The colonisation of Indigenous self-determination: Australia and Palestine

Gary Foley and Tim Anderson

The founding principle of decolonisation – the right of a people to self-determination – has itself been colonised, distorted and twisted into a legitimising concept used by all manner of neo-colonial regimes. A term which signified liberation, self-governance, resource control and participatory democracy is now degraded into 'native police' agencies or powerless advisory bodies.

The Australian political scene has been flooded with praise for constitutional recognition of indigenous peoples, linked to a new advisory body said to give the idea of a 'Voice to Parliament' on behalf of Aboriginal communities, without much reflection on the failure of three earlier elected advisory bodies. Successive governments simply ignored those bodies when what they said was inconvenient. The promise of a new advisory body hides co-option of the term 'self-determination'. Placing a powerless advisory body in Australia's 19th century constitution is mostly an attempt to legitimise the colonial regime.

Similarly, in Palestine, a pseudo-state authority (the Palestinian Authority) set up to recognise the Palestinian nation engages in repression of its youth who resist the colonising regime. Why? because this Palestinian Authority is founded on recognition of the colonial Israeli regime and is funded by the colony's main sponsors, to entrench Israeli and US hegemony.

There have been genuine self-determination initiatives. Many of the early Aboriginal health, legal and artistic bodies were driven by communities, with very few resources. Similarly, in Palestine a range of resistance bodies were created to defend and serve the needs of threatened Palestinian communities. However these movements were often replaced by colonised bodies, which in turn twisted the emancipatory ideas.

There is even some intellectual justification for degradation of the term 'self-determination', e.g. by Sanders (2002), who regards Aboriginal self-determination as "progressively embedded in the Australian bureaucracy, as an 'Indigenous order of Australian government'." This is misleading. Bureaucratic co-option should never be confused with indigenous self-determination.

We have previously demonstrated (Foley and Anderson 2006) that it is indigenous protagonists who made the key advances in Australian indigenous rights, in particular land rights. The colonial state agencies tried to subvert those movements, making great efforts to suggest that, where rights were fought for and recognised, they were actually 'granted' from the *noblesse oblige* of the colonial regime. Yet rights are most often fought for, not 'granted'.

Colonisation of key concepts is often done by simple 'bait and switch' operations, where the popular term is adopted but linked to state mechanisms or empty hegemonic responses. So, for example, the Aboriginal demand for 'land rights' was met with the 'native title' innovation, which declared 'extinguishment' of virtually all pre-1975 claims where there was almost any other sort of title (CLC 2021). Similarly, the Palestinian nation, with growing acceptance in the world, demanded its own state but was presented with the cruel false promise of 'two states' combined with a 'temporary' municipal agency (the Palestinian Authority) which recognises and assists the Israeli colonisers.

To appreciate this deception we must identify the key elements of self-determination, and then observe historically how it and related terms have been misappropriated. Colonised proposals in the name of self-determination should be measured against their contributions to self-governance, resource sovereignty and participatory democracy. This paper will therefore begin by explaining those key considerations, before outlining the colonisation of this idea in the indigenous struggles of Australia and Palestine. Of course these are two distinct histories – and Wolfe (2006: 389) makes the point that colonial cultural appropriation may be greater in Australia than in occupied Palestine – but, nevertheless, some common themes emerge.

1, In-principle considerations

The right of a people to self-determination is now regarded as a cardinal principle in contemporary international and human rights law. Unlike many of the other 'human rights', 'the self-determination of peoples' did not come from western liberalism but rather from the formerly colonised nations, through the 1960 Declaration on Decolonisation.

After 1945 the UN state members included progressively more and more former colonies, all of which supported this declaration, said to have marked an end to imperial systems (Reus-Smit 2011). The UN Charter (1945) spoke of the self-determination of nation-states (Articles 1 and 55), but not of peoples who were not yet recognised as nations or nation-states.

It was the leader of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev (1960), who first proposed a UN resolution on decolonization. Krushchev made appeals to the UN General Assembly in September and October 1960, demanding that the UN declare itself in favour of the "immediate and complete elimination of the colonial system in all its forms and manifestations". A Soviet Union draft resolution appeared soon after and was subject to some amendments before being accepted as GA Resolution 1514 (XV) on 14 December 1960 (UN 1960).

Resolution 1514 branded "The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation as "a denial of fundamental human rights … contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and … an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation". In article 2 it declared: "All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." (UNHCHR 1960a). Article 3 added: "Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence" (UNHCHR 1960a).

Article 2 would later be lifted, word for word, to form Article One of both of the twin covenants of human rights (the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) in 1966. Later in the 1980s the UN's Human Rights body would call self-determination an "essential condition" for the guarantee and promotion of all other rights, standing "apart from and before all the other rights" as well as a basis for non-interference in other nation-states (HRC 1984).

The final version of 1514 in 1960 was sponsored by 43 African, Asian and Latin American states. 89 countries voted in favour, none voted against, and nine abstained: Australia, Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, Spain, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, and United States (UN 1960; also Gouraige 1975 and Danspeckgruber 2002). In other words, most of the colonial powers refused to support this key principle of the UN human rights system, but could not bring themselves to oppose it. They were dragged into a human rights system founded on this key decolonising principle.

Making links with the self determination of nation states cited in Article 1 (2) of the UN Charter (1945), UNGA resolution 1514 was followed, the next day, by GA resolution 1541, on the guiding principles of decolonisation; that is, how can states give effect to decolonisation and thus realise the right of self-determination? These statements tried to bridge the gap between self-determination as a prerogative of nation states and the innovation of the Declaration on Decolonisation, that self-determination was a right of peoples, including subjugated peoples.

UNGA 1541 therefore addressed the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories", that is, peoples who are the traditional owners or custodians of colonised lands. The reference is to territories which are "geographically separate and ... distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it". To have these peoples and lands noted as decolonised" (under the terms of Article 78e of the UN Charter) Principle VI set out three options: a Non-Self-Governing Territory can be said to have reached a full measure of self-government by: (1) Emergence as a sovereign independent State; (2) Free association with an independent State; or (3) Integration with an independent State." (UNHCHR 1960b)

Any such free association "should be the result of a free and voluntary choice by the peoples of the territory concerned expressed through informed and democratic processes" (1541 Principle VII), while any associated territory should have the right to determine its internal constitution without outside interference, in accordance with due constitutional processes and the freely expressed wishes of the people … [with] equal rights and opportunities for representation and effective participation at all levels in the executive, legislative and judicial organs of government" (1541 Principle VIII).

From these legitimate, postcolonial foundations we can surmise that self-determination as a principle of decolonisation, has three key elements, as set out in Table 1: full self-governance, land and resource sovereignty and participatory democracy; that is, both economic and political independence. We can contrast these principles with the characteristics of fraudulent colonised versions.

