institutions with confrontational strategies of the anti-colonial and anti-settler struggle. And although younger and more progressive cadres of leadership began to coalesce around the new clubs, labor unions, and political parties from the inception of the Mandate period, leadership positions remained restricted to scions of prominent families who based their power on vast holdings of land. This naturally laid the nationalist movement wide open to British and Zionist subversion. Through the rivalries between the Husayni and Nashashibi families in Jerusalem, as well as through attempts by certain Arab regimes to support one family-led coalition against the other, the Palestinian movement remained vulnerable to subversion by the British Government, the Jewish Agency, and the Arab regimes alike. While the Zionist movement secretly supported some Arab political parties with money, the British used coveted government positions under their control, such as the mayoralty of Jerusalem, as a means of keeping Palestinian militants under control.²⁹ Attempts by Arab independent regimes to influence the course of Palestinian resistance, on the other hand, were facilitated by the survival of strong pro-Arab sentiments among some Palestinian leaders, sentiments that now took the form of a pro-Hashemite orientation favoring Emir Abdullah of Jordan. A leading Palestinian nationalist who favored a closer link with Hashemites was 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, while the Nashashibis also sided with the Jordanian monarchy in exchange for political backing and support in official British circles. Family rivalries nevertheless reflected serious tactical differences between the conciliatory Nashashibi-led coalition and the confrontational Husayni-led political parties.³⁰

That these significant differences which distinguish maximalists from minimalists in any national struggle movement appeared under the guise of family rivalries is indeed a reflection of the Palestinians' level of political development prior to 1948. Conscious of a distinct destiny and of the common bonds which tie Muslim Palestinian to Christian Palestinian, villager to townsman, urban elite to traditional leadership, the Palestinian nationalist movement was still led by families who based their power on the control of landed estates. Yet, the process of class differentiation was already apparent in the 1920s when the revival of Palestinian commerce and agriculture under the aegis of a relatively modern regime, as well as the land seizures of the Zionist organizations, pauperized landlord and tenant alike and led to the emergence of a modern bourgeoisie and a working class.

Indeed, the new leadership was beginning to challenge the traditional leadership for control of the movement within the nascent urban institutions of the educated middle class such as labor unions, the new press, and the newly emerging politico-cultural clubs. But the demise of the traditional Palestinian leadership, significantly, came not as a result of a struggle between the old and the new classes, but as a result of Zionist successes in 1948, which established the state of Israel and in the process destroyed the traditional leadership's bases of power. Indeed, this feat of the Israeli armed forces resembles the end product of the Napoleonic invasions in Europe a century and a half earlier, which, more than any other historic force, succeeded in sounding the death knell for the European *ancien régime*.³¹

The termination of any hope for establishing Palestinian sovereignty on Palestinian soil in 1948, through the establishment of a Zionist state in Western Palestine and the extension of the Jordanian state system to Eastern Palestine, momentarily thwarted Palestinian nationalism, but did not eliminate it altogether. Despite powerful efforts by both the Israelis and the Jordanians to erase all memories of a separate Palestinian entity, the memory of the Palestinian struggle and the aspirations of the people of Palestine lived on. The name Palestine, first resurrected in modern times by two Jaffa brothers, Yusuf and Isa Daud al-Isa, who applied it as a title for their newspaper *Filastin* in 1911, fell out of use.³² The Israelis ceased to apply the term Palestinian to the Arab population of the Negev and the Galilee who fell under their control with the founding of the state, and reduced them to the religious categories of Muslims, Christians, and Druze. The Jordanians, for their part, imposed a new name on Eastern Palestine as part of the process of integrating the new territory into Jordan proper. On March 1, 1950, a royal decree was issued under the signature of King Abdullah of Jordan in which government employees were officially barred from using the term "Palestine" in official documents. Instead, government circles, as well as various newspapers, began to substitute the terms "West Bank" and "East Bank" for Palestine and Transjordan.³³

The memory of Arab Palestine, however, lived on in the consciousness of pan-Arabists. Statesmen and dynasties with blueprints for a greater Syria, and political parties centered around a wider pan-Arabism, continued to espouse the theme of reconnecting Palestine to the main Arab body.³⁴ Yet the pan-Arabists' sponsorship of the Palestinian cause continued to be regarded with some misgivings. Even when championed by the charismatic hero of Pan-Arabism, Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser, the Palestinian cause was consistently revived and asserted by the Palestinians themselves. Not surprisingly, the strongest manifestations of the Palestinian identity survived among the intellectual circles of Gaza, which though nominally under Egyptian control since 1948, remained separate from Egypt. While Palestinians in Jordan, east and west, faced repeated attempts at political and economic assimilation, the Palestinians in Gaza were always regarded as distinct from the Egyptians and benefited from the pro-Palestinian orientation of

the Nasserite regime. There, Palestinian institutions slowly revived under the Palestinian label and began the pursuit of national redemption. The General Union of Palestinian Students, for instance, meeting in Gaza in 1964, issued a set of declarations on behalf of the people of Palestine. With branches in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, as well as in various European countries, the Union became the first nucleus of the revived Palestinian movement, which eventually metamorphosed into the Palestine Liberation Organization. Acknowledging "our debt of thanks to President Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser and expressing our total confidence in his wise and revolutionary leadership," the Union went on to chart a role for the people of Palestine in the continuing struggle for the motherland.³⁵ Fortified with messages of support from institutions and groups which still considered themselves Palestinian in identity, such as the Union of Arab Jordanian Women in Jerusalem (headed by the veteran Palestinian feminist Zulaykhah Shihabi), and the Palestinian community in the Sudan (who most certainly maintained Jordanian citizenship at the time), the Union of Palestinian Students recommended the following measures:

1. Requesting the Arab Summit Meeting to organize a Palestinian entity based on revolutionary principles.
2. Asserting that armed struggle is the only method of restoring Palestine.
3. Encouraging individual Palestinians to remit a fixed percentage of their income to that proposed Palestinian entity.
4. Organizing all Palestinians into student, worker, peasant, women, and professional cadres.
5. Creating a new Palestinian leadership representative of all segments of the people of Palestine, by electing representatives of these Palestinian cadres to sit as a national council which would in turn elect an executive committee acting as the highest Palestinian authority.³⁶

The General Union of Palestinian Students clearly represented the vanguard of the revived national movement. As expected, the student activists of the mid-1960s who operated under the benign gaze of the Nasserite regime, grew up to found and lead the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the structure of which was foreshadowed in the resolutions and recommendations of the above mentioned third annual meeting of 1964.

The military collapse of the Jordanian regime in Eastern Palestine as a result of the Israeli victory of 1967 again brought on similar consequences to those following the Napoleonic European invasions. Jordanian institutions, as well as the power-base of the pro-Jordanian Palestinian leadership, were speedily removed or radically weakened. In their place sprouted a new Palestinian leadership closely aligned with the Gaza cadres who led the wider Palestinian organization known as the PLO. Reflecting neither the power configuration of the traditional Palestinian landed aristocracy, nor the pro-Jordanian commercial interests of the "West

Bank'' era, the PLO promoted a type of Palestinian movement that was more in tune with the modern definition of nationalism. With the addition of an irredentism not present in the pre-1948 movement, the PLO developed with a wide base of support and a definite territorial identification. The strength of the latter component of the PLO's political philosophy continued to maintain its legitimation in the eyes of the Palestinian people. Despite the enormous pressures and temptations to accept a territorial substitute for the motherland, the PLO struggled, often at great military risks to itself, to maintain its claim to the Mandate territory called Palestine. And despite accusations to the contrary, neither during its involvement in Jordan prior to 1971, nor during its long stay in Lebanon prior to 1982, did the PLO agree to settle for a surrogate homeland.³⁷ Having lost the Jordanian base of its operations, the PLO moved to Lebanon and found itself again accused of seeking to destabilize an Arab government. The PLO nevertheless continued to express its disinterest in accepting anything other than its original homeland. One of the resolutions of the 13th session of the Palestine National Council meeting in Cairo in 1977 stated unequivocally:

The Palestine National Council affirms its belief in the right of the Palestinian revolution to exist on Lebanese soil within the context of the Cairo Agreement concluded between the PLO and the Lebanese authorities. The National Council also affirms its commitment to the principles of this agreement, including the right to carry arms within the refugee camps. . . . The National Council, in addition, affirms its determination to preserve the sovereignty and safety of Lebanon.³⁸

Item 11 of the same set of resolutions also stated clearly the intent of the Palestine National Council to secure for the Palestinian people the right of return, the right of self-determination, and the right to establish their independent state "on its [Palestine's] national soil."³⁹

It should be apparent that the Palestinians were transformed in less than fifty years from a linguistic community, which matched the early modern definition of a culture-nation, into a political-nation that lacked, however, a territory. Having been forced by the challenges and pressures of confronting the Zionist movement to abandon the sectarian communalism of the Ottoman period, they evolved into a quasi-modern people. With the cataclysmic events of 1948, the shock of national dismemberment, and the permanent loss of control over the Palestinian territory, the Palestinians slowly began to emerge again in the mid-sixties as a potent national force. This time they were directed by the new and professional classes. Two of the main factors which generally contribute to the development of nationalism were added after 1948. The first was the strong reference to the lost territory, and the second was the recent memory of the national struggle during the Mandate period. This memory came to overshadow all the preceding memories of the Arab nationalist struggle under the leadership of Prince Faisal, contributing to the emergence of a specifically Palestinian nationalism and identity.

NOTES

1. See a discussion of the different versions of the philosophy of self-determination during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 in Alfred Cobban, *The Nation State and National Self-Determination* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1969), 57-84. For an examination of the antecedents of the idea of self-determination and its propagation by Mazzini, Fichte, Jahn, and others, see Walker Connor, "Nationalism and Political Illegitimacy," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 8, no. 2 (Fall/Autumn, 1981): 201-28.