Table 1: Principles of self-determination	
Principle	Colonised versions
Some mechanism of full self-governance	Advisory bodies or weak municipal agencies
Sovereign control of lands and natural resources, i.e. 'resource sovereignty'	Weak, subordinate land tenure, exclusion from resource control
Self-governance by a "free and voluntary choice through an informed, democratic and participatory process	Subjugation of decision making to a colonial state
Source: UNGA 1514, 1541 (1960)	

Colonisation of this key concept has become a central ideological task of liberal versions of the colonial state, in a postcolonial era. When colonial relations have lost their international legitimacy, there must be adaptations that disguise colonial or neo-colonial relations as something else. There is no better way to do this than by stealing the language of emancipation. Since the colonial state is called upon to recognise indigenous rights and, at times and to some limited extent does, a fond dream is promoted that the colonial state might also be the agent for

emancipation. That is a step too far, yet an idea in which those naïve to bureaucratic logic – or employed by the colonial state – seem to have some faith.

Colonisation of Palestinian demands for self-governance and land control is most plainly seen in the failure of the Oslo Accords (1993 and 1995) between the PLO and the Israelis, and in the role of the moribund Palestinian Authority (PA). While the PA seemed to represent the growing legitimacy of Palestine, and was recognised by the Israeli regime, it has not advanced key Palestinian demands for emancipation and collaborates with Israeli repression and land theft.

These days many Palestinian advocates recognise the failure of the Oslo Agreements, which gave recognition to the Israeli colony and perpetuated the cruel and hopeless myth of 'two states'. Marwan Barghouti of the Palestinian National Initiative said that the Oslo Accords "let [the Israelis] continue the occupation without paying any of the costs" (Damen 2022). The PA gave the semblance of a state with none of the powers and a downwards spiralling image amongst Palestinian people themselves. The Israelis expanded colonisation of West Bank lands even more rapidly, after the Oslo Agreements (Damen 2022). Despite Rabin's claim to 'freeze' the 'settlements', they grew more rapidly, due to a burst of investment in infrastructure (Helm 1993; Ogram 1995; Ofran 2020). In other words, Palestinians lost more land after the PLO and PA recognised the colonial Israeli regime.

In Australia, Sanders has argued that, since the Whitlam government of the early 1970s, Aboriginal self-determination was "progressively embedded in the Australian bureaucracy". He suggests a happy convergence between distinct indigenous demands and an accommodating bureaucracy which would create a base for gains, a convergence which he calls "an Indigenous order of Australian government". He even argues that this as the only "philosophically coherent and historically realistic approach to future Indigenous affairs policy" (Sanders 2002: 1). While there have been some retreats from embedded Aboriginal advisory bodies, Sanders sees a great continuity in this bureaucratic 'self-determination', reinforced at times by events such as the special inquiry into Aboriginal deaths in custody (Sanders 2002: 2-3). He effectively equates the unfolding of 'self-determination' and thus decolonisation with the bureaucratic growth of this "Indigenous order of Australian government" (Sanders 2002: vii).

That matter is seen very differently by indigenous advocates who stress unmet demands for sovereign recognition, restoration of stolen indigenous land and the elimination of police and state repression. Those are the priorities that indigenous Senator Lidia Thorpe and the Blak Sovereign Movement (BSM) say will be buried by the "cheap window dressing" of the 2023 'Indigenous Voice to Parliament" campaign, by which a Labor government wants to embed in Australia's 19th century constitution 'recognition' of indigenous people and a new advisory body (McHugh 2023). On the other hand Foley (1991; 1999), who has long argued for "Aboriginal control of Aboriginal affairs", sees advances in self-determination as driven by Aboriginal mobilisation and obstructed by bureaucratic co-option and appropriation.

Similarly, Abunimah writes of the "gradual erosion" of the concept of self-determination in Palestinian affairs since 1991, coinciding with the rise of the Oslo Accords and the creation of the PA. The PA kept its focus on its own standing and some limited "final status" issues, heavily conditioned by the Israeli regime. In place of a focus on sovereignty, self-governance and control of land, the PA bureaucracy remained closely tied to cooperation with the Israeli regime (Abuninah 2010: 1-8). By contrast, various Palestinian resistance factions acted to oppose the land theft and protect besieged communities.

Any reading of the processes of self-determination must be informed by an emancipatory method. In her 2008 book *Decolonising Methodologies*, Linda Tuhiwai Smith speaks of the need to respond to "new pressures which have resulted from our own politics of self-determination, of wanting greater participation in, or control over, what happens to us" (Smith 2008: 39). That means, in particular critically addressing concepts like 'reconciliation' and 'recognition' of the colonial regime. While emphasising indigenous self-determination and indigenous values, she warns of new ways in which these values are disguised or buried within western labels. As vigilance against this type of colonisation, indigenous people must remain "active participants" of their own self-determination (Smith 2008: 124-125). Similarly, in her 2015 book *Decolonizing Solidarity*, Clare Land speaks of the need for "critical self-reflection" when there is some "recontraction" of indigenous rights and for vigilance over the likely "complicity" of individuals (indigenous as well as non-indigenous) with interests in the colonial institutions and colonial culture (Land 2015: 161, 203, 229).

2. The colonisation of 'self-determination' in Australia

There are important examples of legitimate self-determination processes in Aboriginal Australia. For example, the Aboriginal Medical Services (AMS), at first in Sydney and Melbourne, grew out of the early Aboriginal Legal Service (ALS) led by an Aboriginal committee which operated with volunteer lawyers. These legal services had grown from a Black Power Movement (Foley 2001) which grounded itself in principles of self-determination and land rights – a campaign for the restoration of stolen land. They identified serious health problems, not the least of which was that, as there were no Aboriginal doctors at that time, some Kooris "would literally rather die than be subjected to degrading, humiliating treatment at the hands of non-Aboriginal health workers" (Foley 1991: 5).

The Sydney based AMS then grew "from a two room shopfront medical clinic in Regent Street", staffed by volunteer doctors and directed by an Aboriginal committee. Its objectives included providing Aboriginal and Islanders with free medical services, promoting knowledge and understanding of health matters, training health workers to be the key personnel in the emerging Aboriginal health cooperatives, and strengthening Aboriginal identity and culture (Foley 1991: 2). At the root was community control and adaptation.

Similarly, in Melbourne, the Victorian Aboriginal Health Service (VAHS), set up in 1973 by a group led by Alma Thorpe and Bruce McGuiness, created "a place where Aboriginal people could access medical and social care in a time when racism and other barriers prevented Aboriginal people" from doing so (Fredericks, Luke and Brown 2011).

At the root of both the Melbourne and Sydney initiatives was community-control, which included organising, training and teaching indigenous history. Koori Kollij, set up under the VAHS began by teaching a course on the Politics of Health which included indigenous and colonial history, medical matters and organising community health workers (McGuiness and Brown c1973). The VAHS itself, while organising representative groups, also lobbied against health inequities and campaigned for better housing, employment, land rights, social justice and for an end to racist discrimination.

The AMS pioneered the concept of Aboriginal community controlled health care services "as the only successful way of improving the health of Aboriginal communities ... Our experience has proved that Aboriginal people are capable of solving their own problems if we are given control of the resources and facilities and allowed to do it our way … Aborigines have demonstrated that communities do have the solutions to their own problems" (Foley 1991: 1, 3). The state AMS

developed a range of clinics, spread widely and developed innovative programs, such as the HIV education program in 1987 (Foley 1991: 13, 16).

The achievements of this community control were attested to by informed observers. One of the early volunteer doctors and later NSW Health Minister Andrew Refshauge would write that the AMS "being community controlled ... has ensured that services are targeted to real needs, priorities and set by the people directly affected … Aborigines have demonstrated that communities do have the solutions to their own problems" (in Foley 1991: 3).

Similarly, a Commissioner of the Aboriginal Deaths in Custody Royal Commission, Justice Elliot Johnston, in his 1991 report, spoke of "the important role of the Aboriginal community-controlled health services … controlled locally by Aboriginal people, provide one of the best demonstrations in this country of the World Health Organisation's ideal for the delivery of primary health care … based on practical, scientifically sound and socially acceptable methods and technology made universally accessible to individuals and families in the community through their full participation and at a cost that the community and country can afford to maintain at every stage of their development in the spirit of self-reliance and self-determination" (Johnston 1991: 31.3.49-50).

Johnston recognised "the undeniable strengths of the Aboriginal community-controlled health services … they overcome many of the deficiencies … of the general community or mainstream health services … At the heart of their strength is the fact that the control by and participation of local Aboriginal people ensures not only that the services are attuned to local health care needs but, also, that each service recognises specific social and cultural aspects of health and illness, and of the appropriate responses to them" (Johnston 1991: 31.3.49-50).

These community initiatives, which sought both government and independent funding, led to the formation of the National Aboriginal and Islander Health Organisation (NAIHO), which became "the strongest national Aboriginal organisation of the seventies and early eighties" (Foley 1991: 12). The entire process was an exercise in self-governance.

Yet historically there was opposition from bureaucrats in the Department of Aboriginal Affairs, many of whom had been 'patrol officers' of the earlier protection and assimilation regimes (Anthony and Blagg 2020). They consistently undermined independent, community controlled organisations as "subversive to their dearly held concepts of assimilation" (Foley 1991: 12). Bureaucratic control most often killed the efficacy and dynamism of these initiatives.

In parallel with the struggle for community control were community demands for the restoration of traditional lands and for an Aboriginal voice in broader political and social affairs. These struggles were sometimes mainly at a local level. For example, while much of Australia still argued whether Aboriginal people in Tasmanian still existed (there was a myth of 'extinction') the Tasmanian Aboriginal community fought for and extracted, from a conservative government, a Land Rights Act, the return of some traditional lands and the protection of important cultural sites. Return of indigenous land in Tasmania is an ongoing local struggle (Alexander 2006; TAC 2023).

The key advances in securing land rights came from Aboriginal campaigners; however they were betrayed when Labor Governments elected in 1972 and 1983 reneged on promises of land rights legislation, under pressure from mining companies and regional politicians (CLC 2012; Foley 2013). When the Mabo court case reopened the question of traditional title persisting, after the British Empire supposedly secured sovereignty over the continental land mass, a Native Title Act

(1993) was instituted, by a Labor government, mainly to reassure non-Aboriginal property owners that most indigenous traditional title (in the eyes of colonial law) was "extinguished" (CLC 2021). It is testament to the successful colonisation of language that many Australians still regard the Native Title Act as a gain for Aboriginal communities, rather than a setback. While some northern Aboriginal and Islander communities gained, the extinguishment regime placed very severe limits on the possibilities for most traditional owners. As Foley has said many times "Native Title is not Land Rights and Reconciliation is not Justice" (Foley 1999a). Indigenous flags flying on government buildings and the ubiquitous 'Welcome to Country' rituals these days sustain an illusion that the rights of 'recognised' traditional owners might actually be recognised.

A second parallel history is the trail of marginalised advisory bodies, supposedly set up to give a voice to Aboriginal communities. As Fitzsimmons (2023) pointed out: "if the [October 2023] referendum to establish a First Nations Voice to Parliament succeeds, it will be the fourth attempt in 50 years to establish a representative Aboriginal body to advise the federal government." She is referring to the NACC, established by the Whitlam Labor Government in 1973, the NAC established by the Fraser Liberal/Country Party government in 1977 and ATSIC established by the Hawke Labor government in 1990. Each body was, in turn, abolished after friction with the government of the day (Pratt and Bennett 2004). Even when ATSIC was elected and had some fiscal authority over government funded programs, Aboriginal communities were lukewarm over its role. In the four ATSIC election between 1990 and 2000 indigenous participation ranged between 5% and 30% (across the states), with a national average of about 23% (Sanders, Taylor and Ross 2000: 8). In other words, most did not bother to vote for their ATSIC member, viewing it with as much disdain as they do the colonial government. The ATSIC requirement that voters be registered on the Australian electoral roll imposed an additional disincentive. Yet the ATSIC law called for "maximum participation of Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait Islanders … to promote the development of self-management and self-sufficiency" (Comm Aust 1989).

The more recent proposal for recognition of indigenous people and a new advisory body (the ATSIV) was given shape by the Albanese Labor Government. It is set to go to a national referendum in October 2023, to embed this advisory body in the federal constitution.

However the very idea of a particular advisory body representing the "voice" of indigenous Australia is yet another colonisation of emancipatory language. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders having a "voice" in public affairs is a decent and popular idea, but linking that idea to a advisory body is an attempt to capture the popularity of the idea. Would this mean that no one outside the new advisory body deserves to be heard? Of course no advisory body, providing advice to a colonial parliament, could be said to represent indigenous self-governance, let alone control of land and resources.

The idea at its high point was spelt out by Linda Burney, an indigenous woman who is also a Labor Minister with carriage of the campaign. She says that by embedding the advisory body in the constitution it "cannot be abolished at a whim" as were the previous advisory bodies. (Fitzsimmons 2023). That is a point also stressed by Thomas Mayo (in Mayo and O'Brien 2023: 4). Embedding this body in the constitution is also said to represent recognition of indigenous peoples in the fundamental law of the nation, and was suggested by the 2017 'Uluru Declaration' of a number of indigenous leaders (Mayo and O'Brien 2023: 5). Burney hopes that this advisory body would "play a leading role in treaty making negotiations", but after a long time when she is no longer in the parliament (Visentin 2022). She argues that the new advisory body would make a practical difference in "health, housing, jobs and education" (Butler 2023a), though this of course would depend on the political will of the government of the day. Using the first person plural for the Labor government, she adds the ATSIV would be "an advisory body and the whole idea is to

make sure the decisions that we made are better decisions" (Visentin 2022). In other words the new body is there to enhance the credibility and authority of the parliament.