2. Among the most valuable studies examining the legal aspects of Palestinian self-determination and Jewish claims to nationhood are W. Thomas Mallison, "The United Nations and the National Rights of the People of Palestine," in *Palestinian Rights: Affirmation and Denial*, ed. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (Wilmette, Ill.: Medina Press, 1982), 22-34; with S.V. Mallison, *An International Law Analysis of the Major United Nations Resolutions Concerning the Palestinian Question* (UN, 1979); "The Zionist-Israel Juridical Claims to Constitute 'The Jewish People,' Nationality Entity and to Confer Membership in It: Appraisal in Public International Law," 32 *George Washington Law Review* 983, 1050 (1964); and Cherif Bassiouni and Eugene M. Fisher, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict—Real and Apparent Issues: An Insight into its Future from the Lessons of the Past," *St. John's Law Review* 44, no. 3 (Jan. 1970): 399-465.

3. Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. Talcott Parsons and A.M. Henderson, 3d ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1966), 138.

4. Cobban, *The Nation State*, 35; Boyd C. Shafer, *Nationalism, Myth and Reality* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1955), 7-8, 160-61.

5. Hans Kohn, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History*, rev. ed. (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1970), 9-10.

6. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. and trans., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 177-78.

7. Kemal H. Karpat, ed., *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), 13-14.

8. *Al-Bazzaz on Arab Nationalism* (London: Embassy of Iraq, 1965), 41-42.

9. Karpat, *Political and Social Thought*, 13-14.

10. Shafer, *Nationalism*, 7; Weber, *Theory*, 139.

11. Cobban, *The Nation State*, 107.

12. David Beetham, *Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1974), 122.

13. Cobban, *The Nation State*, 27, 30, 107-8.

14. Beetham, *Max Weber*, 125, 128. For a discussion of the consequences of the generalized use of the terms nation, ethnic community, and state, see Walker Connor, "A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group is a . . . ," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1, no. 4 (Oct. 1978): 377-400.

15. Vatro Murvar and Ronald Glassman, eds., *Max Weber's Political Sociology* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984), 246.

16. Vatro Murvar, "Submerged Nations Surfacing in Research," *Contemporary Sociology* 11 (Jan. 1982): 14. See also Vatro Murvar, *Submerged Nations: An Invitation to Theory and Bibliography on One Major Case Study (Turkestan: Russian and Chinese-Ruled)* (Milwaukee: University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, Department of Sociology, 1982). The term "submerged nations" was not evolved by Max Weber but developed later on. A very limited attempt to apply this analysis to the Palestinian case occurs in Judy Bertelsen, ed., *Nonstate Nations in International Politics: Comparative System Analysis* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), 6-35.

17. Ann M. Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917-1939* (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University press, 1979), 180-82.
18. *Ibid.*, 40-41.
19. *Ibid.*, 84; Simha Flapan, *Zionism and the Palestinians* (London: Croom Helm 1979), 64.
20. Lesch, *Arab Politics*, 87, 90-91.
21. Flapan, *Zionism*, 59.
22. Don Peretz, Evan M. Wilson and Richard J. Ward, *A Palestinian Entity?* (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1970), 1.
23. Lesch, *Arab Politics*, 81.
24. *Ibid.*, 51; Flapan, *Zionism*, 64-65.
25. Lesch, *Arab Politics*, 71, 118, 137.
26. William L. Ochsenwald, "Arab Muslims and the Palestine Problem," *Muslim World* 66, no. 4 (Oct. 1976): 289.
27. Lesch, *Arab Politics*, 125, 150.
28. Easa Ghannam, "The Orthodox Brotherhood Society: An Overview" (unpublished report to the Ramallah Federation, 1979).
29. Lesch, *Arab Politics*, 95-99; Flapan, *Zionism*, 224-250.
30. Lesch, *Arab Politics*, 142-43, 110-11.
31. For an analysis of the contribution of the Napoleonic invasions to European nationalism, see Kohn, *Nationalism*, 35.
32. Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918-1929* (London: Frank Cass, 1974), 8.
33. Shaul Mishal, *West Bank/East Bank: The Palestinians in Jordan, 1949-1967* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978), 1-22.
34. Walid Khalidi, "Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian State," *Foreign Affairs* (July, 1978). This article provides a perceptive insight into the interdependence of Arab nationalism and Palestinian nationalism.
35. General Union of Palestinian Students, "Qararat al-Mu'tamar al-Watani al-Thalith" (Resolutions of the Third National Annual Meeting), Gaza, March 3, 1964, p. 23.
36. *Ibid.*, 7-8, 19.
37. For a Palestinian critique of the PLO's refusal to confront the monarchy in Jordan, see Nabil Sha'ath, ed., *Al-Muqawamah al-Filistiniyah wa-al-Nizam al-Urduni* (Palestinian Resistance and the Jordanian Regime) (Beirut: Center for Palestine Studies, 1971), 103, 272.
38. PLO, "I'lan Siyasi" (Political Resolution), issued by the Palestine National Council during its 13th session, Cairo, 1977, p. 2.
39. *Ibid.*, 3.