Her colleague Attorney General Mark Dreyfus and Solicitor General Stephen Donaghue make the same point, that the ATSIV will "make representations to the executive government" and will not have independent powers of its own (Ravlic 2023). In this respect it would be a lesser body than ATSIC, which did have some fiscal authority.

Advocacy over the ATSIV referendum has been misleading. The official claim that "this idea came from Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people" and "not from politicians" (AEC 2023) is quite false. While it is true that the idea of constitutional recognition and of an indigenous "voice" borrows from the 2017 Uluru Declaration (Scott 2017), notice the following important differences:
(1) Where the Uluru Statement called for a "First Nations Voice", the referendum is for endorsement of an advisory body called "the Voice to Parliament" (ATSIV);
(2) The Uluru Statement called for "ownership of the soil, or better, of sovereignty" and for a negotiated treaty; none of this is mentioned in the referendum; and
(3) The Uluru Statement called for land rights and an end to mass imprisonment, the ATSIV proposal does none of that; let's remember that Labor Government in 1972 and 1983 abandoned their promises of land rights law; and that, in the 1990s, governments also failed to act on the key 'deaths in custody' inquiry recommendations.

So while the "YES" case for an ATSIV is compromised and tries to colonise popular terms such as "voice" and "self-determination", much of the leadership of the official "NO" case against this referendum is led by those who are assimilationist, that is, they do not want to recognise any special status of indigenous peoples; that includes some indigenous figures (Gibson 2022; Menon 2023).

While distancing themselves from the reactionary "NO" case (Butler 2023b), indigenous leaders including Jenny Munro, Senator Lidia Thorpe and Michael Mansell have come out against the ATSIV referendum because they see it as undermining the ground for treaty negotiations. Jenny Munro says constitutional recognition is "about validating their [Crown/colonial] sovereignty on our land, not ours" (Gibson 2022). The Australian constitution, after all, is a colonial relic which does not even recognise any sort of citizen, while declaring the British monarch to be in "possession" of the "Australasian colonies". Michael Mansell says the Voice referendum is a "distraction" and that Prime Minister Albanese should "come back to the table with Aboriginal people and begin discussions about … the treaty" (Butler 2023b).

Opposing what she sees as tokenism which undermines Aboriginal sovereignty, indigenous Senator Lidia Thorpe, while rejecting the "fear mongering" of the NO camp, also rejects the YES campaign as a distraction, calling it "nothing but cheap window dressing … the best the colonial government can offer us is a token advisory body and assimilation into their constitution" (McHugh 2023). Successive governments did not act on recommendations of the 'Bringing Them Home Report' (about kidnapped children) or those of the Royal Commission Into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, and the current government "continues to approve mining projects and land clearing over the objections of Traditional Owners … while allowing suicide, incarceration, and rates of out-of-home care for children to worsen (McHugh 2023).

In short, in the history of colonial recognition of indigenous communities there have been a multitude of devices, from state bureaucracies to cultural agencies to political advisory bodies, very few of which embodied the self-governance, resource control and participatory democracy

implied by the term self-determination. Yet the term was applied to several initiatives, such as the NACC and ATSIC. On the other hand, there is a parallel history of community controlled agencies like the early legal and health services and local cultural bodies, which did demonstrate the reality and efficacy of self-governance.

Just as the idea of 'self-determination' has been colonised by association with bureaucratic initiatives, including a series of advisory bodies, so the idea of an Aboriginal public 'voice' has been misappropriated by plans for 'constitutional recognition' linked to yet another powerless advisory body. The 'recognition' here was always more a legitimising tool for the colonial regime than recognition of the just claims of dispossessed indigenous communities.

3. The colonisation of 'self-determination' in Palestine

While most of the major military operations to dispossess indigenous Australian were concluded by the late 19th century, they are ongoing in occupied Palestine. Where Palestinian communities struggle to hold onto their land and communities, for all of the past century indigenous Australians have been struggling to reclaim stolen land.

Yet liberal Zionism has also tried to colonise the language of emancipation, in particular self-determination and self-governance. The 75 year old fiction of a 'two state solution', as old as the apartheid regime itself, remains at the centre of that illusion. Here also, mutual 'recognition' is politically charged, with collaborator Palestinian institutions and in particular the Palestinian Authority, coming into serious conflict with the community based resistance groups.

Now we cannot make specific parallels between the Australian indigenous and Palestinian indigenous histories, they are distinct; but there are some similar in principle matters which deserve attention. The most instructive areas, we suggest, are the role of recognition and collaboration with the colonial state and the question of 'reconciliation' alliances with disaffected colonists.

Let's start with the genuine self-determination movements, the early Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the various resistance groups. The PLO (founded 1964) was an umbrella organisation for resistance groups, trade unions and professional bodies. It grew from the regional Movement of Arab Nationalists (MAN) and from the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah). The MAN later became the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and was part of the PLO which became recognized as the "sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people, by over 100 countries (Hamid 1975; Sayigh 2005). The early PLO, with mass support, included a wide range of civil and resistance groups.

However the resistance constellation changed in 1967 after the Israelis launched pre-emptive attacks on Egypt, Syria and Jordan, capturing the Egyptian Sinai, the Syrian Golan, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. Armed resistance in the occupied territories began almost immediately, but Fatah's failed insurrectionary campaign (Sayigh 2005) led to a regrouping of resistance forces in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. These forces were eventually destroyed by the collaborationist monarchy in Jordan, curtailed in Syria and then driven out of Lebanon by the 1982 Israeli invasion. Egypt, meanwhile, cut a separate "land for peace" deal with the Israelis (Baroud 2017).

With the PLO leadership dispersed, separate resistance currents arose. First there was 'rejectionist' dissent to the Fatah leadership of the PLO; second a grass roots insurrectionary movement or Intifada, with its own leadership (UNLU); and third the new Islamic resistance

groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which gained influence as the PLO leadership, funded by comprador Arab monarchies, was seen as corrupt and drifting towards recognition of the Israeli regime (Sayigh 2005; PASSIA 2014).

In 1988, the second year of the first Intifada, PLO leader Yasser Arafat "announced the PLO's acceptance of UN Resolutions 242 and 338, which granted Israel a window to "secure and recognised boundaries", and allowed it to continue its occupation in strategic parts of the West Bank" (Damen 2022). That was hugely contentious amongst Palestinian communities. Initially, Hamas and Islamic Jihad were seen as more embedded in communities, providing services and directly confronting the colonisers. That is why Hamas, in its early years, enjoyed greater popularity than Fatah (Knudsen 2005).

Here we find a contradiction. While Hamas has been demonised as the 'terrorist' face of Palestinian resistance, the sectarian groups were also given favourable treatment by the Israelis. Former Israeli officials Avner Cohen and David Hacham, point out that, in the 1980s, the Israelis saw Hamas as a 'counterweight' to the PLO and Fatah (Tekuma 2009), especially as "more violence [was] directed by … Muslim Brotherhood [groups] at nationalist Palestinian groups than at the Israeli[s]" (Shadid 1988: 658). In the end the Muslim Brotherhood linked Islamists of Hamas were "treated less harshly than the nationalists" (Shadid 1988: 674-675).

The defining break of the Fatah-led PLO from its community and resistance base can be seen in the Oslo Agreements of the 1990s, which grew from secret talks with the Israelis and culminated in mutual recognition agreements between the Israeli regime and the PLO, leading to a Palestinian National Authority (the PA, also dominated by Fatah).

The Oslo Accords marked the first time Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) formally recognised one another. Many at that time were hopeful, but what followed shows that Israel used the agreements to justify the expansion of illegal settlements in the occupied territories (Damen 2022). The PA was to be a temporary body pending establishment of a Palestinian state (PASSIA 2014: 4-5). At this point we could say that mutual recognition drew the PLO and the PA into a compromised role, distanced from self-determination aims.

The PLO's representative body, the Palestinian National Council (PNC) has never held elections while the PA's Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) has not held elections since 2006, when Hamas won (PASSIA 2014: 3, 5, 8-9; Jeffrey 2006) but, as a non-PLO member which refused to recognise the Israeli regime, Hamas was denied authority within the PA. What appeared to be bureaucratic gains by the PLO did not translate into self-determination gains.

The Palestinian population supports Palestinian institutions but has little faith in the current parties. Polls have shown that more than half (53%) do not trust any political personality (JMCC 2018). Only 46% regarded the PA's performance as good, but 66% saw the need to maintain it (JMCC 2017). In July 2016 Fatah maintained the highest support at 33%, followed by Hamas at 14% and the PFLP on 3.4%. More than a third (36%) said they did not support any faction (JMCC 2016). In other words, a large majority support their nation and their institutions but, in recent times, there has been a crisis of leadership and of participatory democracy.

The growing Israeli colonies on the West Bank have no basis in international law and there is no 'equality before the law' within what is now widely branded as an illegal Apartheid regime (CCHS 2022), so active resistance remains the only real option for advancing Palestinian rights (UNSC 2016).

Yet the Palestinian Authority, through its embedded relations with the Israeli regime, actively represses that resistance. The PA has engaged in repeated crackdowns on political opponents in the West Bank. This is not just factional antagonism but hostility to active resistance. For example the PA has repressed "welcome events" organised around the release of Palestinian prisoners affiliated with the Gaza-based resistance groups, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) (Barakat 2022). In Nablus, where Jewish colonists repeatedly confront Palestinian youth, PA security forces wounded 17 Palestinian residents and killed one "after the arrest of two men, one of them a Hamas operative wanted by Israel" (Al Kassim 2022). Little wonder that many see the PA as doing the dirty work for the Israeli regime.

Palestinian commentary is turning bitterly against the PA. Motasem Dalloul (2022) from Gaza says that "The PA's loyalty is to Israel, not to the Palestinians". Others say that the PA's "concept of popular peaceful resistance is political acquiescence" (Wadi 2023). Conflict between the resistance groups and the PA has grown to the extent that there are fears of a Palestinian civil war (Baroud 2023). In response, the leading comprador Arab regime Saudi Arabia has apparently offered to resume financial aid to the Palestinian Authority (PA) for Israel normalization (Haaretz 2023). Yet the PA's complicity, "while Israel continues to violate Palestinian rights on a daily basis [is said to be sowing] the seeds of another uprising" (Al-Masri 2022).

In other words, while the PA mouths resistance words it acts to protect its own municipal role within the colonial regime, by moving against active resistance. Recognition of "Israel" and the creation of a Palestinian Authority have not translated into gains in terms of self-governance, securing of land and resources or participatory democracy.

A second theme to consider is the rising role of liberal Zionist and liberal Jewish opposition to the current extremist regime governing Apartheid Israel. What are the opportunities and dangers for the Palestinian struggle?

While the resistance is aided by division in the colonist ranks, a key problem for collaboration is that the mostly North American Jewish identity obsession dominates discussion of the Israeli colony; even though this is shifting away from blind loyalty, there is still a search for vindication of the Jewish mission for a 'safe haven' (Burgis 2023). Traditionally, liberal Zionists have held onto the myth of "two states". For example Jerome Segal, founder of the Jewish Peace Lobby, expresses worry over rise of anti-Zionism within liberal Jewish ranks, arguing that "a two-state solution remains the only politically viable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" (Segal 2020). Others are not convinced.

Israeli dissident Gideon Levy (2023) says that the Netanyahu regime has destroyed any possibility of two states and there is already a single [apartheid] state. "Not a single Israeli Prime Minister worked seriously to realize the [two state] solution … even the Oslo Accords turned out to be an empty promise … [we now have] one state with two regimes, a liberal democratic one in Israel, which includes a discriminatory regime towards Palestinian citizens … and a South African style apartheid regime in the West Bank … the struggle [now is] over the nature of the regime in this one state" (Levy 2019). Yet Levy maintains his strong emotional connection to some sort of Israel, as he demonstrated when writing on the 67 things he "loves about Israel", on the 70th anniversary of the colony (Levy 2018).

We see a similar dilemma for the dissident liberal Zionist Peter Beinart, once a prominent 'two stater' who also now rejects apartheid and speaks of a single state (Segal 2020), even calling for a right of return for Palestinian refugees, an important issue which goes beyond equal citizenship. Beinart argues that Zionism does not require an independent Jewish state, that the notion of a

Jewish state has become “morally indefensible” (Shalev 2020) and that it is not possible to counter anti-Semitism while practising anti-Palestinian racism (Beinart 2020). But he still looks for a Jewish way to tell this story (Wallace-Wells 2021), begging the question, what does a single democratic state mean to former liberal Zionists?

The more practical problem for Palestinians is seen in several Israeli based “peace” initiatives which stress “reconciliation” on terms favourable to the colonisers. One prominent such initiative is the “Two States, One Homeland initiative” (LFA 2023), which is a modified version of “two states” with some idealistic features and the participation of some Palestinian people, to make it seem to be ‘even handed’. Key themes are peace and reconciliation. However this ‘two states one homeland’ notion is driven by liberal Zionists with a mission to continue their dream of a nicer, kinder Israel, and little recognition of the colonial racism that has driven the present vicious reality. First the model makes a moral equivalence between the colonial myth of a Greater Israel and the indigenous nation of Palestine. Second, an idealistic, liberal notion of “open borders” is used to legitimise “Jewish ties” to various settlement areas (Hebron, Nablus and Bethlehem) of the West Bank. This shows a commitment to justifying the land theft of recent decades. The idea of allowing full citizenship in the area designated as “Israel” may even be genuine, but does not reckon with the vicious racism which has so far denied equal rights. In short, this is a variant of the ‘two states’ myth which speaks of “equal partnership” and “reconciliation”, while seeking to preserve the colonial incursions and land theft which have made such equality impossible. The reconciliation will be one of Palestinians reconciling themselves to colonial privilege, in exchange for some ‘pie in the sky’ promises.

4. Conclusion: on the colonisation of “self-determination”

Both Aboriginal Australia and Palestine have examples of community controlled organization, the creation of self-governance structures compatible with the post-colonial ideal of self-determination. This self-determination can occur even under colonised rule and while a greater struggle is afoot. However the degeneration of these self-governance structures into bureaucratic advisory bodies, or municipal appendages of the colonial state, has subverted self-governance and done nothing for the preservation or reclaiming of sovereign land and resources.

The experience of Palestine shows that an obsession with ‘recognition’ by the colonial regime can lead to the illusion of an advance, without even slowing the pace of dispossession. Similarly in Australia, the project of embedding an advisory body into an explicitly colonial, anti-democratic constitution always ran the risk of recognising and lending greater legitimacy to the colonial regime. If there were to be an embedded advisory body it would most likely function as a shield and lightning rod for the regime, disarming the force of actual community based demands for land rights and justice.

In both cases, measures to add legitimacy to the colonial regime in the name of limited self-governance, or providing a ‘voice’ to indigenous communities, demonstrate colonial skill in capturing popular notions. In Australia the colonization of these powerful ideas has been through ‘bait and switch’ tactics, where the powerful idea is held out but then substituted for a poor compromise mechanism. Similarly, in Palestine, the idea of a Palestinian nation-state, or at least the path towards one, has been substituted for a municipal authority with very limited functions but which serves to assist Israeli control of ongoing dispossession.

Reconciliation is often held out as a way forward, and out of conflict, but great care must be taken to see that this is not principally an acceptance of colonial dispossession. Even verbal recognition of prior ownership or custodianship (as in the Australian rituals of ‘Welcome to

Country') may amount to nothing if the colonial regime is allowed to consolidated 'extinguishment' of actual prior ownership. Reconciliation is not justice.

Given the colonial skill in coopting terms of liberation there should be eternal vigilance over any new recontraction of indigenous rights to ensure that the mechanisms are measured against the key elements of self-determination: their contributions to self-governance, resource sovereignty and participatory democracy; effectively economic and political independence.

Bibliography

Abunimah, Ali (2010) 'Reclaiming Self Determination', Al Shabaka, May, pp.1-8, online: https://al-shabaka.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/reclaiming-self-determination.pdf

AEC (2023) 'Your official referendum 2023 pamphlet', online: https://www.aec.gov.au/referendums/files/pamphlet/your-official-yes-no-referendum-pamphlet.pdf

Al Kassim, Mohammad (2022) 'West Bank Violence Is Prelude to Uprising Against PA, Expert Says', The Media Line, 20 September, online: https://themedialine.org/top-stories/west-bank-violence-is-prelude-to-uprising-against-pa-expert-says/

Alexander, Alison (2006) Aboriginal Land Rights, The Companion to Tasmanian History, online: https://www.utas.edu.au/library/companion_to_tasmanian_history/A/Aboriginal%20land%20rights.htm

Al-Masri, Hani (2022) 'How the Palestinian Authority became a prisoner of its own illusions', Middle East Eye, 5 January, online: https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/palestinian-authority-prisoner-own-illusion-how

Anthony, Thaila and Harry Blagg (2020) 'Enforcing assimilation, dismantling Aboriginal families: a history of police violence in Australia', The Conversation, 19 June, online: https://theconversation.com/enforcing-assimilation-dismantling-aboriginal-families-a-history-of-police-violence-in-australia-140637

Barakat, Jehad (2022) 'Why is the Palestinian Authority cracking down on opposition?' Al Jazeera, 25 January, online: https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/1/25/analysis-palestinian-authority-cracking-down-on-opposition

Baroud, Ramzy (2017) 'How a missing 'the' enabled Israeli occupation', Al Jazeera, 21 November, online: https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2017/11/21/how-a-missing-the-enabled-israeli-occupation

Baroud, Ramzy (2023) 'The Resistance vs. the Palestinian Authority: Will Abbas Lead Palestinians to Civil War?' Palestine Chronicle, 19 July, online: https://www.palestinechronicle.com/the-resistance-vs-the-palestinian-authority-will-abbas-lead-palestinians-to-civil-war/

Beinart, Peter (2020) 'I No Longer Believe in a Jewish State', New York Times, 8 July, online: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/opinion/israel-annexation-two-state-solution.html

Burgis, Ben (2023) 'Israelism Is a Powerful Indictment of Pro-Apartheid Indoctrination', Jacobin, 22 June, online: https://jacobin.com/2023/06/israelism-documentary-pro-apartheid-indoctrination-israeli-occupation-palestine

Butler, Dan (2023a) 'Here are the four areas Linda Burney wants the Voice to focus on', SBS, 5 July, online: https://www.sbs.com.au/nitv/article/here-are-the-four-areas-linda-burney-wants-the-voice-to-focus-on/0piw5lrh6

Butler, Dan (2023b) 'The Blak Sovereign Movement have said No to the Voice. Here's what they want instead', NITV, 10 July, online: https://www.sbs.com.au/nitv/article/lidia-thorpe-has-declared-her-opposition-to-the-voice-shes-calling-for-blak-sovereignty-instead/8re90yy67
Butler, Dan and Finn McHugh (2023) 'Lidia Thorpe is calling for the referendum to be scrapped', NITV, 16 August, online: https://www.sbs.com.au/nitv/article/genocide-and-invasion-lidia-thorpe-says-voice-will-be-powerless-to-change-ongoing-disadvantage/3j7upimxo
CCHS (2022) SIX (6) important reports on Israeli Apartheid, Centre for Counter Hegemonic Studies, online: https://counter-hegemonic-studies.site/israeli-apartheid-6/
CLC (2012) 'The History of the Land Rights Act', Central Lands Council, 17 March, online: http://www.clc.org.au/articles/info/the-history-of-the-land-rights-act/
CLC (2021) 'Native Title Made Simple', Central lands Council, March online: https://www.clc.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/CLC-Native-Title-made-simple.pdf
Comm Aust (1989) 'Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act', No. 150 of 1989, online: http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdb/au/legis/cth/num_act/aatsica1989478/
Dalloul, Motasem A (2022) 'The PA's loyalty is to Israel, not the Palestinians', Middle East Monitor, 12 September, online: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220912-the-pas-loyalty-is-to-israel-not-the-palestinians/
Damen, Rawan (2022) 'The Price of Oslo', Palestine Remix, Al Jazeera, online: https://remix.aljazeera.com/aje/PalestineRemix/the-price-of-oslo.html#/14
Danspeckgruber, Wolfgang F. (2002). The Self-Determination of Peoples: Community, Nation, and State in an Interdependent World. Lynne Rienner
Essa, Azad and Gofran Mohamad (2021) Peter Beinart: Why I no longer believe in a Jewish state', Middle East Eye, 23 June, online: https://www.middleeasteye.net/video/peter-bienart-why-i-no-longer-believe-jewish-state
Fitzsimmons, Caitlin (2023) 'Before the Voice: Political posturing and failed ambition', Sydney Morning Herald, 22 January, online: https://www.smh.com.au/national/before-the-voice-political-posturing-and-failed-ambition-20221213-p5c607.html
Foley, Gary (1991) Redfern Aboriginal Medical Service 1971-1991: twenty years of community service. Aboriginal Medical Service Co-operative, Redfern, New South Wales, online: https://vuir.vu.edu.au/27033/1/Redfern%20Aboriginal%20Medical%20Service%201971-1991.pdf
Foley, Gary (1999) 'Whiteness and Blackness in the Koori Struggle for Self-Determination', online: KooriWeb, online: https://www.gooriweb.org/essays/pdf_essays/whiteness%20and%20blackness%20in%20the%20koori%20struggle.pdf
Foley, Gary (1999a) 'Native Title is not Land Rights and Reconciliation is not justice', VU Research Repository, July, online: https://vuir.vu.edu.au/27499/1/Native%20Title%20is%20not%20Land%20Rights%20and%20reconciliation%20is%20not%20justice%201999.pdf
Foley, Gary (2001) 'Black Power in Redfern 1968 – 1972', Koori Web, 5 October, online: http://www.kooriweb.org/foley/essays/pdf_essays/black%20power%20in%20redfern%201968.pdf
Foley, Gary (2013) 'How Bob Hawke Killed Land Rights', Tracker, January, online: http://www.kooriweb.org/foley/essays/tracker/tracker19.html
Fredericks, Bronwyn; Joanne Luke and Allan Brown (2011) 'Victorian Aboriginal Health Service: revitalising Health for All Project, Lowitja Institute, online: https://www.lowitja.org.au/content/Document/Teasdale_Corti_VAHS_posterJune2011.pdf
Foley, Gary (2023) 'The National Aboriginal Consultative Committee (NACC) 1973 – 1977', The Koori History Website, online: http://www.kooriweb.org/foley/images/history/1970s/nacc74/naccdx.html

Foley, Gary and Tim Anderson (2006) 'Land Rights and Aboriginal Voices', *Australian Journal of Human Rights*, Vol 12(1), pp.83-108, online: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AJHR/2006/5.pdf
Gouraige, G.J. Eddy (1975) The United Nations and Decolonization, The Black Scholar, Vol. 5, No. 7, AFRICAN LIBERATION (April 1974), pp. 16-23 (8 pages), Taylor & Francis
Haaretz (2023) Report: Saudi Arabia Offers to Resume Palestinian Aid to Smooth Normalization With Israel', 30 August, online: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-08-30/ty-article/report-saudi-arabia-offers-to-resume-palestinian-aid-to-smooth-normalization-with-israel/0000018a-430f-d435-a59e-cfef8c590000
Hamid, Rashid (1975) 'What is the PLO?' Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Summer, 1975), pp. 90-109 (20 pages)
Helm, Sarah (1993) 'Settlements mushroom despite Rabin's pledge: Israeli building projects in the occupied territories boom in defiance of the US', The Independent, 18 March, online: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/settlements-mushroom-despite-rabin-s-pledge-israeli-building-projects-in-the-occupied-territories-boom-in-defiance-of-the-us-1498355.html
Ho, Cason (2023) 'Aboriginal elder and advocates fear lack of information about Indigenous Voice to Parliament', ABC News, 6 July, online: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-07-06/voice-referendum-lack-of-information/102560934
HRC (1984) General Comment 12, Article 1 (Twenty-first session, 1984) (on the right to self-determination), online: http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/gencomm/hrcom12.htm
Jeffrey, Simon (2006) 'Hamas celebrates election victory', The Guardian, 27 January, online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jan/26/israel1
JMCC (2016) 'Poll No. 87 - July 2016 - Local Elections & Stalled Negotiations', Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre, 26 July, online: http://www.jmcc.org/documentsandmaps.aspx?id=872
JMCC (2017) 'Poll No. 90 - Trump, the Peace Process & Elections', Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre', 6 September, online: http://www.jmcc.org/documentsandmaps.aspx?id=875
JMCC (2018) 'Poll No. 91 - Trump's Jerusalem Decision & Freedom of Expression', Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre, 24 February, online: http://www.jmcc.org/documentsandmaps.aspx?id=878
Johnston, Elliot (1991) National Report: Volume 4, Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, online: https://webarchive.nla.gov.au/awa/20070524232148/http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/71989/20070524-0000/www.austlii.edu.au/au/special/rsjproject/rsjlibrary/rciadic/national/vol4/index.html
Khrushchev, Nikita (1960) 'Nikita Khrushchev Urges End to Colonialism', 1 January, online: https://www.unmultimedia.org/classics/asset/C809/C809/
Knudsen, Are (2005) Crescent and Sword: The Hamas enigma, Third World Quarterly, 26:8, 1373-1388, DOI: 10.1080/01436590500336898
Land, Clare (2005) Decolonizing Solidarity, Zed Books, London
Levy, Gideon (2018) Sixty Seven things Gideon Levy loves about Israel, Haaretz, 25 April, online: https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2018-04-25/ty-article-magazine/.premium/gideon-levy-finds-67-things-he-loves-about-israel/0000017f-f64e-d318-afff-f76f98570000
Levy, Gideon (2019) 'One state, two nations', Palestine Israel Journal, Vol 24 No 1, online: https://www.pij.org/articles/1906/one-state-two-nations
Levy, Gideon (2023) 'Kaplan street must realise there's no longer such thing as the occupation, it's already one state', Haaretz, 13 August, online: https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2023-08-13/ty-article-opinion/.premium/kaplan-st-must-realize-theres-no-longer-such-thing-as-occupation-its-already-one-state/00000189-eaf4-d9cf-a7eb-fbffb9080000

LFA (2023) ‘A Land for All: from conflict to reconciliation’, online: https://www.alandforall.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/booklet-english.pdf
Lucas, Cade (2023) ‘Speaking out: Gary Foley lends his voice to the Indigenous community opposing the Voice’, Umbrella, 29 January, online: https://umbrellanews.com.au/featured/2023/01/speaking-out-gary-foley-lends-his-voice-to-the-indigenous-community-opposing-the-voice/
Mayo, Thomas and Kerry O’Brien (2023) The Voice to Parliament Handbook, Hardie Grant, Melbourne
McGuiness, Bruce; and Allan Brown (c1973) Koori Kollij: Politics of Health, First Term, VUIR, online: https://vuir.vu.edu.au/26833/1/Koori%20Kollij%20Politics%20of%20health%201%20synopsis%20-%20Copy.pdf
McHugh, Finn (2023) ‘'Window dressing': Lidia Thorpe's Blak Sovereign Movement releases its own Voice pamphlet’, SBS News, 20 July, online: https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/window-dressing-lidia-thorpes-blak-sovereign-movement-releases-their-own-voice-pamphlet/w8e9dxg6t
Menon, Praveen (2023) ‘Indigenous people opposing Australia's Voice referendum’, Reuters, 11 May, online: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indigenous-people-opposing-australias-voice-referendum-2023-05-11/
Ofran, Hagit (2020) ‘The puzzle of Rabin, Oslo and the settlements’, Times of Israel, 9 November, online: https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/rabin-oslo-and-the-settlements/
Ogram, Peter (1995) ‘Settlement Expansion, MERIP, July-August, online: https://merip.org/1995/07/settlement-expansion/
PASSIA (2014) ‘PLO vs PA’, Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, Jerusalem, September, online: http://passia.org/media/filer_public/8a/e7/8ae7c030-ac1d-4688-b3f4-606fbd50cd41/pa-plo2.pdf
Palestine Chronicle (2023) ‘Outrage over Palestinian Authority’s Attack on Funeral in Nablus’, 29 March, online: https://www.palestinechronicle.com/outrage-over-palestinian-authoritys-attack-on-funeral-in-nablus-video/
Pratt, Angela and Scott Bennett (2004) ‘The end of ATSIC and the future administration of Indigenous affairs’, Parliamentary Library, Canberra, Current Issues Brief, No. 4 2004–05, online: https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/FXED6/upload_binary/fxed68.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search="library/prspub/FXED6"
RA (2023) ‘Acknowledgement of Country and Welcome to Country’, Reconciliation Australia, online: https://www.reconciliation.org.au/reconciliation/acknowledgement-of-country-and-welcome-to-country/
Ravlic, Tom (2023) ‘Voice is ‘an enhancement’ to government, advises solicitor-general’, The Mandarin, 21 April, online: https://www.themandarin.com.au/218165-voice-is-an-enhancement-to-government-advises-solicitor-general/
Reus-Smit, Christian (2011) Struggles for Individual Rights and the Expansion of the International System’’, 14 April, Cambridge University Press, pp. 207 – 242, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818311000038
Sanders, Will (2002) ‘Towards an Indigenous Order of Australian Government: rethinking self-determination as Indigenous affairs policy’, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, No 230/2002, online: https://caepr.cass.anu.edu.au/research/publications/towards-indigenous-order-australian-government-rethinking-self-determination
Sanders, W; J. Taylor and K. Ross (2000) ‘’Participation and representation in ATSIC elections: a ten-year perspective, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, ANU, Discussion paper 198, online: https://caepr.cass.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/docs/2000_DP198_0.pdf

Sayigh, Yezid (2005) 'The PLO and the Palestinian Armed Struggle', Arab-Israeli Relations, 1917-1970: The Middle East Online, Series 1, Cengage Learning, online: https://www.gale.com/binaries/content/assets/au-resources-in-product/arab-israeli-essay_sayigh_the.pdf
Scott, Geoff (2017) 'The Uluru Statement from the Heart', The Uluru Dialogue, online: https://ulurustatemdev.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/UluruStatementfromtheHeartPLAINTEXT.pdf
Segal, Jerome (2020) Oslo Is Dead, the Two-State Solution Isn't'', Foreign Policy, 7 August, online: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/07/oslo-is-dead-the-two-state-solution-isnt/
Shadid, Mohammed K. (1988) 'The Muslim Brotherhood Movement in the West Bank and Gaza', Third World Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2, Islam & Politics (Apr., 1988), pp. 658-682
Shalev, Chemi (2020) 'Peter Beinart Proclaims He's Still a Zionist, Though He No Longer Believes in a Jewish State', Haaretz, 22 July, online: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2020-07-22/ty-article/.premium/peter-beinart-on-why-hes-a-zionist-despite-abandoning-concept-of-jewish-state/0000017f-db15-df9c-a17f-ff1dabdf0000
Smith, Linda (2008) Decolonising methodologies, Zed Books, New York
TAC (2023) 'Stand for Or land, Tasmanian Aboriginal Centre, online: https://tacinc.com.au/stand-for-our-land/
Tekuma, Moshav (2009) 'How Israel Helped to Spawn Hamas', The Wall Street Journal, 24 January, online: http://web.archive.org/web/20090926212507/http:/online.wsj.com/article/SB123275572295011847.html
UN (1960) YearBook 1960, Chapter V, online: https://www.un-ilibrary.org/content/books/9789210602099/read
United Nations (1945) 'United Nations Charter', 26 June, online: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text
UNGA (1960a) Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1514 (XV), General Assembly Fifteenth Session, online: https://daccess-ods.un.org/tmp/7409735.3219986.html
UNGA (1960b) 'Principles which should guide Members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73 e of the Charter', 1541 (XV), 15 December, online: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/206178
UNGA (1960a) 'Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples', General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), 14 December, UNHCHR, online: https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/declaration-granting-independence-colonial-countries-and-peoples
UNGA (1960b) 'Principles which should guide Members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73 e of the Charter', RefWorld, A/RES/1541, 15 December, online: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f0654c.html
UNSC (2016) 'Israel's Settlements Have No Legal Validity, Constitute Flagrant Violation of International Law, Security Council Reaffirms: 14 Delegations in Favour of Resolution 2334 (2016) as United States Abstains', UN Security Council, SC/12657, online: https://press.un.org/en/2016/sc12657.doc.htm
Visentin, Lisa (2022) 'Reconciliation will be 'damaged' if Voice fails: Burney', Sydney Morning Herald, 20 November, online: https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/reconciliation-will-be-damaged-if-voice-fails-burney-20221117-p5bz8i.html
Wadi, Ramona (2023) 'The PA's concept of popular peaceful resistance is political acquiescence', Middle East Monitor, 29 August, online: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230829-the-pas-concept-of-popular-peaceful-resistance-is-political-acquiescence/

Wallace-Wells, Benjamin (2021) ‘A liberal zionist’s move to the left on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’, The New Yorker, 23 May, online: https://www.newyorker.com/news/annals-of-populism/a-liberal-zionists-move-to-the-left-on-the-israeli-palestinian-conflict
Wolfe, Patrick (2006) ‘Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native’, Journal of Genocide Research, 8:4, 387-409, DOI: 10.1080/14623520601056240